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Art. 1.—THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF M. THIERS.

THE private papers which M. Thiers bequeathed to his sister-in-law, Mademoiselle Félicie Dosne, were handed by her to the Bibliothèque Nationale, on the understanding that they were not to be accessible to the public until ten years after her death. I was able to examine these papers last year, and I have since published important extracts from them in some of the Paris newspapers, such as the 'Journal des Débats' and the 'Temps,' and in some of the French reviews. I am now preparing for publication a special study of these papers, which I believe will be found to contain matter of the highest interest to the historical student.

The legacy of Mademoiselle Dosne comprises twenty-seven volumes of original letters of various kinds, and over fifty other volumes in which are included many documents, the greater part of which have already been made known to the public, being included either in a collection of extracts made under the direction of the donor and published in five volumes for private circulation among her friends, or in official documents or in certain special works, like M. Doniol's 'La Libération du Territoire.' The documents to which I refer deal with M. Thiers' diplomatic tour through Europe in 1870, to the evacuation of French territory, to the commercial negotiations with England, to the return to France of our military prisoners, to the reconstitution of our finances, to the reorganisation of the Army, to the defence of Paris against the Germans, to the second siege of Paris during the Commune, and other matters.

I propose in this article to present to the readers of  
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the 'Quarterly Review' a number of unpublished extracts from the correspondence of M. Thiers, while at the same time retracing the personal characteristics of this illustrious statesman and briefly recalling the salient events in the life of an historic personage whom I had the privilege of observing at close range during the period when I filled the office of Keeper of the Records of the Assemblée Nationale at Bordeaux and at Versailles.

The portrait of Thiers made long ago by Lamartine still remains the most faithful of all :

'He was,' Lamartine wrote, 'a little man, naturally well-knit, active, perfectly poised in every member, as if he were always ready for action, the head well balanced on the neck, the face stamped as that of a man of varied capabilities, the eyes clear, the mouth firm, the smile shrewd, the hands short but well formed and ever open, as in those who, according to the common expression, carry their hearts in their hands. The common herd might have considered the physiognomy of Thiers plain, or even ugly, but for my own part this mistake was impossible. It was an instance of intellectual beauty of features forcing a rebellious body to express the splendour of the mind. The mind of Thiers, like his body, was perfectly poised in all its aspects, vigorous and active. He was, perhaps, as a Southerner, a little too much inclined to assert himself. Modesty is either a northern virtue, or the fine flower of one's education. He was the first to speak, and the last; he scarcely listened to what other people had to say, but he spoke with such precision, such assurance and such a fertility of ideas that one willingly forgave him his volubility. . . . His phrases, moreover, were neither pretentious nor eloquent; they welled smoothly from his mind and his heart.'

Such is the portrait of Thiers which Lamartine drew in 1846. Astonishing as it may appear, this portrait needs very little retouching to-day. My recollection of M. Thiers is as he is marvellously presented in the celebrated portrait by Léon Bonnat—the hair short and clustered in a little tuft on the top of the head, the face clean-shaven, the forehead broad and almost without a wrinkle, while between the well-curved eyebrows were two deeply-cut furrows strongly characteristic of will and obstinacy; the eyes *malicieux* and alert, twinkling behind gold eye-glasses; the nose slightly curved and



inclined towards the mocking lips; the chin firm, and resting on a stiff collar; the figure comfortably enclosed in a well-fitting frockcoat, while the small but plump hands indicated a peculiar strength and energy. I seem still to hear his clear, distinct, precise voice, his full-toned accent, which nevertheless had nothing of the South about it, his persuasive and commanding style. I can still recall that natural eloquence, full of logic, of balance and good sense, of shrewdness and scholarship, and the wonderful charm which it produced upon the most refractory auditors.

The astonishing fact for those who are able to recollect the events of the war of 1870, the Commune, the Peace of Frankfort and the liberation of the territory, is that Thiers, for over two years, as reorganiser and master, in the midst of unexampled difficulties, directed the highly complicated affairs of France and marched triumphantly over apparently insurmountable obstacles, after having had to combat the incessant demands and bad faith of the foreigner, the violence and the crimes of insurgents at home, the multiple and irreconcilable exigencies of political parties—a redoubtable host of adversaries, in short, both at home and abroad. Though seventy-four years old, he dominated the natural fatigue of old age by a vivacity, a versatility and a strength of soul and mind and body that were without parallel.

In the course of the almost unknown address which was prepared by Emile Ollivier for the reception at the Académie Française of the historian Henri Martin as the successor to the *fauteuil* of Thiers—the delivery of which, by the way, the Academy, on May 29, 1878, decided to postpone, on the ground that, in their opinion, it appeared likely to reflect on the memory of the illustrious statesman—there is to be found a very accurate portrait of Thiers and a brilliant appreciation of his oratorical style which reveals a master-hand.

‘Those who had not previously listened to the wonderful eloquence of M. Thiers,’ wrote Emile Ollivier, ‘experienced at first a slight feeling of disappointment. He possessed, as a matter of fact, none of those outward advantages to which so many celebrated orators have owed an appreciable part of their success. His brain was remarkably well equipped,

as a result of his insatiable curiosity; the eye sparkling with a luminous vivacity, the lip whimsical and firm, the features full of expression and glowing with intelligence. Owing to his small stature, barely half his figure could be seen above the front of the rostrum. His voice, which was lacking in musical tones, was incapable of grave or pathetic inflexions, and at the outset one had some difficulty in catching his words. This first impression, however, was soon dissipated, as the enchanter rapidly brought his seductive powers into action. He never attempted any of those powerful appeals to the feelings which carry hearers away and leave them breathless with emotion. His method was rather to lead up to his point by a series of small but effective efforts, made with rapidity and precision. There was no attempt at formal oratory during the opening passages of his speeches, which at first took rather the form of delightful *causeries*, sprinkled with witty touches which pleased by expressing all that is the most intelligent, the most sprightly and the most Attic in the French language. Little by little, however, the speech took a broader development; repetitions became less frequent and the style more impressive. A suffused fervour animated, carried along and impelled the reasoning. The voice became vibrant, the gestures dominating, and the *causeur* was transformed into an alluring orator who swept his hearers off their feet.'

This portrait is entirely lifelike if one adds the essential fact that Thiers, when carried away by the greatness and importance of his subject, had the gift of suddenly calling up moving recollections, daring phrases, forceful expressions, solemn accents, original and pathetic exclamations and unexpected touches calculated to reach the most unimpressionable minds and hearts. Thus I remember and shall ever remember the sittings of the Corps Législatif in July and August 1870, in which Thiers had to struggle against the unrestrained passions of a furious majority, and where, almost single-handed, he revealed the awful perils into which a war, for which the country was badly prepared, was about to precipitate France. I can still see him at the tribune, dominating by his voice, become vibrant as a trumpet, the violent objurgations of Clément Duvernois, Jérôme David and Cassagnac. He unveiled the perfidy of Bismarck, and deplored the fact that, above all others, the Premier and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Emile Ollivier and the Duc de Gramont, had not known how to profit, as they might and ought to have done, from the fraud committed by the German Chancellor in his reproduction of the famous Ems telegram.

I heard Thiers afterwards at Bordeaux and at Versailles—at Bordeaux, when he secured the voting of the unhappy preliminaries of peace and the adoption, under the form of a celebrated pact, of a policy of patience, opportunism and reconstruction which had been so impatiently demanded and awaited; then at Versailles, when he subdued the fury of the Commune, concluded peace, restored the credit of France, and liberated the territory. On more than one occasion he showed himself superior to the most highly reputed debaters; and he imposed upon a jealous and sometimes unmanageable Chamber the authority of a firm, tolerant, far-seeing and wise policy, based upon an experience which very few statesmen could claim. His most irreconcilable opponent, Emile Ollivier, felt himself compelled to praise Thiers in these terms:

‘No impartial judge could refuse to admire this indefatigable old man, constantly at work both by day and by night, passing from Cabinet Councils to the tribune in the Chamber, from there to the battlefield itself, and thence to conferences with our implacable enemy, using up the last remnants of his life in wresting back our territory from the foreigner and our capital from anarchy.’

Such was the man whose posthumous records I have despoiled with all the respect and care which they deserve. In these papers is revealed the whole history of the period from 1830 to 1877, clothed with a new life and invested with what I may characterise as real actuality. If it were necessary to set forth here everything in these papers that appears to me to be of interest to the reader, several complete numbers of this review would have to be devoted to the purpose. I cannot, in the space at my command, publish more than a few of the more important extracts; and, in order that these may produce their fullest effect, I shall incorporate them in a sketch of the varied and active career of the man who, first for ten years, under the Monarchy of July, and afterwards for nearly three, at the outset of the

Third Republic, directed the affairs of France. In this brief summary of the life of Thiers I have made no attempt to introduce any fresh matter, except in the form of extracts from hitherto unpublished private papers to which I have had access, together with a few reflections which his long years of devoted service to France as deputy, Minister, head of the State, writer, historian and thinker have inspired.

Louis Adolphe Thiers was born at Marseilles, on April 15, 1797, of a family of merchants who had been ruined by the Revolution. Towards those who were responsible for that great upheaval, however, he entertained no feelings of bitterness, for his first historical work was to a great extent devoted to a eulogy of their acts. In 1806 he won an exhibition at the lycée at Marseilles, and became imbued with a love for the army and military matters in general, under the inspiration of the drum with which the classes were opened and closed. It is surprising, indeed, that he did not decide to follow as a career a profession for which he believed himself to have been created. His small stature was certainly, in his own opinion, no insuperable obstacle, for he was in the habit of reminding people that the great Napoleon himself was only 5 ft 3½ in. in height. His family, however, wished him to enter the legal profession; and he went to Aix to read law with Mignet, who became and ever remained his closest friend. Gifted with a genuine passion for letters, he competed at the Aix Lycée for a prize offered for the best essay in the form of an eulogy of Vauvenargues. He sent in two papers, one from Paris and the other from Aix itself, and by this means was twice awarded the prize which, owing to some stupid prejudice, he had been at first refused.

He soon left Aix with Mignet for Paris, and settled with his companion in an attic in the Passage Montesquieu. Mignet secured a post on the staff of the 'Courrier Français,' and Thiers on that of the 'Constitutionnel,' then under the editorship of Etienne. He there served his apprenticeship as a publicist and at the same time as an art critic. I have read his criticisms on the Salons of 1822 and 1824, one of which appeared in the 'Constitutionnel' and the other in the 'Globe'; and I know of few

critics of the present day who are endowed with so much conscientiousness and talent. In 1823 he began his 'History of the Revolution,' which he fashioned into a weapon against the Government of the Restoration. This work, although quite forgotten to-day, is still worthy of perusal. The fault of the book is that the author—who was, of course, at that period still very young—completed his earlier chapters without taking sufficient trouble in consulting the sources of information that were available to him—a fault which he carefully avoided in his subsequent work on 'The Consulate and the Empire.' He certainly showed greater care in the later chapters, and armed himself by drawing on such authorities as Jomini and Baron Louis. Nevertheless he drew upon himself criticisms, which were both just and severe, for having been, like Lamartine, too indulgent in his judgments on certain men of the Revolution and their actions. He did not flatter 'la vile multitude,' however, and he subsequently justified this strong epithet by the following letter which he addressed to a Parisian publicist named Paultre, who had questioned him on the subject:\*

'MONSIEUR,

'Je suis si occupé en ce moment que je ne puis que vous répondre un seul mot. Je n'ai pas maintenant à ma disposition le passage dont il s'agit, mais le sens que vous donnez au mot "vile multitude" est le vrai. Je n'ai pas entendu parler du bon peuple, de celui qui travaille, soigne sa famille, sert le pays et respecte les lois et l'humanité. J'ai voulu parler de cette partie du peuple que tout honnête homme doit réprouver, et qui égorgeait dans les prisons de Septembre, et traînait à l'échafaud le vertueux Bailly. De même qu'il y a le bon et le mauvais riche, il y a le bon et le mauvais peuple, qui heureusement est de beaucoup le moins nombreux.

'Voilà l'explication d'un mot dont je ne retire rien que la fausse application qu'on en veut faire pour servir la cause du Gouvernement personnel contre moi qui n'ai cessé de le combattre. Recevez mes salutations très affectueuses.

'A. THIERS.

'21 Mai, 1869.'

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\* Written in M. Thiers' own hand and endorsed 'Réponse sur "La vile multitude."'

Jules Simon, notwithstanding his deep affection for Thiers, did not hesitate to criticise him in eloquent terms for having rather too much partiality for the Mountain and for the *audace* of Danton, which led him sometimes to appear to take the side of popular might against the right. If, in his work on the Revolution, he exaggerates the splendours of that tremendous epoch, it may be said for Thiers that he wished, under the Restoration, only to revive the reforming spirit of the *cahiers* and to propagate what Napoleon himself termed 'the truths of the Revolution.' In thus eulogising a period which, although signalised by magnificent actions, was also stained by many deplorable deeds, Thiers is to be excused on the ground of his youth—he was only twenty-six—and because of the opposition which he offered to the Royalists, the implacable enemies of the Girondins.

In 1826 M. Thiers, who had prepared himself very thoroughly for his future career, was able to demonstrate to the financial world of that day, in his book 'La Banque de Law,' that he had a sound knowledge of political and social economy. In this excellent book he explained admirably the working of the deplorable system which had afflicted and compromised the latter part of the reign of Louis XV, already darkened by so many faults of weakness and blundering. The advent of the Polignac Ministry induced him to throw himself into the political arena. On Jan. 1, 1830, with Armand, Carrel and Mignet, he started the 'National'; and from the 9th of the following June onwards he foresaw the probable accession to power of the Duke of Orléans. On July 29 he drafted the Orleanist proclamation, and on the following day he contributed more than any other person to the formation of the Government of July, which gave to France a representative monarchy, a constitutional king, two Chambers and a majority strong enough to command respect.

In this connexion I may give a hitherto unpublished extract from a statement which Thiers himself dictated to his secretary, M. Martin, on returning from his visit to Neuilly, whither he had gone to offer the Crown to the Duke of Orléans.

The day preceding that on which the deputies decided to bestow the Lieutenancy-General upon this prince,



pending the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, M. Thiers was deputed by M. Laffitte and General Sébastiani to go to the Duke's residence at Neuilly. He carried as credentials a simple sheet of paper bearing the signature of the General and the following note from M. Laffitte:

'I beg Monsieur le Duc d'Orléans to hear M. Thiers with the fullest confidence and to listen to what I have asked him to say on my behalf.'

M. Thiers left immediately on horseback, accompanied by M. Schefer *ainé* and M. Chaulieu, an officer of the Garde Nationale. After surmounting many difficulties placed in his way by the various military posts on the road, Thiers reached the Parc de Neuilly before the close of the morning. The Duke of Orléans had gone out. Thiers stated that his errand was important, and he was received by the Duchess, Madame Adélaïde and Madame de Montjoie being also present. The conversation was animated. The fears that had been inspired by the events in Paris, the scruples raised as a consequence of the offer Thiers had come to make, were of a kind to impress all four parties to the interview. The following extracts are taken from notes of the conversation dictated by Thiers to his secretary later on the same day.

'Madame Adélaïde dit à M. Thiers que la famille d'Orléans partageait tous les sentiments des Parisiens; qu'elle n'avait cessé d'être avec eux de l'opposition; qu'elle associait tous ses vœux aux leurs, mais qu'il fallait prendre garde, en se hâtant trop tôt de changer de dynastie, de donner à la révolution le caractère d'une révolution de Palais. L'Europe, disait Madame Adélaïde, est capable de s'y tromper et de croire qu'une intrigue du Duc d'Orléans a renversé Charles X, tandis que c'est la conscience politique qui l'a renversé. Si à tous les dangers que peuvent faire courir encore à la cause libérale les troupes de Charles X et la Vendée, venait se joindre l'Europe, la cause de la liberté serait perdue.

'Permettez-moi, Madame, répondit M. Thiers, de vous faire encore apprécier la situation de la France. Nous voulons la monarchie représentative. Il nous faut une dynastie nouvelle *qui nous doive la Couronne*, et qui, nous la devant, se résigne au rôle que le système représentatif lui assigne. Tout



le monde saura bien que vous n'avez pas recherché la Couronne, car certes elle est assez périlleuse aujourd'hui pour qu'on ne l'ambitionne pas. . . . Que le Duc d'Orléans vienne aujourd'hui au milieu de Paris déclarer qu'il se rallie à la Révolution, qu'il veut partager tous les dangers des Français et se mettre à leur tête, et il aura fait sa part dans la révolution de Juillet. Il ne faut pas vous dissimuler qu'il y a peut-être encore de grands périls à braver; que Charles X est à Saint-Cloud et qu'il a encore des ressources. Mais il vous faut des périls. Ce seront là des titres à la Couronne. Décidez-vous! Que le Duc d'Orléans se décide! Il ne faut pas laisser flotter les destinées de la France!

Madame Adélaïde se leva et répondit à M. Thiers: "Si vous croyez que l'adhésion de notre famille puisse être utile à la Révolution, nous vous la donnons bien volontiers. Une femme n'est rien dans une famille; on peut la compromettre. Je suis prête à me rendre à Paris."

"Mais prenez y garde [repliqua M. Thiers]. Tous les esprits sont loin de se renfermer dans les mêmes bornes. Il y en a qui s'accommoderaient encore de Henry V pour s'épargner la difficulté de changer de dynastie. Il y en a d'autres qui, fidèles au souvenir de Napoléon, songent au duc de Reichstadt. D'autres aussi iraient droit à la République. Il y a table rase. Tout est donc possible en ce moment. Il faut se hâter. Il existe en faveur du duc d'Orléans plus de chances politiques que pour tout autre. Cependant, il peut perdre tous ses avantages en un jour, et les plus prompts seront les plus habiles. Les trônes sont aux premiers occupants. Quant à l'Europe, ce serait se tromper étrangement que de croire qu'elle nous sera hostile par la royauté d'Orléans. Bien au contraire, elle nous sera favorable et ne viendra pas joindre ses armées à celles de Charles X, si elle voit que nous nous arrêtons à la monarchie et que nous n'allons pas encore, comme des fous, tenter l'expérience d'une République. . . ."

M. Thiers déclara qu'il regarda la première promesse de Madame Adélaïde comme suffisante. "Madame," dit-il, "vous placez la Couronne dans votre Maison."

"Ceci fait, il fut convenu qu'on allait écrire sur le champ au duc d'Orléans. M. Thiers écrivit à la hâte les raisons qui devaient décider le Prince.

"Il repartit immédiatement et se rendit au Palais Bourbon auprès de Laffitte et du Général Sébastiani pour leur raconter le résultat de sa mission. Ceux-ci considérèrent que la démarche de la Princesse engageait toute la famille, et dès ce moment on fit savoir partout qu'une personne de la famille d'Orléans allait arriver et qu'on l'aurait bientôt toute entière.

Alors commença un long travail pour décider tous les députés à proclamer la lieutenance-générale du duc d'Orléans. Les plus hardis parlaient de lui adjuger la couronne sur le champ. Mais par un moyen terme on imagina de lui décerner la lieutenance-générale. Il y eut beaucoup d'hésitations et même de résistances. M. de Cormenin disait qu'on n'avait pas le droit de défaire un Roi. L'idée de l'acceptation de la famille d'Orléans, qui se répandit dans le Palais de la Chambre, acheva d'entraîner les députés, et la Lieutenance fut décrétée.\*

This statement corroborates the following passage which Thiers wrote subsequently in his book on 'La Monarchie de 1830':

'Que voulions-nous avant Juillet? La monarchie représentative avec une dynastie qui en admit les conditions et qui par cela nous dût la trône. L'entraînement des esprits vers cette idée ne datait pas de ce jour. Il datait de quinze années. C'est au duc d'Orléans que s'adressait Paul-Louis Courier dans ses pamphlets et Cauchois-Lemaire dans ses lettres condamnées par la Censure. . . . C'est auprès de lui et avec lui que les bons citoyens allaient déplorer les fautes qui pouvaient perdre l'Etat et qui heureusement n'ont amené que sa régénération. Aussi fallut-il à peine quelques heures pour que Paris, les deux Chambres et l'Hotel de Ville lui eussent décerné la Couronne, sous le titre de Lieutenant-Général.'

As Under-Secretary of State for the Treasury, under the direction of Laffitte, and then, in 1832, Minister of the Interior, Thiers was, as Talleyrand said, 'Non point parvenu, mais arrivé.' The treason of the Jew Deutz, the original of whose receipt for 500,000 francs is included in this collection of papers belonging to Thiers, furnished him with an unpleasant but effective means of securing the person of the Duchesse de Berry and thus putting an end to the Vendéan insurrection. From the Ministry of the Interior, where he had no wish any longer to 'play the part of a Fouché,' Thiers passed to the Ministry of Public Works; and, while there, he was responsible for some of the more important monuments of France, including the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. He subsequently

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\* A short extract from that conversation is to be found in a book now forgotten: 'La chronique de Juillet 1830,' by M. L. Rozet.

went back to the Ministry of the Interior, then to the Foreign Office, and from 1836 to 1840 he held the post of Premier.

In this last year he was concerned with a matter which deeply interested the whole of France, namely, the proposal to bring back to Paris from St Helena the ashes of Napoleon, in fulfilment of the last wish of the Emperor, who desired that his remains should find their final resting-place on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the people he loved so well. Through the medium of Guizot, who was then French Ambassador in London, he carried out the negotiations with the British Government very skilfully, and secured from Great Britain the satisfaction he sought. Palmerston gave his consent and added the remark: 'Voilà un vœu bien français!'

The following are some important extracts from the papers of M. Thiers on this subject. On June 27, 1840, he wrote to Guizot as follows:

'... J'ai reçu l'extrait de la dépêche de Sir Hudson-Lowe, qui est conforme au procès verbal français rédigé par Marchand. Tout promet un état de choses excellent et une parfaite conversation. Si on trouve en effet la maçonnerie intacte, et tous les signes d'une immobilité de vingt années, il faudra prendre les choses telles quelles; mais si on trouvait ou des signes suspects, ou bien une exhumation préalable faite par le Gouverneur de Sainte-Hélène, qui, dans l'attente de notre expédition, aurait spontanément exhumé le corps, il faudrait peut-être alors faire l'ouverture du cercueil. Je suis d'avis de ne faire cela qu'à la dernière extrémité, et probablement pas du tout. Je voudrais seulement qu'au besoin on fut autorisé à ouvrir le cercueil. C'est le moyen de faire tomber mille bruits absurdes. Nous n'en userons probablement pas. Sachez, aussi, si, d'après les ordres donnés, l'exhumation préalable n'aura pas eu lieu.

'Autre point à régler, celui du titre à donner à Napoléon. Dans la note où Lord Palmerston nous annonçait la restitution, il a qualifié Napoléon, *l'Empereur Napoléon*. Obtenez une instruction précise pour que ce titre soit conservé dans le procès verbal. Ce procès-verbal deviendra public, il faut donc songer aux moindres détails. . . .

'Quant aux bâtiments amateurs visitant Sainte-Hélène, il faut laisser faire les Anglais, mais prévenez Lord Palmerston qu'il y aura des importuns, des malveillants, etc. . . .

'Adieu, mille amitiés bien tendres.'

A few days later Thiers wrote as follows to Philippe de Chabot, who was the King's Commissioner at St Helena.

'Paris, 2 Juillet 1840.

*'Instruction Confidentielle.*

'Je vous donne, Monsieur, quelques instructions qui devront rester secrètes et d'après lesquelles vous aurez à vous conduire pendant votre mission à Sainte-Hélène.

'D'abord vous aurez seul le pouvoir de décider toute question de conduite pendant la durée du voyage, pendant le séjour à Sainte-Hélène et le retour en France. En cas de contestations, vous produiriez ces instructions, mais dans ce cas seul; et tout débat, s'il pouvait s'en élever un, devrait être terminé à l'instant même par la production de vos instructions. Je vous recommande même de montrer, le cas échéant, la fermeté nécessaire en vous armant de tous vos pouvoirs pour terminer toute difficulté ou contestation quelconque.

'Si, sur l'un des bâtiments s'était introduit un individu quelconque, véritablement étranger, ou aux équipages ou à la liste des personnes désignées pour prendre part au voyage de Sainte Hélène, vous en demanderiez immédiatement la mise à terre avant de partir de France. Les deux bâtiments devront autant que possible naviguer de concert. Il faudra diriger la marche de manière à être de retour en France et à toucher Cherbourg du 1<sup>er</sup> au 10 décembre prochain.

'Arrivé à Sainte-Hélène, vous assisterez à l'exhumation avec le Prince, s'il le veut, avec les deux capitaines des deux bâtiments, avec M.M. Bertrand, Gourgaud, de Las Cases, Marchand, l'Aumônier et les quatre anciens serviteurs de l'Empereur. Vous demanderez au Gouverneur de Sainte-Hélène d'employer la force suffisante pour empêcher les curieux de l'île ou de l'Europe d'assister à l'exhumation. L'intention du Gouvernement Anglais est d'empêcher les importuns, les malveillants de débarquer à Sainte-Hélène dans cette circonstance. Le Gouverneur doit avoir donné des instructions à cet égard.

'Si l'exhumation n'a pas encore eu lieu, vous demanderez qu'elle ait lieu en votre présence et en présence des seules personnes désignées. Vous assisterez soigneusement à ce travail, quelque long qu'il soit. Si, une fois arrivé au cercueil, vous le trouvez, ainsi que tout ce qui le précédera, dans un état qui atteste une immobilité de vingt années et une parfaite conservation, alors, avec le respect qu'exige un tel acte envers un tel mort, vous ouvrirez le cercueil en prenant les précautions convenables, et vous constaterez l'identité. M.

Marchand, qui a placé le corps de Napoléon dans le cercueil, sera pour cela un témoin précieux. Plus d'un signe certain subsistera encore et servira à constater cette identité.

'Si l'état des lieux, si la destruction du cercueil par les animaux qui infestent l'île vous faisaient craindre le résultat de la constatation, si vous pouviez craindre de ne pouvoir y arriver d'une manière certaine, ou si la destruction du cercueil ou ce qu'il contient vous faisaient craindre les conséquences de l'ouverture des diverses enveloppes de bois et de métal, vous recueillirez la dépouille dans son état, tel quel, et vous la placerez dans le cercueil envoyé à Sainte-Hélène. Vous avez des instructions sur les soins matériels à prendre que vous suivrez exactement avec l'aide des officiers de santé attachés aux deux bâtiments. Vous signerez le procès-verbal comme commissaire du Roi accrédité. Vous pourrez inviter les témoins qui vous accompagnent à signer avec vous.

'Vous n'exigerez pour l'Empereur que les honneurs que voudra lui rendre le Gouverneur de l'île. Vous n'élèverez à cet égard aucune contestation. C'est à bord des bâtiments Français que tous les honneurs dûs à un souverain seront rendus à la dépouille mortelle de Napoléon.

'Vous reviendrez par la route indiquée par l'usage, vers les côtes de France. Quand vous serez en vue de Brest, vous pourrez détacher la *Favorite* afin de nous signaler votre arrivée. Vous irez ensuite mouiller dans le port de Cherbourg ou vous vous arrêterez pour recevoir nos ordres ultérieurs. Je ne puis pas imaginer que, dans la traversée, une attaque puisse avoir lieu contre notre division navale. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que votre précieux dépôt devrait être défendu, comme des marins Français doivent défendre ce qui leur est confié, avec le dernier degré d'énergie et de dévouement.

'Vous pourrez, sur les lieux et dans les limites prescrites par Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intérieur, donner les gratifications et les secours aux pauvres que la circonstance rendrait convenables.

'Recevez, Monsieur, etc.

'Le Président du Conseil,

'(signé): A. THIERS.'

But on Oct. 28, 1840, M. Thiers had already resigned office, because Louis Philippe did not want to embark upon a war of one against four, but preferred to play the simple rôle of Grand Elector, in virtue of the axiom dear to his Prime Minister, 'Le Roi règne et ne gouverne pas.' M. Thiers made known his decision to Guizot on Oct. 23, in the following letter:

'MON CHER COLLÈGUE,

'Je vous ai adressé une dépêche télégraphique, et j'y ajoute une lettre du Roi qui vous arrive par courrier extraordinaire. Vous aurez deviné certainement, avant toute explication, de quoi il s'agit.

'Le cabinet n'a pas été d'accord avec le Roi sur la rédaction du discours de la Couronne, et nous lui avons donné notre démission. Je crois que notre discours était modéré et tout juste au niveau des circonstances. Cependant, le Roi en a pensé autrement, et je suis loin de m'en plaindre. La situation est si grave que je comprends parfaitement les opinions diverses qu'elle inspire.

'Vous êtes naturellement l'un des hommes auxquels le Roi a le plus pensé dans cette occasion, et il souhaite que vous fassiez la plus grande diligence pour venir l'aider à sortir des difficultés bien grandes du moment. Ne croyez pas que je serai pour vous un obstacle. Le pays est dans un état qui nous commande à tous la plus grande abnégation. . . .

'Adieu, et croyez à mon amitié sincère.

'A. THIERS.'

The following is the text of the Speech from the Throne which the King refused to read. It has remained almost unknown down to the present day :

'Messieurs les Pairs, Messieurs les Députés,

'En vous réunissant aujourd'hui, j'ai devancé l'époque ordinaire de la convocation des deux Chambres. Vous apprécierez la gravité des circonstances qui ont dicté à mon gouvernement cette détermination.

'Au moment où finissait la dernière session, un traité a été conclu entre la Porte Ottomane, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, la Prusse, la Russie, pour régler le différend survenu entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi d'Egypte.

'Cet acte important, accompli sans participation de la France et dans les vues d'une politique à laquelle elle n'a pas adhéré, pouvait dans l'exécution amener de dangereuses conséquences. La France devait les prévoir et se disposer à faire face à tous les événements.

'Mon gouvernement a pris sous sa responsabilité les mesures qu'autorisaient les lois et que dictaient cette situation nouvelle.

'La France, qui continue de souhaiter sincèrement la paix, demeure fidèle à la politique que vous avez plus d'une fois appuyée par d'éclatants suffrages. Jalouse d'assurer l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, elle la croit



conciliable avec l'existence du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, devenu lui-même un des éléments nécessaires de la force de cet Empire. C'est en respectant tous les droits, en ménageant tous les intérêts, qu'on peut jeter en Orient les bases d'un arrangement durable.

'Mais les événements qui se pressent pourraient amener des complications plus graves. Les mesures prises par mon gouvernement pourraient alors ne plus suffire. Il importe donc de les compléter par des mesures nouvelles, pour lesquelles le concours des deux Chambres était indispensable. J'ai dû les convoquer.

'Elles penseront comme moi que la France, qui n'a pas été la première à livrer le repos du monde à la fortune des armes, doit se tenir prête à agir, le jour où elle croirait l'équilibre européen sérieusement menacé. . . .

[There follow some paragraphs dealing with the Argentine Republic, African affairs, and the attempt of Prince Napoleon at Boulogne].

'Cette session sera presque toute entière consacrée à l'examen des mesures que les circonstances ont commandées à mon gouvernement, ou peuvent lui commander encore. Il ne vous présentera que les projets de lois indispensables à l'expédition des affaires.

'Messieurs, j'aime à compter plus que jamais sur votre patriotique concours. Vous voulez comme moi la France forte et grande. Aucun sacrifice ne vous coûterait pour lui conserver le rang qui lui appartient: Elle n'en veut pas déchoir. La France est fortement attachée à la paix, mais elle ne l'achèterait pas à un prix indigne d'elle; et votre Roi, qui a mis sa gloire à la conserver au monde, veut laisser intact à son fils le dépôt sacré d'indépendance et d'honneur national, que la Révolution française a mis dans ses mains.'

On Oct. 24 M. Thiers gave to our Ambassador at Madrid, Comte Mathieu de la Redorte, the following statement as to the reasons for his resignation:

'Mes notes ont amené en retour un langage très amical de l'Angleterre, mais des conclusions très peu conciliantes. Ainsi, on nous dit en termes très gracieux que, si Méhémet-Ali se soumet promptement au Sultan et accepte le traité du 15 Juillet, on lui laissera l'Egypte, c'est à dire mieux que le traité. Je n'ai donc trouvé là rien d'assez rassurant pour renoncer à notre conduite intérieure, c'est à dire à l'observation armée. J'entend par "observation armée" une organisation de nos forces telles que nous puissions au besoin faire la



guerre. Le discours de la Couronne, très modéré, très pacifique, indiquait de nouvelles mesures qui n'étaient pas cependant une levée en masse, mais le complément d'organisation de l'armée de ligne. Il n'était pas question par exemple des Gardes Nationales. Or, le Roi s'est retourné complètement, surtout depuis la tentative d'assassinat. Il voulait un discours tellement en contradiction avec la situation, discours d'ailleurs tout rédigé par lui, que nous n'avons pas pu y tenir. Malgré mon désir de traverser la crise il a fallu sortir.'

To M. Bresson, our Ambassador at Berlin, M. Thiers wrote on Dec. 11 as follows :

'Je suis libre enfin et des chaînes du pouvoir et des ennuis des discussions. Je vais retourner aux livres et aux voyages. Je voudrais pouvoir oublier le pays, son abaissement, ses dangers intérieurs. Je l'aime trop pour n'y pas penser sans cesse. Je n'ai que cette peine, car je suis du reste bien heureux d'avoir échappé à tant d'embûches. J'ai le profond sentiment de notre abaissement. On veut dire en vain que la faiblesse imprévue du pacha d'Egypte nous a dispensés de tout effort. La faiblesse du pacha est venue de la démoralisation ; et la démoralisation, de l'abandon où nous l'avons laissé. Tout eût été autrement conduit si nous l'avions voulu. Nous avons perdu le premier rang.

'Il faudra des efforts gigantesques pour nous le rendre. Adieu, mon cher ami, je fais des vœux pour vous. Je suis de votre avis. J'irai voir l'Allemagne, bien que j'aime encore et toujours l'Italie. C'est, après ma famille, ce que j'aime le mieux. Adieu, mille tendresses.

'A. THIERS.'

M. Thiers had fought against experiments in electoral reform and had made special efforts to support Mehemet-Ali and Egypt against the domination of Turkey. The Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, which had been signed in London on July 15, 1840, had disappointed him ; and, while he accepted, at the instance of Leopold I, the Note of Oct. 8, which referred to this subject and appeared conciliatory, he still favoured, personally, a more self-assertive and aggressive policy. As the party of peace at any price appeared likely to have their way, and the King had declined to countenance the measures recommended by Thiers in his draft of the proposed Speech from the Throne, he decided to throw off the burden of

office and return to the much-loved studies which had won for him, some years before, his *fauteuil* in the French Academy. At the time of his election, he had warmly thanked his brother Academicians for having discerned, amid the tumult of party politics, a disciple of letters temporarily drawn away from his favourite occupation. On returning to the Academy he found himself possessed of much more leisure, notwithstanding the fact that he was at the same time the leader of the Left-Centre, and that he was engaged in ardently fighting the Guizot Ministry, towards which he had at the outset appeared sympathetic. He was associated with Odilon Barrot, and joined the latter in proclaiming his intention of upholding in France and before Europe the reformative ideas of the Revolution. He continued with eagerness the completion of his great work on 'The Consulate and the Empire,' of which he finished the last chapters in 1862, and in regard to which the papers he left at his death include a large number of warm appreciations coming from all quarters, from the principal writers, politicians, generals, savants and statesmen of the time.

Not only did he take no part himself in the campaign of the 'Banquets' on the subject of electoral suffrage, but he disapproved of it, and even regretted that one of his closest friends, Duvergier de Hauranne, should have allowed himself to be drawn so energetically into the movement. During the night of Feb. 23-24, 1848, there was a question of calling Thiers back to power, in association with Odilon Barrot. Louis Philippe hesitated for a time, but finished by rejecting Thiers, and thus sealed the fate of the Constitutional Monarchy.

M. Thiers gave his adhesion to the Provisional Government, because he could not do otherwise, and then left Paris. Elected to the 'Constituante' by four constituencies, he decided to sit for the Seine Inférieure; and in the first Republican Assembly, as in that which followed it, he became the leader of the Constitutional Opposition. In this position he distinguished himself by an eloquent, stubborn and often fruitful resistance to the doctrines of demagoguery and Socialism. His book on 'La Propriété,' which was written at this period, remains a model of logic, clearness, right thinking and great courage. The perils which then threatened society were such that,

after looking everywhere for weapons with which to meet them, he felt compelled to associate himself with the Catholic clergy, who alone advocated the solid and salutary doctrines which he believed capable of offering resistance to a demoralising and disintegrating nihilism.

Failing to find in the 'Législative' the forces sufficient to ward off all the difficulties and all the dangers that threatened, he gave his support to the presidential candidature of Prince Louis Napoleon, who appeared to him to be the man to consolidate and direct the Conservative Party. The proof of this is given in an important letter from M. Thiers to M. Jules Lindet, a banker of Alençon, to whose nephew I am indebted for a copy of it. The letter is as follows :

'MONSIEUR,

'Je vous remercie de votre confiance et de l'expression de vos sentiments pour moi. Je me hâte d'y répondre en faisant ce que vous désirez. Mon opinion, et celle des principaux membres du parti modéré, est toute favorable à la candidature du Prince Louis Bonaparte. C'est pour lui que mes amis et moi nous voterons. La personne du général Cavaignac ne nous inspire aucun sentiment hostile, mais ses liaisons personnelles l'attachent fortement à un parti qui est incapable de bien gouverner la France, à un parti qui n'a que des idées anarchiques. M. Louis Bonaparte, au contraire, indépendant de toute relation de ce genre, semble vouloir se ranger au milieu des hommes d'ordre. Il l'a prouvé par son manifeste et il le prouve tous les jours par ses relations. Nous avons donc adopté sa candidature avec l'espérance de voir la France passer en de meilleures mains. Dans l'état présent des choses, ce n'est pas le bien que nous espérons, c'est le moindre mal. Le bien est pour longtemps refusé à notre pays, et nous n'aurons pas perdu nos voix si nous arrivons au moindre mal.

'Telle est, Monsieur, mon opinion et celle de Messieurs Molé, Odilon Barrot, de Montalembert, Berryer, Bugeaud, Changarnier, Oudinot, Maleville, H. Passy et quantité d'autres.

'Vous pouvez, Monsieur, faire connaître l'opinion que je vous exprime ici, mais je ne consens point à la publication de cette lettre qui dépasserait la mesure dans laquelle je veux me renfermer dans la lutte électorale.

'Recevez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.

'A. THIERS,  
'Membre de l'ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE.'

M. Thiers gave his support not only to the candidature, but to the Government of the Prince President until the day when he perceived and could say with regret that the Empire was an accomplished fact. He was one of those who protested on the Second of December and were sent to the prison of Mazas. His detention was not of long duration, but he declined to go into exile unless a formal order to that effect was issued. This order he preserved among his papers as a proof of the kindly behaviour of the new Empire towards him.

The following is the text of M. Thiers' formal protest against the Coup d'État of the Second of December :

'Je déclare que c'est contre ma volonté que je quitte mon pays, et que je ne cède en m'éloignant qu'à la contrainte exercée sur moi par un gouvernement qui dispose de la force.

'A. THIERS.

'Paris, ce 8 Décembre, 1851.'

The Duc de Morny, as Minister of the Interior, informed M. Thiers of the Government's decision to send him into exile in the following letter, which was accompanied by a copy of the Presidential decree.

'16 Janvier, 1852.

'À M. THIERS,

'MONSIEUR,

'Je vous adresse une ampliation du décret en date du 9 janvier qui vous éloigne momentanément du territoire français.

'Le Gouvernement a pris cette mesure dans un intérêt de sécurité publique. Il sera heureux le jour où les circonstances lui permettront de le faire cesser.

'Recevez, Monsieur, l'expression de ma considération.

'MORNY,

'Ministre de l'Intérieur.'

The copy of the Presidential decree which accompanied this letter was as follows :

'Au nom du Peuple Français.

'LOUIS NAPOLEON, Président de la République.

'Décrète :

'Article 1<sup>er</sup> : Monsieur Thiers, ancien Représentant à l'Assemblée Législative, est momentanément éloigné du

territoire Français et de celui de l'Algérie pour cause d'intérêt général.

'Article 2<sup>me</sup>: Il ne pourra rentrer en France et en Algérie qu'en vertu d'une autorisation spéciale du Président de la République.

'Fait au Palais des Tuileries,

'Le Conseil des Ministres entendu,

'Le 9 Janvier, 1852.

'(Signé): LOUIS NAPOLEON.

'Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,

'(Signé): MORNY.'

On Dec. 20, M. Thiers arrived at Kehl, on his way to Frankfort. 'Je viens,' he wrote to his mother-in-law, 'd'avoir une idée de la prison; je vais m'en faire une de l'exil.' He planned to go from Frankfort to Cologne, and then to Brussels. He asked his friend Mignet to send him a copy of 'The Letters of Cicero,' to enable him to occupy his time while in England, where he expected to spend his period of exile. He also promised himself to undertake certain work which had no relation to the unhappy circumstances of the moment. 'C'est de la pure philosophie,' he said; 'la persécution ne m'ôtera ni ma tranquillité d'âme, ni ma persévérance dans mes opinions.' And a few days afterwards he added:

'Je tue le temps en lisant les "Lettres" de Cicéron. Quel tableau de Rome et de tous les temps! Quel bon citoyen, quel homme de bons sens! Quelle victime de la fureur des partis et de l'éternelle faiblesse des honnêtes gens!'

Thiers' first letter from London is dated Jan. 22, 1852; and on the 24th he announced his arrival, surrounded by pleasant society, at The Grange, the seat of the Ashburton family in Hampshire. 'Lady Ashburton,' he wrote, 'est d'une véritable gentillesse, avec autant de noblesse de cœur que d'étendue d'esprit.' Soon afterwards he took a house in London, where he could receive his friends. On Feb. 4 he was present at a sitting of the House of Lords which was attended by the Queen in state.

'La Reine,' he writes, 'm'avait déjà gagné le cœur l'année dernière, et je reste sous le charme. Elle est douce, fière, confiante. Elle prononce l'anglais avec une clarté, un accent, une vérité d'intonation que tout le monde admire, et qui m'a

permis à moi, qui commence à peine à lire les journaux, d'entendre certaines phrases. Quand elle est sortie, j'ai été poussé par la foule jusqu'à la portière de sa voiture, et je l'ai vue partir au milieu des cris enthousiastes du peuple qui aime cette Reine plus que ne l'aimerait un Roi. . . . J'ai eu le cœur navré et presque les larmes aux yeux en comparant l'inutilité de nos trente ans d'effort aux succès des Anglais dans cette carrière de la Monarchie Constitutionnelle. Voilà la vraie république, le vrai gouvernement des nations éclairées !'

On Feb. 19, he attended a debate in Parliament, and heard Clarendon, Russell, Disraeli and Monteagle. In his comments on the debate, which was on the Irish question, he says :

'Un grand peuple traitant ses affaires librement, avec chaleur mais paisiblement, auprès d'une Royauté, qui, sans l'entraver, le contient. Voilà la vraie liberté, celle qu'on trouve ici dans une réalité saisissante ! Peut-être les Tories remplaceront les Whigs la semaine prochaine, ce qui peut avoir de graves conséquences ; cependant, la Reine est tranquille et le peuple fait ses affaires sans inquiétude.'

By March 1, however, in spite of the attentions and the kindness with which he was welcomed, M. Thiers confessed that he had begun to find London rather tedious, owing to his ignorance of the language, which made things very difficult for him. Although he had begun to read English, he could not as yet understand a word that was said to him in that tongue. A solitary life in St George's Place would have suited him much better. He sometimes regretted that he had decided to spend the days of his exile in the North, rather than in the South, for the English fogs chilled him to the bone.

On March 24, Thiers wrote to his sister-in-law, Mlle Dosne, that Comte Walewski had been to see him, and had told him, on behalf of the President, that, if he would merely express his desire to return to France, he would be at once given his passport.

'Quoique je souffre de mon exil,' he wrote to Mlle Dosne, 'jamais je ne demanderai sous aucune forme une rentrée. Ma patrie est mon bien. Quand on me le rendra, on ne me rendra que ce qui m'appartient. C'est une chose que je

recevrai et que je ne demanderai pas. . . . Je ne puis accepter une grâce individuelle et, sans forfanterie, je n'en veux pas.'

On April 21, he left England for Italy. In the month of August, 1852, he returned freely to France, without having to ask permission of anybody, but with the knowledge that all obstacles to his return would be overcome without the least difficulty. In 1863, after twelve years of silence, which he must have found very wearisome, he re-entered the Chamber, as one of the deputies for the Department of the Seine, and defended brilliantly what he termed '*les libertés nécessaires*'—that is to say, individual liberty, the liberty of the Press, electoral liberty, parliamentary liberty, and ministerial responsibility. I shall never forget, among others, his speeches of May 14 and 18, 1867, on the subject of the foreign policy of France in relation to Germany and Italy. Advocating, more than ever, a policy of good sense, he warned his colleagues—although, alas! in vain—that they had only one more fault to commit. He vainly called upon the Government to follow for the future a conservative policy abroad and a really liberal one at home. By his clear, plain, natural eloquence, full of admirable good sense and broad and just views, he won from all who loved clearness and logic the popularity which he deserved.

In 1870 he demonstrated, although without being understood or followed, that the country was plunging into an unhappy war without preparations or alliances. After the Revolution of the Fourth of September, which he would have avoided, he consented to make a tour of the Chancelleries of Europe, in an attempt to secure for his country the sympathies which had been unjustly refused to her. He was no more listened to in the European capitals than he had been in the Chamber; and Europe is paying dearly to-day for its lamentable indifference to the pleadings of Thiers.

Elected to the National Assembly by twenty-six constituencies, he decided to sit again for the Department of the Seine, and remained in Parliament until his election as President of the Republic. Who can ever forget what he said, wrote and did for the purpose of concluding peace, crushing the Commune, reestablishing



order, reconstituting the essential forces of France—her army, navy, commerce, agriculture, manufactures, finance and public works—and liberating her territory? Nevertheless, the majority of the Assembly, dissatisfied at not being able to induce him to reestablish the monarchy, banished him from power on May 24, 1873. And what was the result? The same majority, frustrated, owing to the *intransigence* of the Comte de Chambord, in their efforts to bring about a fusion of the various Royalist elements, found themselves obliged to vote the constitutional and fundamental laws of the Republic.

On leaving office M. Thiers returned to what he was fond of calling 'ses chères études.' He often spent the whole day at the Natural History Museum, or at the Collège de France, or at the Observatory, or in visits to the learned in letters and philosophy. He also at the same time maintained a copious correspondence with notable men in all countries, and employed himself in gathering important material for the philosophical work, which, according to his own expression, was to assure his fame. Of this work he left only the rough draft, but this is sufficient to demonstrate that the task which he set himself would have been to combat materialistic views. In this book he intended to prove and uphold the existence of a creative God, of a God of Providence, of a Supreme Director of the world, in accordance with Virgil's maxim, 'Mens agit at molem.' Death took him before he was able to complete this work, which had been the dream of his life, and of which I have before me the general scheme.

Such was Thiers, who revealed himself to all as a great patriot, a great liberal, a great historian, already famous at twenty-five years of age, a Minister at thirty-three, dictator or head of the State at seventy-four. One may repeat to those, who seem not to recognise or who would minimise his worth, a remark which one of his former colleagues made during an anxious period: 'Ah, if he were only here!' And this regret we French may again express to-day, when the whole world is passing through the most terrible convulsion and enduring the most colossal troubles that it has ever known. Far be it from me to dispute the merits of the statesmen

of to-day, but who among them can claim to have had such consummate experience, to have such a sure touch, such a variety of profound knowledge, such a broad grasp of the science of politics, of things and of men, as he?

If he were still living, what would be his counsel to us to-day? To do our duty. What duty? The duty of bringing ourselves into closer and still closer association with our Allies and of marching with unwavering agreement, steadfastness and energy towards the common aim—against the New Barbarism, against the skilled and studied barbarism of a nation of prey. I can hear him again asking us :

‘Quelle doit être la préoccupation continuelle des Puissances? C’est avoir le soin de leur propre grandeur, de veiller sans cesse les unes sur les autres, pour qu’aucune d’elles ne menace la sûreté commune ; et, s’il y en a une qui, par les prétentions qu’elle affiche, par la force qu’elle déploie, devient dangereuse pour l’indépendance des autres, on se réunit contre elle afin de la réduire ou de la contenir. Quelle est cette politique là? Qu’est-elle en réalité? C’est la politique de l’indépendance des nations.’

When in 1867, Thiers—who even then had observed the tendency of Prussia to predominate Europe—wrote : ‘La monarchie universelle est de toutes les formes du despotisme la pire,’ he already foresaw what must one day result from the insolent desire of that Power to crush all nations under the same yoke, to stifle their natural genius and to turn them into slaves. Such efforts, of course, must always end in a catastrophe, but at this period of the world’s history we have a right to demand that the whole race should be able to render such cataclysms impossible. To this end we are bound to follow the counsels of those who, having pursued a political career not as an object of vainglorious ambition but as the unceasing occupation of their disinterested studies, have had no other desire than to defend the real interests of Humanity.

HENRI WELSCHINGER.

## Art. 2.—GERMAN METHODS IN TURKEY.

As an 'Oversea Briton' who has resided in Turkey for over thirty years, without losing touch with the old country, the present writer has had an exceptional opportunity of being brought into contact with the question of British oversea trade with the country he lived in. Certain aspects of the foreigner's trade as compared with British oversea trade, to which but little attention has hitherto been directed, have been forcibly brought home to him. In particular, there is one which stands out above all others. It is bound up with the whole question of oversea trade, and may, perhaps, be summed up, by saying not that 'Trade follows the Flag,' but that 'Trade follows the Bank.' The utilisation of banking credit, in other words the financing of oversea trade, combined with other factors, has rendered immense services to German and Austrian commerce, and makes their competition with us very serious.

It was recently said that 'To understand German methods and to appreciate them at their proper value is to go more than halfway towards winning the commercial war.' The intention of the present writer is to endeavour to open British eyes to some of the German methods in oversea trade, and to indicate the points of value in the foreign system, as well as the faults in our own. The writer has watched the development and growth of German trade under the fostering care of the German Government. Diplomacy, commercial influence and finance have all assisted; and the combination has permeated the country, with the result that the volume of British exports to Turkey, and even of Turkish exports to Great Britain, has seriously fallen off. It is, however, not only British trade that has suffered; the trade of other countries has been similarly affected. Italy is an exception, but this is chiefly because Italy has been so much under the influence of German-owned and controlled banks and industries.

A few figures may be given to show the falling-off of British export trade to Turkey and the increase of German trade. The figures as shown below are the Turkish Custom House figures, and are fairly complete down to 1911-12 (the Turkish financial year commences in

March). It has not been possible to obtain the Turkish figures for 1912 and 1913, but the British figures for those years, ending Dec. 31, are given. The larger figures for 1910-11-1911-12 are those of German exports to Turkey, including railway and war material.

	Great Britain.	Germany.	Railway and war material included.
	£	£	£
1900-1	7,364,900	583,300	
1905-6	9,739,300	1,174,300	
1908-9	8,557,040	1,759,700	
1909-10			
1910-11	7,504,158	3,448,347	5,137,000
1911-12	9,000,000	4,630,000	5,330,000
1912	8,332,827	figures not available.	
1913	7,993,000	"	"

Perhaps the best comparison of figures down to 1909 is that given by Sir Adam Block, K.C.M.G., President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Turkey, in his Presidential address in March 1910, when he stated

'that, whereas the total imports into Turkey have increased in 1908-9 by more than 7,000,000*l.* as against 1900-1, and by almost 1,000,000*l.* as against 1905-6, British trade, which is pre-eminent, is slowly dropping proportionally to the trade of other countries and is less in bulk in 1908-9, as compared with 1905-6, by nearly 1,000,000*l.* Italian trade is steadily increasing; and German trade, which was 583,300*l.* or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the whole in 1900-1, rose to 1,174,300*l.* or  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the whole in 1905-6, and 1,759,700*l.* or 6 per cent. of the whole import trade in 1908-9.\* In eight years German trade increased by 1,176,400*l.* The volume of their imports increased in that period about 300 per cent. As compared with 1905-6, German imports show an increase of 600,000*l.*, whereas British imports have dropped by nearly 1,200,000*l.* in the same period.'

In 1888, the British imports into Turkey were 42.80 per cent. of the whole import trade; in 1900-1, 35 per cent.; in 1908-9, 30 per cent. Sir Adam Block further stated, in regard to exports from Turkey, that

\* As compared with 1908-9, the figures of 1911-12 for German imports show an increase of 2,871,000*l.*, whereas British imports only increased by 442,960*l.*

'those to the United Kingdom are still at the head of the list, but have dropped about 1,000,000*l.* since 1905-6; and, from 38 per cent. of the whole export trade in 1900-1, the proportion has dropped to 32½ per cent. in 1905-6, and to 28 per cent. in 1908-9. Germany has increased from 4½ per cent. to 6 per cent. of the whole.'

The capture of commerce in the Near East was accomplished by German activity on the one hand and British inactivity on the other. On the one side there was a thorough and continuous effort to capture the Turkish import trade, which was backed by German diplomatic and consular influence, and furthered by the offer of commercial facilities and financial assistance. To these must be added the careful conduct of the German merchant and his capacity to meet the wishes of the client, in regard to the quality of the goods and the form best suited to the necessities of the country and customer. On the other side we have to note the absence of diplomatic and consular influence as well as of commercial and financial aid, while the somewhat crude methods of English commerce and the generally careless, 'take-it-or-leave-it' style of the British merchant, together with his reluctance to study the nature of the article wanted, the requirements of the country and the wants of the client, placed him at a further disadvantage.

Let us endeavour to describe the two methods. To understand the diplomatic activities of Germany, one must depart from the usual conception of diplomacy as illustrated by the work of the British diplomatic body. The German diplomatic corps is on a quite different footing. They are not out for political objects alone, but for business; and the members of the consular corps are at one with them, in the sense that they form part of the diplomatic corps, and their best men have a career open to them and can occupy high positions; whereas, on the contrary, the British consuls, trained as they are in a special consular service, specialists in regard to the country in which they reside, and employed hardly anywhere else, were and are a class apart from the diplomatic body. No one can rise beyond a Consul-Generalship or the head dragomanship at the Embassy;

and the man who has attained even such a position is hardly on a level with the latest Third Secretary or Attaché just out from England.

When the German Emperor and his advisers determined to capture the country, they meant to capture it commercially as well as politically. His diplomats were not simply the Ambassador and his staff at the end of a telegraph wire communicating with the Foreign Office, but an active live organisation which directed the Foreign Office in Berlin on commercial matters, and had the Deutsche Bank at its beck and call. The Deutsche Bank was barely second to the German Embassy, for the Embassy was also at its beck and call. Each worked with the other, and all worked together with Berlin. Immediately the order went forth, the Deutsche Bank began its work in Turkey, at first through the medium of the Anatolian Railway Company and subsequently as a separate establishment. It was soon followed by other German and controlled banks, such as the Deutsche Orient Bank, which was opened in January 1906. The Deutsche Bank in Turkey, both before and after its establishment as a separate concern, was continually receiving visits from its Berlin managers, amongst them Dr K. Helfferich and A. von Gwinner; and the German Ambassador, with the whole diplomatic corps in Constantinople, was there to carry out the Bank's directions. The Deutsche Bank, when finally established at Constantinople as a Bank in 1906, was a complete institution perfectly organised. It got hold of every specialist and expert it might think useful for the furtherance of big railway, dock, drainage, mining and other schemes. This was Germany's method of peaceful penetration. 'Haute finance' made full use of the Embassy. Its projects, whether they had a purely political or a quasi-political object in view, were initiated, elaborated and put into operation subject only to the approval of the authorities in Berlin.

It may be said that the peaceful penetration of the Germans in Turkey began actively immediately after the granting of the concession for the Anatolian Railways in 1899, for in 1890 there was founded at Zürich an institution called the 'Banque des Chemins de fer Orientaux.' Its principal object was defined as being

'all kinds of financial operations having relation to the construction and working of railways or other permanent concerns useful to the development of the "traffic en Orient." The nominal capital of this concern was fifty millions of francs. There was a big General Board and an Inner Committee, which consisted of, amongst others, Dr Jules Frey, K. Schrader, Dr K. Helfferich, Otto von Kühlmann, and A. von Kaulla. It is interesting to see how this concern is connected with German and Turkish-German institutions in Turkey. The chief members of the Inner Committee above referred to figure on most of such concerns.

The Deutsche Bank, before its establishment in Turkey, worked through the Anatolian Railway Company, the latter dealing with, amongst other things, the Konia Irrigation Works and also the Bagdad Railway concession. On its list of Managing Directors we find the names of A. von Gwinner and Dr K. Helfferich. The Anatolian Railway Company, a Turkish Société Anonyme founded in 1889, running the railway from Haidar Pacha, opposite Constantinople, to Eske Cheir and thence eastward to Angora and south-eastward to Konia, with several branch lines, has A. von Gwinner as President, K. Schrader as Vice-President, and on its Board Dr K. Helfferich, O. von Kühlmann, A. von Kaulla, and others. The Bagdad Railway Company, a Turkish Société Anonyme, the definitive concession for which was granted in 1903 for the line from Konia to Bagdad, with branch lines, has A. von Gwinner as President, with K. Schrader, Dr K. Helfferich and O. von Kühlmann on its Board. The Mersina-Tarsus and Adana Railway Company, formerly an Anglo-French possession, captured in 1908, has A. von Gwinner as President and Dr K. Helfferich on its Board. The Oriental Railway Company, originally, and in fact until 1911-12, an Austrian concession, became in that year a Turkish Société Anonyme. Amongst its directors are Dr Jules Frey, A. von Gwinner, Dr K. Helfferich, A. von Kaulla, Otto von Kühlmann, and K. Schrader. The Monastir-Salonica Railway Company is a Turkish Société Anonyme. Its President is K. Schrader, and on its Board are A. von Gwinner, Dr Jules Frey, Dr K. Helfferich, A. von Kaulla, O. von Kühlmann, and others. The Company dates from



1891. The Port of Haidar Pasha is also controlled by a Turkish Société Anonyme. K. Schrader is President; and on its Board are A. von Gwinner as Vice-President, Dr Jules Frey, Dr K. Helfferich, and Dr K. Zander. The Company dates from 1902.

The Société des Tramways de Constantinople is a Turkish Société Anonyme. This includes electric power for lighting the city of Constantinople, for traction, etc. Its business is very important. In this company the Deutsche Bank is directly interested, but it is not possible to give the list of directors. It is, however, controlled by the same interests as those mentioned above in connexion with railways. The full extensions of the various powers granted were finally obtained in 1913-14. The Metropolitan Railway Company, which runs the line from Galata to Pera (formerly British), has been since 1911 a Turkish Société Anonyme. It was taken over in 1910 by German interests, namely, the Deutsche Orient Bank and the Deutsche Bank. The President of the Deutsche Orient Bank at Berlin is the President of the Railway. The Société Anonyme des Bateaux de la Corne d'Or (Golden Horn ferry-boats) is ostensibly a purely Turkish Company, as the shareholders must be Ottoman subjects, but in reality it is owned by the Deutsche and Deutsche Orient Banks.

The Deutsche Orient Bank came into existence in January 1906, and at first was mostly commercial. Its domicile is Berlin. Its principal branches are at Hamburg, in Egypt, Tangiers and Constantinople. It has some eight or ten agencies in Egypt, and eleven or twelve agencies in Turkey outside Constantinople. In October 1916 the Schaaffhausensche Bankverein retired from the Syndicate of this Bank, after selling its holdings to the Deutsche Bank. The Nationalbank für Deutschland in Berlin continues to belong to the Syndicate. The Oesterreichische Kreditanstalt, the Wiener Bankverein, and the Ungarische Kreditbank also joined the Deutsche Orient Bank. The Bank has in consequence been reconstructed, and has become, as described by the 'Frankfurter Zeitung' on Oct. 19, 1916, a Germano-Austro-Hungarian unity. It is stated, by the same authority, that the field of activity of the new grouping is to be restricted mainly to operations of financing governmental and other public

enterprises of economic importance, but the present banking and commercial operations will continue.

So much for the *haute politique* and *haute finance* of Germany's enterprises in Turkey. The Deutsche Bank, through the Embassy and its consulates, did its best to develop trade and commerce; and the consular service was actively employed in the national interest. The Vice-Consul and even the Consul-General were not above paying personal visits to the smallest firm or the humblest person of any nationality to glean information, to find out all about trade and everything connected with it. They collated the reports of the Chambers of Commerce and our own blue-books, and established at the Deutsche Bank in Berlin a sample room and a library, where German merchants could ascertain all that is to be known about the products of the country and its requirements.

Successful business concerns carried on by subjects of other nationalities in the Near East were marked down by the Consuls, and their methods enquired into. If the Consuls could not get the information wanted, they approached one of the German or German-controlled banks; and with their assistance the system adopted by the concern in question was soon found out. To attain this object, the banks would approach such businesses, offering high interest on accounts current, facilities for overdrawing, and other financial advantages. The acceptance or even provisional entertainment of such offers enabled the bank to make a careful study of the resources of their clients, their manner of business, the character of their customers, in short the whole inside of their affairs, with the result that one day either a German competitor would appear on the market under the auspices of the bank, or German participation in the concern would be suggested. If this were accepted, then in a short time the principals would be bought out, or the firm would be compelled to come to some arrangement with the German competitor, as otherwise a cut-throat competition would ensue, which, in the circumstances, would probably entail ruin.

Several times a year the German Government promoted excursions of German exporters and importers,

and invited merchants to take advantage of them. Enterprising merchants visited Turkey in hundreds, by special trains at special rates. They were well looked after and taken round the country, each group being conducted by appropriate agents; and the requirements of the country and the kinds of article required were explained to them. They were introduced to native merchants and generally given every facility for finding out what would sell; and, when they left, they had acquired valuable knowledge about the conditions of his special trade. They were pleased, above all, because they knew that the German Government, with its whole machinery, including the banks, was behind them. As a result, they did better business on their return; they talked about it, and their countrymen followed them.

The Deutsche Bank and its connexions, and, for the matter of that, other German banks, may be compared to a big cobweb, of which the centre is Berlin or some other spot in Germany, with immense threads stretching out all over the world in a crisscross network—always the web, but always German. Did a merchant wish to do business, the Bank would find him an agent in the country. The agent would be some one, of course, probably a German or Austrian, recommended by the local branch; and, if he was a native agent, he would be promised the Bank's financial support if he would bring over his *clientèle* or portfolio of customers to the German merchant and throw over his British houses. The parties, that is, merchant and customer, would soon be in communication through the agent. Did the German merchant want to be financed? That would be easy. The Bank's idea of the merchant's dealing with the customer would be so much against the invoice and bill of lading, so much by a three months' bill, and the balance in a six months' bill, or some such term, perhaps of longer date. The Bank would even offer to take charge of the whole matter from first to last, and, if the merchant desired, would finance him up to 70 per cent. or 80 per cent. of the amount against the Bank's receiving the bills of lading or other securities.

If the German merchant were the creditor pure and simple, the local buyer might give trouble; he would most likely pay the amount of cash against the bills of

lading of the goods, in order to get possession of them, but he might refuse to meet the first bill or the second on the ground that the goods were not up to sample, or on one of the thousand and one pretexts which a debtor will raise when his creditor is many hundred miles away in another country. But, once the transaction gets into the hands of the Bank, a powerful Bank on the spot, he would be a brave debtor who dared refuse to honour his bill of exchange on presentation for payment by the Bank. He would have to have a very good excuse to venture on such a course. If it was a genuine claim, it would be attended to by the Bank with firmness and justice to all parties; otherwise he would incur the risk of a lawsuit, with all the influence of the Bank, Embassy and Consulate against him, the cutting-off of his credit, the impossibility of doing trade with Germany or even with other countries, as he would be blacklisted with all the banks. The merchant could, however, in most circumstances get time if he really required it, a renewal of one of his bills or more, but in return he would have to give further orders or make other concessions. Meanwhile the manufacturer got his money and set out to get further orders and to provide further merchandise for the customer, perhaps with the encouragement of the Bank, but always under its advice and protection, and with the aid of its agent.

It is not proposed here to draw comparisons between this system and that of British banks. The nearest approach to the German system is that, when the British merchant gives credit to oversea customers, he sends the drafts or bills of exchange for acceptance or presentation through his own bank, say, at Bradford, which institution hands them to some other institution in London, which in turn hands them to the agency of a foreign bank, and later they are presented. If the bills are paid, well and good; if they are not paid, they are probably referred for instructions or they are protested and returned to England, and weeks or months are lost over disputes, probably ending with a lawsuit, in which the manufacturer is at a great disadvantage. In such a case, the merchant, hundreds of miles distant from his customer, is to a great extent dependent on his agent. The bank's action is a pure banking action, a mechanical form; and,

although it may not suit the customer to have his bills protested, yet he will put forward a sufficient excuse at the time of 'protest' in order to cover himself as against the bank, and the bank has no further interest in the matter. The agent, too, may not be quite straightforward; and there is no bank to control him as a German bank controls agents recommended by itself.

Let us next look at the other side of the oversea trade, namely, the export trade from Turkey. A merchant in Turkey wants to export his goods to Germany, America or elsewhere. He applies to the German bank on the spot. Enquiries are made in Berlin respecting the article, the most likely market, etc.; and a customer is soon found, or the articles are forwarded 'on commission' or 'on consignment' to the bank or some agent of the bank, generally a German. The bank offers, against shipment and the bills of lading, to advance so much per cent. on the goods and takes charge of the affair; the merchant has the best part of his outlay back, and so matters progress. In such a transaction the position is one of mutual profit, with security and confidence for the native or local merchant, as also for the German or other foreign merchant. The bank has the matter under control, not only the security of the financial part, but the many questions attendant before the final closing of the whole transaction—freight, insurance, question of short delivery, brokerage, samples, storage, etc., until final sale. The bank, besides its own interest, has the interests of all parties under its protection; and the matter, once in the bank's hands, is always in its hands until completion, for its ramifications along the threads of the cobweb system are all linked up with its cross branches and controlled houses.

How many exporters in Turkey (we may ask), dealing with England, did their business entirely through the medium of a British bank? The answer would not be difficult to give, for no British banks or banking agencies existed in Turkey.\* The business would be done for

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\* In 1909 there came into existence the Banque Nationale de Turquie (a Turkish Société Anonyme), an Anglo-Turkish concern really founded by Sir Ernest Cassel. Its capital was 1,000,000*l.* Its operations, although

the most part through the German or the German-controlled banks, with their branch establishments in the United Kingdom, or by one of the many foreign banks operating in England. Walk through the city of London and note the number of foreign banks; and then it will be understood how the importer into the United Kingdom carries on his business with England. The importer is being financed, in one way or another, by the parent banks or branches of those foreign banks in the foreign country; and those banks are mostly German or German-controlled, and are established as offshoots in Britain to receive the consignments and protect their own trade, and see that, so far as possible, nothing goes into British hands. Naturally, that foreign bank in London takes care only to employ other Germans, naturalised or not naturalised—a professedly German firm, or a firm the real character of which is hidden under the Limited Liability Company Acts. It would, however, be fairly correct to say that the leading British merchants exporting from Turkey to Great Britain were satisfied, one way or another, to do their business through or with the foreign banks in London or elsewhere, as described above, partly because the business was a continuous transaction, with every facility given; partly, perhaps, because the foreign bank understood foreign trade, whereas the purely British concerns did not understand it or did not want the business.

Again, the foreign banks in the Near East, of which mention has been made, possess such a complete organisation that the first comer who wanted to send money to the Far East, or in fact anywhere, had only to apply to them, and his request was granted and his business put through direct. If a merchant, whether stranger or customer, wants them to take charge of a business, the charge is almost always promptly accepted. There are plenty of letters and papers to sign, it is true; but these are precise and concise and quickly settled, and there is no more trouble. It is the same all over the world. The German banks and their ramifications extend

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expressed to be for all kinds of banking transactions, were limited; and there is every reason to believe that it did not fulfil the purpose it was intended to do, and this perhaps from want of Government support.



everywhere ; and the German merchants, agents, brokers, commission-agents and others follow in their train. All are kept in the family, so to speak. Of course, credit to oversea customers becomes an easy matter under such a system. It is the bank's business, and the bank knows all about the oversea merchant ; but it is not business that any English bank would touch, because the organisation is wanting, and such business is not banking strictly so called. Can it not, then, be said to-day, with a fair amount of truth, that it is a case of making the old adage read, 'Trade follows the Bank,' rather than 'Trade follows the Flag' ; unless, of course, the Bank is synonymous with the Flag, which it has come to be in Germany.

The wealth and power, as well as the political utility, of the German banks are only too clearly illustrated by what happened in regard to the Bagdad Railway. It was at one time thought impossible that the Germans could finance the matter without the help of the British and French money markets. It was a great surprise to both those markets when the Deutsche Bank, with its many participants, all German or German-controlled, in Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and elsewhere, quietly put up the money required.

The consular assistance given by the German Government to its subjects and to foreigners working for German interests is very effective. The officials are most painstaking and will do anything and try everything to push a claim and to get it settled. One has only to have worked with them on these commercial questions, to appreciate how ready they are to adopt any practical suggestion and to take advice in following up the matter. It has been said of the German consular officials that their maxim is, 'How to get the thing through,' and not, as unluckily is too often the case with our own authorities, 'How to get rid of the thing with the least trouble.' While this would be unfair to our authorities, it is not unfair to say that the German authorities would give the most efficient assistance on only the semblance of a case, whereas, to get efficient assistance from our own authorities, one had to convince them of an overwhelming case and satisfy them on every point. And this was often prohibitive, for the cases are



few indeed in which there is nothing to be said against a claim. The Germans may have carried their system to one extreme; our authorities certainly carried theirs to the other. The natural result was that, under the German system, litigation and trouble were often avoided by the quick and persistent following-up of the affair, whereas our authorities would insist on all legal remedies being exhausted before they would take up the matter.

British diplomatic influence was at one time excellent and its power was felt far and wide in the Near East. It was, perhaps, the result of a deliberate and cold-blooded decision, some nearly twenty years ago, that suddenly all real protection of British interests ceased. Certain holders of big concessions were actually urged to dispose of them to Germans or German-controlled groups, and a curious chapter could be written on this point. The British diplomatic corps differs radically from the German in that it exists for political purposes alone, and not for commercial purposes as well. From the Ambassador downwards, the Embassy people will have nothing to do with commerce. It is true that a few years ago a Commercial Attaché was added to the staff of the Embassy; but, although a very competent man was appointed, his activities were limited to questions relating to commercial treaties and kindred matters. The consular service is looked down on by the diplomatic. Was there ever a Consul-General who really worked hand in hand with the Embassy? There is almost always friction between the services. Nevertheless, the consular service is excellent in many respects, its members being specially trained, and residing permanently in the country from the time of their entering the service. They are English gentlemen with a knowledge of languages, of the country and the people, excellent as compilers of blue-books of exports and statistics, even well informed on trade, and most of them keenly alive to the interests of their country; but the service does not get the help it should get from the diplomatic body. As a result British interests have suffered. We do not mean to imply that it was the fault of either service that British trade suffered. The fault is in the system as regulated by Government. If our diplomatic influence had been used as the Germans used theirs, results might have been different.

The difference between the amount of success obtained by trade and finance, supported as they are by Germany, and that obtained by similar interests when unsupported, is enormous. German influence, political and other, has been able to obtain concessions for railways, for the construction of harbours, docks, drainage systems, bridges, quays, mines, tramways, gas and electricity works; and the same influences have facilitated the raising of loans for the aforesaid purposes. The construction and carrying out of the concessions has conferred benefits on the country concerned, by bringing in capital and employing labour; while the home industry has profited largely, for the materials, virtually all except stone and sand, were brought from Germany in German bottoms, and, with it all, came German skilled workmen and others in their train who wanted German goods in their new homes. Of course trade followed. That is the system, not peculiar to Turkey but carried out all over the world.

Lastly, we come to the German manufacturer himself and to his conduct towards his customer, his reliability and his adaptability to the requirements of the country, and his readiness to supply the article required. As explained above, the German merchant feels that he has the influence of his Government and of the bank behind him. He either has visited the market himself or has orders from his agent; and, once having begun business, if he does not again visit the oversea market, he studies the requirements through his agent or his commercial traveller, the latter, perhaps, representing several firms. The orders are acknowledged, and a sale note is exchanged. A time is fixed for delivery, and generally this is strictly kept. This latter point is essential, especially in a country which is somewhat of an exchange mart and has its special seasons. The merchant is very careful to produce goods answering to the samples. If any dispute arises, the agent and the bank are there to settle the matter, and business gradually develops. But the merchant, whatever he has to deliver, will not, as a rule, enter into a contract unless he feels sure of being able to deliver up to time. The German merchant is reliable, punctual, persistent, and he gives long credit. His articles

are up-to-date, cheap, please the eye, and sell well. Hence his success.

The British merchant labours under another disadvantage, which might surely be removed. Are we always going to stick to the old weights and measures? Cannot the metric system be introduced, if only for oversea trade? The remark made once before might be repeated here. So long as the British were alone in the oversea trade, the foreigner had to take the goods with English weights and measures; but to-day, when the foreigner has most probably a metric system also, this retention of our old forms constitutes another reason why the foreigners' goods are more acceptable than British.

Apart from this, the greater adaptability of the German merchant gives him a considerable advantage. The British merchant was first in the market and has manufactured, for years, an excellent article, which the foreigner has taken because he could not get a better, or because he could not get a similar article, better or worse. But, either owing to a change of conditions or competition or even education, the foreigner comes to realise that this article is not really the best for his purpose, and he is led to think that it might be improved. The adaptable German or Austrian comes along and submits an article very likely inferior as to make, generally cheaper, never dearer, but more suited to the purpose for which it is required. As a result the English article drops out of the market.

An example may show how this comes about. English so-called light ploughs were beginning to be used in certain districts some years ago. They were thought excellent, but they were still very heavy for the needs of the country, and their use increased slowly. An Englishman who acted as an agent for the sale of such ploughs, and knew the country and its wants, devised a much lighter plough, more suitable to the country, and had one built locally by his own men as a model. It was pronounced by natives, after trial, to be a great success. He approached several big firms in England, but all refused to manufacture such an article. The Englishman went so far as to offer to take several thousands of these ploughs within a fixed term, and he

produced a bank guarantee, but it was of no use; no one would touch the light plough. Finally he applied to an American, who got it taken up in the States. He was then enabled to put it on the local market, with the result that it drove out the English plough immediately; and the agent has since sold many thousands of these American-made articles. What followed? The American manufacturers found it to their interest to send out specialists and agents to study the requirements of the country; and they have now got a very fair footing on the market with all kinds of agricultural machinery. This result has been obtained by adapting themselves and their machines to the actual needs of the country, and discovering the article best suited for the conditions of soil, draught, labour, and the pockets of the people. A dozen other examples could be given to illustrate this point of adaptability, but this, although it does not apply to the Germans, is sufficient for my argument.

In oversea trade it seems to be almost a necessity that British merchants should have a middleman in the matter, or a foreign agent, who naturally wants his commission and profit. This necessity for a foreign agent may be illustrated by the following incident. A British Consul, who had done his best to develop British trade, in answer to pressing enquiries from a British chamber of commerce, received an application from a very important firm in the Midlands in connexion with hardware, and was asked to recommend a good agent, an Englishman if possible. The Consul, after considerable difficulty, succeeded in persuading a merchant to take up the matter, and handed over the correspondence. Thereupon the merchant wrote to the British manufacturers, stating that he would take up their business on terms as to credit, etc., similar to those given him by his American suppliers, whom he was ready to give up. Several weeks passed before any answer was received, and then it came in the form of a letter from a firm of 'foreign agents' in the Midlands, who said they were acting for the manufacturing firm, and that, if the merchant wished to do business with the manufacturers, it would have to be through them; and they stated their terms. The merchant thereupon wrote to the manufacturers, referring to his previous letter, stating that he had offered to do

business with *them*, and asking why he had only heard from their foreign agents. The manufacturers replied that they were not in the habit of doing oversea trade except through such agents, and that the question of terms concerned the latter. Needless to say, the matter fell through; and the whole correspondence was handed over to the Consul for his edification.

Even if all the preliminaries are settled and the orders given, there is often a deplorable carelessness in their execution. There is a tendency on the part of manufacturers or their employees to think accuracy a matter of slight importance; the customer is a long way off, and in goes the damaged piece of stuff or the short length, which should not have got in at all. The same carelessness is apt to show itself in regard to punctuality and the delivery of orders up to time. The British merchant has got himself a very bad name in this respect, whereas it is just the contrary with his competitors. Turkey has special demands, special markets and seasons; for instance, when the peasants begin to sell their harvest, there is a very brisk business, lasting perhaps only a couple of months or so. The up-country merchants come down perhaps some six weeks ahead of the harvest, when they know that a good harvest is assured, to buy their stocks for the coming season. The oversea merchant has chosen his samples and sent his orders to England early in the year, with a specified time for delivery. If the goods are not forthcoming in time, the merchant has lost his market for the year and probably a good many of his principal regular customers. Unluckily this is of frequent occurrence. The following example is authentic. One season, out of some two hundred orders placed by an agent with his principals, only one was up to time, and that was a small order sent out by parcel post. No other order came forward within six weeks of contract time; others were over six months late. There was no valid excuse; the most that could be urged was 'press of business.' That concern, needless to say, did not last long, but it virtually ruined a very good agent on the local market. It is to be clearly understood that this is no exceptional case; but it is almost impossible to imagine such a thing happening with a German merchant.

The necessity of complying with the requirements of the customer and the neglect of the British manufacturer to do so may be illustrated by the following example. A merchant invited a British house to supply galvanised pails of a special size and measurement. Eventually the first part of the order came forward, and the remainder was on its way, when the oversea merchant discovered that the diameter of the pails sent was about three-quarters of an inch too big. They were excellent pails, but of no use for their particular purpose. The British manufacturer was indignant when the oversea merchant complained, because, said he, 'I ought to have charged you more; you have got more metal than you should have had.' There was more metal in the pails than was ordered, no doubt; but it was just this that made them useless. In Turkey almost every house, rich or poor, has at least one cistern, generally built under the house, for storing rainwater; and there is a small aperture in the lid through which the pail is let down to draw up water. For some reason or other—the East is the East—the aperture is always a certain size, neither bigger nor smaller; and the pails furnished were just too big.

One more example of similar carelessness may be given. An oversea merchant wanted to capture a certain trade, which was in the hands of Austrians. It was the import of scythes; and the only difference between the ordinary British scythe and the kind in vogue in the interior is that the haft is at a different angle with the blade. The scythe is used by the natives for reaping grain; and, as the stalk is not of much importance, the reaper need not bend low to his work, as he does in this country. Several samples of the native scythe were sent to a British manufacturer, and special attention was called to the absolute necessity of the haft being set on at the proper angle. When the goods came forward, the haft was found to be according to the usual English model, and no account had been taken of the special requirements. The only excuse forthcoming was that the English model was much better than those sent, and the default could be remedied by the special handles as supplied by the manufacturer at so much each.

A few words before closing about commercial travellers. The German commercial traveller is generally a



specialist, speaks several languages, and is well up in his subject. He is there not only to sell his principal's goods but to get the customer's ideas. He studies the market, the requirements of the country, the article required, suggests and improves, and helps the customer in every way, leaving a feeling of confidence and mutual satisfaction behind him on his departure. His British compeer is but seldom seen, nor is he, as a rule, very efficient. He may know the article he 'travels in,' but he does not know languages—a few words of French, perhaps, or, as an alternative, a little German, form his linguistic equipment, and he is generally absolutely dependent on the local agent. Our travellers are not so well trained in their business as are the German. They should be better educated; they should endeavour to study not only the article required but the needs of the customer. They are too fond of being shown round by the agent, and fail to get into touch with the right people. Perhaps, owing to class differences in England, the employer has not sufficient confidence in his man to give him full powers, or to be guided by his advice. If only the younger partners in a firm, or the sons of the owners, would go round as the Belgians and the Germans do, they would learn something. However, the war will change a good many things; and it may be hoped that British manufacturers, merchants, and agents will be able in the future to get rid of the defects which we have thought it necessary to point out. If to this improvement on their part is added judicial governmental support and a more enterprising spirit among bankers and others in the matter of financial assistance, there is no reason why we should not recover much of the ground we have lost of late years.



Art. 3.—AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

1. *Historical Sketch of the United States Department of Agriculture ; Its Objects and Present Organization.* Compiled by Charles H. Greathouse. Washington : Govt. Printing Office, 1907.
2. *Hearings before the Committee of Agriculture, House of Representatives, on the Agricultural Appropriation Bill.* Sixty-Fourth Congress ; First Session. Washington : Govt. Printing Office, 1915.
3. *A Brief Statutory History of the United States Department of Agriculture.* By Francis G. Caffey. Case and Comment, February and March, 1916. Volume XXII, Nos 9 and 10.
4. *Programme of Work of the United States Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year 1916-1917.* Prepared under the Direction of the Secretary of Agriculture by E. H. Bradley, July 1, 1916. Washington : Govt. Printing Office, 1916.
5. *Congressional Record.* Vols LI and LIV. Washington : Govt. Printing Office, 1914, 1917.

THE Department of Agriculture at Washington has been a department of first rank in the executive branch of the Government of the United States—a department presided over by a Cabinet Minister—since 1889. In these twenty-eight years it has gradually acquired one outstanding distinction. With the single exception of the Post Office, it is to-day in more close and frequent touch with the hundred million inhabitants of the United States, and it renders them more constant and direct service, than any other department of state at Washington. There is no state department at Whitehall with which it can well be compared. Comparison is not possible, because the work of the Department of Agriculture at Washington comprises work that at Whitehall is divided among at least three departments—the Board of Agriculture, the Local Government Board, and the Education Department ; and also because the Department of Agriculture at Washington does much work that, owing to differences in conditions in England and the United States, has no counterpart in governmental undertakings at Whitehall.

Agricultural colleges and farm experiment stations, deriving much of their income from the Federal Government, are established in all the states. Through these colleges and experiment stations, and also through county agricultural leaders and demonstrators, appointed under an Act of Congress of 1914 known as the Smith-Lever Act, the Department of Agriculture is carrying out an educational programme as wide as the continent. In the administration of pure-food laws enacted by Congress, as distinct from those enacted by the state legislatures, the Department also discharges some duties that in England are delegated to the Local Government Board. In this work the Department at Washington serves all the people of the United States—the people of the cities as well as those of the rural areas. Its educational work, on the other hand, is in the direct interest of the men and women, the boys and girls on the six million farms in the United States.

This article is concerned only with the educational work of the Department of Agriculture. The simplest method of describing the work of Congress and of the Department on behalf of good agriculture and efficient farm economy is to take the budget of one of the state agricultural colleges, and show the connexion of Congress and the Department with the sixty-six agricultural colleges and with the farm experiment stations associated with the colleges, and the connexion of the colleges and the Department with the vast scheme of educational extension work now being carried out under the Smith-Lever Act of 1914.

The budget of the agricultural college of the State of Illinois, for the year 1916-1917, shows that it received grants from the Federal Government towards the cost of its maintenance under three heads : \*

1. For the endowment of teaching in agriculture and the mechanic arts (Morrill and Nelson funds) annually . . . . .	\$50,000,000
2. For investigation in agriculture (Hatch and Adams funds) . . . . .	30,000,000
3. For demonstration work in agriculture and home economics (Smith and Lever funds, 1916-17) . . . . .	58,184,030
Total . . . . .	\$138,184,030

\* Cf. 'Congressional Record,' 1917, vol. lrv, no. 52, 3177, 3178.

In some states there is more than one agricultural college. The total number in 1917 is sixty-six. The history of these institutions is soon told. So long as the old doctrines of the Democratic party were maintained in their integrity at Washington, the Federal Government had no connexion, direct or indirect, with education. Any extension of the powers and functions of the Federal Government was antagonistic to the principles of the Democratic party; and in 1857 the first bill passed by Congress for aiding the state governments to establish colleges for the teaching of agriculture was vetoed by President Buchanan. The bill had been introduced by Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont. Four years later, after the election of Lincoln, and of a new House of Representatives, Morrill reintroduced his bill. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate; and in June 1862 there was enacted the law under which what have since been known as the Land Grant Colleges came into existence.

The Federal Government at that time was much in the position of the Government at Ottawa after it acquired the larger part of the vast territory of the Hudson Bay Company in 1869. It had enormous areas of public land at its disposal; and, with money accruing from these lands, the agricultural colleges, now under the control of the state governments, were founded. By the Act of 1862 each of the then existing states received from the Federal Government a large donation of public land. Representation in the Lower House at Washington is based on population; and under the Morrill Act there was apportioned to each state an area of land equal to thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative in Congress to whom the state was entitled by the apportionment under the census of 1860. As the lands so assigned were sold, the money accruing was directed by the Morrill Act to be invested in bonds of the United States or in state bonds. The money was to form a perpetual fund; and the interest accruing from it was to be applied to the support and maintenance of at least one college in each state,

' where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics,

to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the states may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life.'

It was specifically provided in another section of the Act of 1862 that no portion of the land grant fund, nor any of the interest accruing from the fund, should be applied, directly or indirectly, under any pretence whatever, to the purchase, erection, preservation or repair of buildings. In establishing a land grant college, a state government might use a sum of money not exceeding ten per cent. of the amount it received, in the purchase of a site for a college, or in the purchase of an experimental farm. Otherwise, by the Morrill Act, and also by four subsequent Acts for aiding the states in promoting the teaching of agriculture, the cost of buildings for agricultural colleges has always been a charge on the states.

Over agricultural colleges established under the Morrill Act the Federal Government had no supervision or control. It was left to the state legislatures to prescribe the course of teaching. There was no audit in the interest of the Federal Government, no examination, test or inspection to ascertain whether the Federal Government, as representing the people of all the states, was getting value for its money. All the duties of a state government to the nation outside its own borders in respect to its agricultural college, largely maintained by the Federal Government, had been discharged when copies of the annual report of the college, 'recording any improvement and experiments made, with their costs and results,' had been forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior at Washington, and also to all the other colleges endowed by the land grants of 1862.

Between 1862, when the Federal Government made possible an agricultural college in every state, and 1914, when the Smith-Lever Act was passed, three additional grants were made to the state agricultural colleges for the extension of their work. The first was in 1887. Congress then passed an Act providing for the establishment of agricultural experiment stations in connexion with the agricultural colleges. A grant of \$15,000 a year

was made to each state for the maintenance of an experiment station. The work to be undertaken was defined in the Act as follows :

'To conduct original researches or verify experiments in the physiology of plants and animals; the diseases to which they are severally subject, with remedies for the same; the chemical composition of useful plants at their different stages of growth; the comparative advantages of rotative cropping, as pursued under a varying series of crops; the capacity of new plants or trees for acclimation; the analysis of soils and water; the chemical composition of manures, natural or artificial, with experiments designed to test their comparative effects on crops of different kinds; the adaptation and value of grasses and forage plants; the composition and digestibility of the different kinds of food for domestic animals; the scientific and economic questions involved in the production of butter and cheese; and such other researches or experiments bearing directly on the agricultural industry of the United States as may in each case be deemed advisable, having due regard to the varying conditions and needs of the respective states or territories.'

It was under this law of 1887 that, for the first time, the Department of Agriculture at Washington was brought into direct connexion with the work of the agricultural colleges. The connexion was effected by a section of the Act which directs that, in order to secure, so far as possible, uniformity of methods and results in the work of the experiment stations, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture to furnish forms for the tabulation of the results of investigations or experiments; to indicate from time to time such lines of enquiry as to him shall seem most important; and in general to furnish such advice and assistance as will best promote the purpose of the Act.

A few years after the experiment stations had been established, the American Association of Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations was organised; and, chiefly at the instance of this association, Congress in 1906 increased the appropriation for each experiment station from \$15,000 to \$30,000 a year. Earlier than this—in 1890—by what is known as the Nelson Act, an additional annual appropriation was made to each of the

agricultural colleges. The net result of these Acts of Congress of 1862, 1887 and 1906, for the advancement of the teaching of agriculture, was that in 1914—the year before the Smith-Lever Act went into operation—each state was receiving from the federal treasury \$50,000 a year for its agricultural college, and \$30,000 for its experiment station.

Since, in all this legislation, the cost of the buildings at agricultural colleges and at experiment stations, with their maintenance and repair, is thrown on the state, and all the state legislatures make annual appropriations for their colleges, it will be realised that this liberal expenditure in the interest of agriculture by federal and state governments has popular support. The agricultural college in most states is regarded with much local pride. It is in more helpful contact with the people than any other state institution, with the single exception of the common school. The four-year courses at the agricultural college—courses extending from October to June—as well as the numerous shorter special courses, are open to men and women; and usually there are no tuition fees for residents of the state.

Long before the Smith-Lever Act made large funds available for extension work, the agricultural colleges were centres of a continuous propaganda in the interest of good farming and improved farm homes. The work was carried on in the class-room, at the experiment station, on the lecture platform, through farmers' local organisations, known all over the United States as 'granges,' at state and local agricultural shows, through the local press, and in some states also through the primary and secondary schools.

In these years, before the United States Government made appropriations to the states for extension work, there existed in the Department of Agriculture a division which was exclusively concerned with the work at the state experiment stations. Its functions, which since the Smith-Lever Act came into operation have been taken over by the states relation service bureau of the Department, were to carry out the provisions of the Acts of 1887 and 1906; to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to certify to the treasury department when federal grants might properly be paid to the state experiment stations;



to report to Congress regarding the work and expenditures of the stations; and to aid the stations in the effective development of their work.

Inspectors from the bureau visit each experiment station at least once a year. Its work and its expenditure are carefully examined; and on the basis of reports made by these inspectors, warrants are issued on the United States treasury for the payment of the grants to the various states. There have been instances of grants being withheld because conditions at the experiment stations did not warrant the appropriations being paid. Stations must submit their schemes of work—what are known at Washington as their projects—to the Secretary of Agriculture, practically to the States Relations Service Bureau. These schemes are sometimes modified at the instance of the bureau; and some schemes have been withdrawn because of disapproval by the bureau.

While the agricultural colleges were extending their work by means of the federal grants of 1887, 1890 and 1906, and of liberal appropriations from the state legislatures, larger appropriations were made by Congress to the Department of Agriculture, and its work was greatly extended. The appropriation for the Department for 1887-1888, the year in which Congress made its first grant to the colleges for experiment stations, was \$637,000. Ten years later, in 1898-1899, the appropriation had risen to nearly \$2,500,000. In 1908 it was nearly \$10,000,000; and for 1913-1914, the year before the Smith-Lever Act came into operation, it was \$16,651,000.

With the enactment of the Smith-Lever law the Department entered on a new era. It began to have a direct, as distinct from an indirect part in what may be described as the popular teaching of agriculture and farm economy. From 1887 to 1914 its work for agricultural education was, in the main, done through the state experiment stations, and by means of bulletins and reports sent through the post to farmers, cotton growers, grain growers, cattlemen, foresters and lumbermen, market gardeners, fruit growers, and poultry men. The most widely-circulated of the Department's publications is the 'Farmers' Bulletin.' This is a publication of twenty octavo pages—pages a trifle larger than those of the 'Quarterly Review.' The bulletins are written in plain



language, and are adapted to the different sections of the country, 'their specific object being to tell farmers how and when to do things.' Seventy-seven of these bulletins were published in 1914. Reprints were also issued of 243 earlier bulletins for which there had been calls; and in 1914 in the aggregate 14,795,000 bulletins were sent through the mails.

What are known as Department Bulletins are more specialised than the Farmers' Bulletins. They are concerned with subjects of interest to fruit growers, truck growers (the American term for market gardeners), poultry men, and lumbermen. They are intended for men who are specialists, actively engaged in these various industries, and who, while not technical men, are more or less professional, and can be described as professional workers. Included in the Department Bulletins are what are known as Professional Papers, in which information on highly technical subjects is communicated to scientists or technologists in the same or allied fields of enquiry. These bulletins are issued in editions averaging six thousand copies. They are distributed free to applicants.

Purely scientific and technical subjects are handled in the 'Journal of Agricultural Research,' which is issued weekly, and is sent free to the agricultural colleges and experiment stations, and to technical schools and universities. The Experiment Station Record is a technical review of the world's scientific literature pertaining to agriculture. Its free distribution is restricted to the staffs at agricultural colleges and experiment stations. The 'Weekly News Letter' is a quarto sheet of four pages, three columns to a page. It contains news of the more important activities of the Department, with articles on farm practice and home economics. Its circulation is restricted to the employees of the Department in Washington and in the field, to crop correspondents, and to various agencies that cooperate in the work of the Department. The Monthly Crop Report, distributed to all persons sufficiently interested to ask that their names should be placed on the mailing list, publishes data concerning current agricultural conditions. Its chief features are estimates of acreage, reports of conditions, and statistics as to yields and prices. At the end of each month comes the list of publications. It

gives a brief description of each publication issued during the month, and an indication of the region of the country to which it is adapted. It is by means of this list that miscellaneous applicants are enabled to keep in touch with the Department, and to ask for those publications in which they are interested.

The duties and functions of the Department between 1887 and 1914 came to include much that might not inaptly be described as police work, chiefly in connexion with the administration of the federal pure-food code, the stamping-out of disease among cattle, and the eradication of insects and diseases that work havoc in the plant world. But it was chiefly through its supervision of the work of the state experiment stations, and through its various widely-circulated publications, that the Department made its contribution to the propaganda for improved farming and better economic and social conditions in the farming communities.

For some years before the new era in the history of the Department, which began after the passage of the Smith-Lever Act, several of the larger agricultural colleges, with some help from semi-public organisations like the Rockefeller Foundation, or from chambers of commerce, or from state associations for the improvement of agriculture, had been engaged in extension work. The college faculties had organised itinerant schools for the teaching of agriculture. Not content with the work they were doing with their four-year students or their short-course students, they had sent their teachers into the rural communities, where they conducted schools for even as short a period as two weeks and then moved on to another community. In a considerable number of states county agencies had also been established. Graduates of agricultural colleges, after they had had two or three years of actual experience on farms, and 'had made good' (to use the American expression), were appointed resident county agents at salaries from \$1200 to \$1800 a year, and commissioned to devote the whole of their time to visiting farms, instructing farmers in new and improved methods of work, and in improving the general farm economy of the counties in which they are placed. Women graduates of the agricultural colleges who had specialised while at college in the care of poultry and in

farm home economy, were similarly appointed, to devote their time to the education of the women of the farms in matters pertaining to farm home management.

It was found, so early as 1912, that this extension work by the agricultural colleges was highly appreciated in the farming communities of the states in the south and west in which it had been undertaken; that the county agents were welcome on the farms, in the farm homes, and in the rural schools, where they helped to organise corn clubs, pig clubs, and poultry clubs among boys and girls from the farm homes. It was perceived that this direct teaching was resulting in more efficient farming, in better-kept and more sanitary farm houses, in the introduction of much labour-saving machinery and many labour-saving appliances on the land and in the homes, in more attention to farm gardens and better home economy, and finally that it was obviously tending to make farm life more attractive to the boys and girls of the farms. It was also realised at Washington that colleges which embarked in this direct teaching of agriculture and farm economy should not be dependent on semi-public sources for the funds with which to carry it on, but that it was a mission in which the Department of Agriculture should have some part, and over which the Department should have some supervision, as since 1887 it has had over the state experiment stations.

A Bill for aid by the Federal Government was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1912. It did not pass in that session, but in 1914 the Smith-Lever Bill was submitted to Congress by the House committee on agriculture. Mr Asbury F. Lever, of North Carolina, was chairman of that committee. Mr Hoke Smith, of Georgia, was chairman of the Senate committee on agriculture. Hence the names attached to the Bill. These two standing committees, it should be explained, form the link between the Department of Agriculture and Congress. The Appropriation Bill for the Department is framed by the committee of the House of Representatives. The chairman of the committee is in charge of the Bill when it is before the House. After it has passed the House it goes to the Senate. There it is referred to the committee on agriculture; and the chairman of this

committee is in charge of the Bill while it is before the Senate. The sittings of the House committee are open to the public; and at these hearings, in each session of Congress, there is an investigation of the various lines of activity of the Department. It is by means of these hearings that Congress maintains its supervision and control over the Department; and, moreover, the public is, or can be, informed of its activities, and of the cost to the national treasury of its work.

The Appropriation Bill for 1916-17 allotted nearly \$25,000,000 for the various services of the Department. Separate votes for each division or bureau, with details as to the duties and salaries of employees, are embodied in the Bill. It is intimated beforehand by the chairman of the committee what votes will be taken on a given day. The chief of the bureau whose vote is before the committee, accompanied by his principal associates, is then in attendance. Each of these officials is subject to a searching examination by the chairman and by the members of the committee as to the services to which a particular vote is to be applied. Examination of the chiefs of bureaus and divisions in this way is necessary, because the position of the chairman on the floor of the House of Representatives is similar to that of the parliamentary chief of a department at Whitehall, part of whose business it is to carry the estimates of his department through committee in the House of Commons. The chairman of the committee on agriculture at Washington must know in detail the purpose of every vote in the Appropriation Bill in order that he may make his general statement in support of the Bill, and also be in a position to answer any question regarding the work of the Department of Agriculture that may be asked by members of the House.

The Smith-Lever Bill originated with the committee on agriculture of the House of Representatives. Under its provisions a grant of \$10,000 a year is made to each of the states for extension work, and a second grant, based on the rural population of the state, is made subject to the condition that a corresponding grant for extension work is made by the state legislature. The rural population of a state is arrived at by deducting from the total population all the towns in which there are more than

2500 inhabitants. For the year 1916-17 the total grant was \$1,580,000. Each year until 1921 the grant will be increased; and, when the maximum is reached, a little over \$5,250,000 a year from the federal treasury will be available as the contribution of the Federal Government towards the cost of the extension work of the state colleges of agriculture.

Mr Lever introduced the Bill to the House in a speech in which he recalled the educational work of the Department of Agriculture, and emphasised the importance of associating the Department with the extension work of the agricultural colleges:

'We have (he said) accumulated in the agricultural colleges and in the Department of Agriculture sufficient agricultural information, which if made available to the farmers of the country, and used by them, would work a complete and absolute revolution in the social, economic, and financial condition of our rural population. The great problem we are up against now is to find the machinery by which we can link up the man on the farm with these various sources of information. We have expended in the neighbourhood of a hundred million dollars in the last half century gathering together valuable agricultural truths. We have spent fifty years in trying to find an efficient agency for spreading the information throughout the country, and putting it into the hands of the people for whom it was collected.

'We have tried the Farmers' Bulletin. We have tried the press. We have tried the lecture and the institute work. All these agencies have done good. They have been efficient in a measure. But there is not an agricultural student in the country who does not realise that the greatest efficiency is not being had from those agencies. This Bill proposes to set up a system of general demonstration teaching throughout the country; and the agent in the field of the Department and the college is to be the mouthpiece through which this information will reach the people—the man and woman and the boy and girl on the farm. You cannot make the farmer change the methods which have been sufficient to earn a livelihood for himself and his family for many years unless you show him, under his own vine and fig tree, as it were, that you have a system better than the system which he himself has been following. The plan proposed undertakes to do that by personal contact—by going on to his farm, under his own soil and climatic conditions,

and demonstrating that you have a method which in results surpasses his own.'\*

One supporter of the Bill, Mr G. H. Young, of North Dakota, summed up the case for it thus: 'It enlarges,' he said, 'the work of the colleges. In fact, it makes every farm a class-room.' In the discussion, nine out of ten speeches were in favour of the Bill; and several tributes were paid to Dr Seaman A. Knapp, of the Department of Agriculture, the pioneer of demonstration work, who from 1902 to 1910 was in charge of farmers' co-operative demonstration work in the southern states. It was Dr Knapp's conviction that sufficient knowledge, applicable and helpful to the farming industry, was annually worked out in the Department of Agriculture and at the State experiment stations to readjust agriculture and place it upon a basis of greater profit, to reconstruct the rural home, and to give to country life an attraction, a dignity, and a potential influence it has never possessed. 'This body of knowledge,' Dr Seaman wrote, 'cannot be conveyed and delivered by a written message to the people in such a way that they will accept and adopt it. This can only be done by personal appeal and ocular demonstration.'

The problems with which the Department of Agriculture and the teachers of agriculture and farm economy are confronted are various. Among these are the one-crop areas; the large proportion of farmers who are owners of the land they cultivate, but make a poor living and have little money at their disposal; the chronic shortage of labour in all farming communities; the large number of farms in the hands of new-comers from European countries who cannot read English; and the large areas in the southern cotton-growing states, where tens of thousands of small plantations—one-mule farms—are rented by negroes.

One of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Bill in the Senate, Mr F. M. Simmons of North Carolina, insisted that demonstration work, such as was contemplated by the Bill, was most urgently needed for the coloured farmers of the southern states.

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\* 'Cong. Rec.,' vol. LI, pt II, 193.



'They own (he said) their own teams; they rent their lands; they either pay a certain amount of money, or they pay a part of the crop. They cultivate the land upon their own initiative. They do not come to the landowner or to the superintendent of the farm and ask him how their farm is to be cultivated. So the coloured man must be treated as an independent farmer, having his own notions about farming. And he has notions about it, and they are very firm and fixed and stubborn notions too, which you cannot get out of his head by sending him literature. The only way you can get those notions out of his head, if they are bad—and in some instances they *are* bad, because he is not a very successful farmer—is to teach him by object-lessons the better way; to show him some particular method by which he can increase the yield of his cotton patch, his corn patch, or his potato patch. Let him see as a matter of actual demonstration the well-cultivated land right by the side of his poorly cultivated land, and let him see the method employed from day to day in developing the new agricultural methods, and next year he will adopt them, for he is an imitative creature. Show him they are good and he will adopt them; but you have got to show him by demonstration.' \*

Generally speaking, there was no serious or sustained opposition to the Smith-Lever Bill. Some speakers in both houses complained that, in view of what had been done for manufacturing communities by means of the protective tariff, and in view of what had been done for waterside cities by river and harbour appropriation bills, singularly little had been done by the Government for the farming communities; and there were outspoken references to the condition of American farming.

'It is humiliating for an American farmer,' said Senator Simmons, 'to go to Europe and find how much more the European farmer is producing. . . . It is a lamentable fact that to-day the United States is more backward in its agriculture than any nation of the world standing in the same class as the United States. We are actually reaching a condition in this country, where we are not producing much more than enough to supply our own population.' †

Speeches of similar import were made when the Bill was before the House of Representatives. 'What must

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\* 'Cong. Rec.,' vol. LI, pt II, 2739.

† Ibid., 2737-38.



be done,' asked Mr Dudley M. Hughes, of Georgia, 'to keep the boy on the farm?' 'Conditions,' he answered, 'must change in order to keep him there.' Mr Hughes estimated that in the last ten years there has been in the United States an increase of twenty-three per cent. in acreage under cultivation, an increase of thirty-five per cent. in production, and an increase of sixty per cent. in consumption. 'If this ratio continues,' added Mr Hughes, 'this country will in ten or fifteen years be an importer of food instead of an exporter.' The conditions described by Mr Simmons and Mr Hughes are matters of common knowledge. They have been emphasised during the last eighteen months in the almost continual discussions of the high cost of living. One reason for these conditions, and in particular for the tendency of boys to leave the farms for the cities, was suggested in the course of the debate on the Smith-Lever Bill in the Senate by Senator Gronna, of North Dakota, who is a member of the committee on agriculture. 'There is no industry except farming,' he remarked, 'in which a man has to accept the price offered by the buyer.'

The Smith-Lever law came into operation in the fiscal year 1914-15. Some details of its working were forthcoming in the session of Congress of 1915-16, when the appropriation for the Department of Agriculture was before the committee of agriculture of the House of Representatives. They were given to the committee by Mr C. B. Smith, chief of the office of extension work, one of the subdivisions of the states relation service bureau of the Department.

'The department and the college (said Mr Smith) employ a state leader who is in charge of all county work. The state leader selects the county agent, inaugurates and directs his work, subject to the approval of his superior officers, who are the director of the extension service and the director of the states relation service in the department at Washington. The state leader has to find men who understand the science of agriculture and the practice of agriculture. He takes graduates of the colleges who have remained in the state, and who have made a success in the practice of agriculture. He takes the agent down to the county where he is to be employed, and lets the people look him over, and see whether or not he is acceptable to them. His employment is the joint

action of the county, the state, and the Department of Agriculture. . . . The county agent's business is to bring to his county everything that is appropriate to that locality. If the farmers need a cow-testing association, he will help them to organise it. If they need a breeding association, he will help them with it. The one big thing that he needs . . . is to have a good organisation of farmers behind him, supporting him in his work, and helping him to shape up the work itself.\*

More details of the work of the county agents in the fifteen southern states were furnished to the committee by Mr Bradford Knapp, who is in charge of extension work in the south :

'The county agent goes to a man, and if he can persuade him to become interested in growing better corn [i.e. maize] and in doing it more economically, he says: "How many acres will you take?" The farmer answers that he will take one or five, or whatever it is. The agent says: "On this land I want you to follow the directions I shall give you. We will put our heads together to discover what is the best way to handle your crop. You follow your own plan on the rest of the farm." The preparation of the land is gone into; and the county agent tells him what variety of corn he would like to have him plant, and helps him to get a variety adapted to that particular soil and climate. He gives him instructions about planting, and the method of cultivation of the crop. In the fall the seed is selected for the next crop. The agent shows the farmer the method of seed selection. That corn is harvested, measured and weighed. They get the average of that and the average of the near-by corn, and the farmer makes a report to the county agent. Throughout the season the county agent visits the farmer at such times as it is necessary to give him instructions. He may not be there when the cultivation is taking place, but comes around once in every three or four weeks to see how the crop is coming on. When he comes, he invites the farmers of the neighbourhood, tells them what he is doing, and discusses with them the methods that have been employed in cultivating this particular crop.'

Extension work with the women on the farms in the south was begun in 1910. In reviewing this work before

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\* 'Hearings before the Committee of Agriculture,' 1915-16, 1431.

† Ibid., 1205.

the committee on agriculture, Mr Knapp stated that in 1915 there were 350 women county agents at work in the southern states.

'They deal (he said) with the problems of the farm and farm economy. They teach home-gardening, the canning of fruits and vegetables from the gardens; they give demonstrations of labour-saving devices in the home—home-made affairs—leading to better conditions and greater economy in the home itself. Women county agents are to-day reaching approximately thirty-five thousand homes in the south.' \*

A new value attached to the work and opportunities of the county agents as soon as the United States became involved in the war, and the propaganda for increased food-production in this country began. In the agents both the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural colleges had a ready medium through which farmers and food-growers could be directly reached and immediately interested in the new movement. But the most obvious opportunities of utilising, for war purposes, the services of the county agents and the county leagues associated with them were to be found in the towns and cities, where, before the war, little had been known of the county agency system. Here the agents and the county leagues engaged in two new departments of work. They served as labour-recruiting agencies for farms—chiefly in recruiting boys from the high schools—and they also gave much practical help to the armies of allotment-holders that came into existence early in April last, when it was brought home to people of all classes that the food supply would be a most pressing question in the winter of 1917-1918. Local committees secured land in or near the cities for free allotments; and, through the work of these committees, lawns were broken up for vegetable gardens. County agents, and supervisors working under them, gave instruction on the spot to the amateur gardeners, and in many places they also helped them in securing seed and fertilisers.

In the fiscal year 1916-1917 approximately \$34,000,000 were being expended by the Government of the United

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\* 'Hearings,' 1209.

### 332 AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION IN U.S.

States on the Department of Agriculture, on the agricultural colleges and experiment stations, and on extension work under the Smith-Lever Act.\*

Appropriation to the department of agriculture	\$25,000,000
Morrill and Nelson funds for colleges of agriculture . . . . .	2,400,000
Hatch and Adams funds for experiment stations	1,440,000
Smith-Lever Act . . . . .	1,580,000
Meat inspection . . . . .	3,000,000
Printing funds . . . . .	600,000
Total . . . . .	\$34,020,000

The Department of Agriculture serves the urban communities in at least two ways. The inspection of all food products that enter into interstate commerce—all food products that are marketed outside the states in which they are grown and prepared for sale—comes under the Department. Many such products cannot be sold unless they bear the stamp of the Department. The urban population also shares, or can share, with the rural population in that part of the extension work which is devoted to home economics; and largely through the activities of the Federation of Women's Clubs, home economics are now being systematically studied by women in the cities. But in normal times no part of the propaganda of the Department is directed to persuading people to leave the cities in order to engage in farming. The object of the Department and of the agricultural colleges and the extension work is the same—to improve all departments of farm economy, to improve conditions on the farms and in the farm homes, and thereby to retain in rural pursuits the men, women and children who are now on the six million farms of the United States.

EDWARD PORRITT.

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\* 'Cong. Rec.,' vol. LIV, No. 52, 3178.

Art. 4.—THE PLACE-NAMES OF ENGLAND. ✓

1. *Names and their Histories*. By Isaac Taylor. Rivington, 1894.
2. *Notes on Staffordshire, Worcestershire, and Warwickshire Place-Names*. By W. H. Duignan. London: Frowde, 1902-1912.
3. *The Place-Names of Hertfordshire* (Hertford: Austin, 1904); of *Huntingdonshire* (Cambridge: Deighton, 1904); of *Bedfordshire* (Deighton, 1906); of *Cambridgeshire* (Deighton, 1901); of *Berkshire* (Clarendon Press, 1911); of *Suffolk* (Deighton, 1913). By Professor Skeat.
4. *The Place-Names of Lancashire*. By Professor H. C. Wyld and T. Oakes Hurst. Constable, 1911.
5. *The Place-Names of Oxfordshire*. By Henry Alexander. Clarendon Press, 1912.
6. *The Place-Names of England and Wales*. By Rev. James B. Johnston. Murray, 1915.

And other works.

MAPS are documents which have a fascination for many people to whom geography as a science is unknown. They are eloquent of the life both of the present and the past, vivid records of human endeavour and the obstacles which it has overcome. In these days of wide-spread education there are few people who have not some general notion of at least the map of their own country and of the world as a whole; and there are many who take up an atlas and study it as a matter of general interest, learning thereby, perhaps unconsciously, to know outlines and positions scattered over the world's surface. There is much that a map can tell to any one who studies it intelligently; but even for the most intelligent observer there is an infinite amount of information lying on the face of it which can only be appreciated after a large measure of study and enquiry. Much has been done of late years to transform maps into living documents, and to make the events of the past live by reference to them; and this has both quickened and induced the interest taken in them.

But there are two elements in a map—the physical features, which man can modify to a very limited extent by the processes of engineering and agriculture; and the nomenclature, which is entirely of his own creation.

Many books, both elaborate and elementary, have been written on the physical features of the British Isles; but it is only of late years that the study of British place-names has been carried out in a scientific fashion; and, so far, the trustworthy material relates only to certain of the counties of England. But that which has been done has laid a solid foundation of method which future enquirers and students can follow with the assurance that it provides the means of arriving at truth undiluted by misleading fancy. For many generations, place-names afforded an all-too ample field for the speculations and guesses of the antiquary who, innocent of philological knowledge, made large generalisations from mistaken particulars, and rushed to any conclusion which might add a dramatic interest to the subject. Still, if he erred, he erred splendidly; and his work had this merit, at any rate, that it made men realise the interest of the subject which he had treated with so free a hand and so uncontrolled an imagination.

In order to understand place-names it is necessary to realise how they came into existence. Men find it necessary to carry in their heads some sort of a plan of the region in which they live. In the days before maps this necessity was met by giving each topographical feature, whether natural or artificial, its own name. Each field in an English parish had its special name by which it was known to the parishioners; and thus the dwellers in the neighbourhood carried about in their heads a fair working knowledge of its topography. And what applies to the small area of the parish applies to the larger area of the kingdom, and to the still larger area of the world. With the growing use of the map field-names are passing out of use. But this is partly due to increased facilities for travel. In old days, when men moved within much smaller areas than now, their minds were naturally much more concentrated on them, and on the minutiae of their natural features. Darwin, in his account of the cruise of the 'Beagle,' relates how he was struck with the minuteness in the distinction of natural objects displayed in the language of the Indians of the island of Chiloe, off the west coast of South America. Their topographical vocabulary was



larger than those found among civilised races. It is the same with the beginnings of English nomenclature.

In the vast majority of cases the place-names of this country go back at earliest to Saxon, at latest to Danish, times; and the earliest extant sources are documents of the period before the Norman Conquest. Those documents are largely charters recording grants of land, which have often appended to them a more or less detailed statement of the boundaries of the land in question. The first thing that strikes the student of these documents is the abundance of what would appear in translation to be synonymous terms. At the present day men speak of a brook or a stream, or sometimes of a bourne or streamlet; but they do not really use them as distinctive terms, save that the last implies a stream of small size. For the rest the terms as used in modern times are generic rather than specific, employed indifferently by the ordinary man to denominate a stream of any kind. But our Anglo-Saxon forefathers made fine distinctions between different kinds of streams. They distinguished nine different types of them. 'Broc' survives in our 'brook,' 'Lac,' used of a slow-flowing stream, is still used in Hampshire in the form 'lake' with the meaning 'brook,' and is used in the same sense in field-names in the south of England. 'Rith' and 'rithig,' used of very small streams, survive very rarely in field-names; but 'rith' is still applied to streams flowing through the mud of the harbours of the Hampshire coast. 'Floda' and 'baec' were different kinds of intermittent brooks. The former survives in the form 'flood' in field-names, the latter in many place-names containing the element 'beck.' There is the same fineness of distinction with regard to different kinds of hollows or valleys, which are called either combes, slades, deans, haies, or lithes according to their types. Moreover, each combe, slade, and so forth, had its own name; and the haies, with individual names, included mere depressions in hillsides such as would hardly be noticed at the present day.

A place-name is commonly formed of two elements, of which the second gives the genus, the first the species or, it may be, the individuality of the object named. The

imaginative and poetical element, so often present in the place-names of Celtic lands, is conspicuous by its absence from Anglo-Saxon and Danish nomenclature. It is true that spirits like Puck and Grim do sometimes contribute to the vocabulary; but that is due to superstition, not to poetry—a superstition usually connected with some great work, such as a dyke of mighty length, which the Saxons, measuring human endeavour by their own, ascribed to superhuman agency. For the rest, our Teutonic forefathers were a strictly practical race, who called objects by the most direct of descriptive terms. It was very characteristic of them to call places by the name of the person who owned them, or, at any rate, lived on or near them; and, as ninety-nine out of every hundred of these eponymous heroes are totally unknown to history, the habit does not add either romance or interest to the study of English place-names.\* But it is not without its significance, because it points to the idea of private property in land having been strongly developed in, at any rate, the last centuries of the Saxon period, whatever communal ownership may have existed in the early days of settlement. The application of personal names to all kinds of objects in nature is a very remarkable feature in Saxon nomenclature. Of 262 village and hamlet names in Oxfordshire which are composed of the usual two elements, the first element is personal in 100 cases, descriptive in 153, and doubtful in the remaining 9.†

Town and village names in England throw some light on the life of those who gave and used them, because they were themselves brought into existence by the circumstances of that life. But the local names and the field-names of the parishes of this country are still more illuminating. It is possible to draw up a typical description of the distribution of certain common local names

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\* Cwichelms Hlaew, the modern Skutchammer Knob, on the Berkshire downs above Hendred, east of Wantage, is undoubtedly the tomb of an early king of Wessex. Cerdices Beorh, 'Cerdic's Barrow,' which has now disappeared, stood, as the Saxon charter of St Mary Bourne in Hampshire shows, in the south-west corner of Hurstbourne Priors. It is very probable that it is the tomb of the famous Saxon founder of the Wessex kingdom.

† In Berkshire the numbers are: 75 personal; 95 descriptive; 3 doubtful. In Cambridgeshire: 60 personal; 66 descriptive; 22 doubtful.

in the parishes of the south of England.\* There is the village, probably near the centre of the parish. Round the village will be found fields, often called furlongs. Somewhere near a stream in the parish will be found fields called meads. These last may or may not be near the village, or may even be in a detached part of the parish. Outside the furlongs, towards the borders of the parish, will be found fields called leys or leaze; and the holts, copses, and woodlands generally, will usually be found near the parish boundary.

The distribution of names is typical, because the life of different village communities in Saxon times did not display so much variety as at the present day. The reason for this sameness was that each community, owing to the comparative absence of means of communication, had to be self-providing in respect to the ordinary necessities of life. There was so much ploughland; and, as that was the land which especially called for labour, its situation determined the site of the village—all the more so, inasmuch as holders did not occupy continuous stretches of arable ground, but strips of it scattered throughout the area of ploughland belonging to the community.† Outside this lay the pasture or 'lea,' and the woodland necessary for building and repairing houses. The mead or hay-land was always near a stream, since, in the days before grass seed, the water meadow was the only land on which hay grew. There

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\* The present writer cites the case of the south of England, because he is fairly well acquainted with the field-names of that region. To acquire a working knowledge of the field-names of the whole of the country would be the work of a lifetime. Still, it is probable that the distribution of local names is not very different in the other parts of this country.

† An instance taken from quite modern times will illustrate the circumstances under which farming was carried on in Saxon days. In the village of North Moreton in Berkshire the Enclosure Act was not put into force till after the Tithe Award was made—about 1840. So the map attached to the Tithe Award shows the old agricultural system. This little parish of 1100 acres was divided into more than 1500 plots of land. In very few instances indeed were two adjacent plots in the occupation of the same person. Every holder cultivated strips of land scattered all over the 1100 acres. The largest holder cultivated 179 pieces, of which only four were adjacent to other strips in his occupation. The total area of his holding was very little more than 100 acres. Men working under such conditions were bound to live in the centre of the ploughlands of the community.

were, moreover, fields devoted to the growth of rye, flax, and woad, as is shown by local and field names. Then, too, in many of the parishes of England, the field-name Honey Ham indicates where the bees were kept in days when sugar was unknown. Even if the fact were not known from other sources, the place-names of England would clearly show that the Saxons were essentially an agricultural race. The endings -ton, -ham, -worth or -worthy, and -wick, all mean homesteads of some kind. Probably the 'worths' were farms on clearings made later than the original settlements; and 'wick' came to mean a dairy farm where cheese was made, though that may not have been its original meaning.

The Enclosure Acts of the late 18th and early 19th centuries swept away the old system of farming which had gone on with comparatively slight modifications since Saxon times, and rendered many of the terms and names in common use obsolete. They survive in the field-names of this country. 'Headland,' though still used, has lost its significance. 'Hedgerow' is now commonly applied to any hedge. Formerly, in the days when live hedges were not used—days not very far past—it meant a line or belt of trees planted to protect land from the wind. The numerous field-names which refer to the shape of fields originated at a time when the rectangular strip of plough-land was the normal shape. 'Mere' was the word used in some Berkshire parishes, till quite recent times, for an occupation road which had developed along the 'maere' or boundary of a plough-land. Curiously enough, there is no surviving trace of this use of it in Hampshire, where such roads are commonly called droves. In the field-names are to be found, too, many words used in an antique sense: such as 'callow,' in the sense of 'bare'; 'yonder,' as a comparative, meaning 'further'; 'in,' usually in compounds, meaning 'near'; 'bleak,' in the sense of the Saxon 'blac,' meaning 'bright'; 'moor,' used almost invariably in the sense of waterlogged ground near a stream; and many others.

These old names of houses, woods, brooks, and fields are just as much a part of English geographical nomenclature as the names of towns, villages, and the larger rivers. They form an enormous mine of old and mediæval

English which has been so far little worked.\* The vastness of the enterprise may be estimated by any one who realises that each parish in the country furnishes, at a very low estimate, an average of two hundred names. In many of the larger parishes the number mounts up to a thousand or even two thousand. And few counties have less than two hundred parishes, and many have twice or three times that number within their borders. Moreover, these field-names include an immense number of names of Saxon date which have no duplicates among the village and town names of the country.

There are curious differences of usage or, it may be, of dialect in neighbouring districts divided from one another by some physical feature which men in the days of no railways and bad roads did not often traverse. The line of the Berkshire downs from Swindon to Reading is one of these. Many field-names which are common north of it, in Berkshire, do not occur in Hampshire, and *vice versa*. In Berkshire, as has been said, an occupation road is often called a 'mere'; but the name is not used in Hampshire. In Hampshire a quarry or chalkpit is almost invariably called a 'dell'; but in Berkshire, though chalkpits are very common, that term is not used. These contrasts of usage can be traced back to Saxon times. 'Del' (quarry) occurs seventeen times in Hampshire charters, but only once in Berkshire, and this in a region south of the Downs, on the Hampshire borders. In Hampshire charters a boundary running along a balk of plough-land is almost invariably described as running 'along mearc'; and 'mark' is a fairly common element in Hampshire field-names, though very rare in Berkshire. In Berkshire charters a boundary running along a balk is described as running 'along (Ge)maere.' In individual names, 'Maerc' occurs thirteen times in Hampshire, and forty-five times in Berkshire charters; whereas 'mearc' occurs thirty-two times in Hampshire, and eight times in Berkshire. In Hampshire a stream is often called a 'lake'; but that use of the word does not appear in the

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\* In the field-names of the two counties of Berkshire and Hampshire alone are a number of words which are obviously common terms, but are not to be found in the great Oxford Dictionary, nor in the Dialect Dictionary, nor in Halliwell's Dictionary of Archaic Terms.

Berkshire Tithe Awards. There is a similar curious difference between the local names of Hampshire and of the Isle of Wight; but in this case it seems to go further back to the very origins of the nomenclature of the two districts. In Hampshire there are very few cases in which elements in names of ancient date are not repeated several times in the county nomenclature. But in the local names of the Isle of Wight are many elements not found in Hampshire. Is this contrast due to the Jutish settlement of Wight as contrasted with the Saxon settlement of the opposite mainland?

Many of the difficulties which beset the enquirer into the origins of place-names are well illustrated in the books under review. The first and most important lesson which recent research in the subject has taught is that the old method of guessing at the origin of names by the similarity of some element in them to some known name or common term is thoroughly unsound. The truth is that absolute certainty is only attainable when the enquirer has at his disposal old forms of the modern name; and, in the majority of instances, those forms must go back to Saxon times or, at least, very near to them. Argument from analogy or resemblance can never attain to more than high probability. Aston is one of the commonest of village and local names, and in the vast majority of instances it originates in the Saxon East-tun, 'East Farm or Village.'\* In instances where old forms of the name do not survive it would be reasonable to assume that such was the origin of the name. But Mr Duignan mentions one instance in which the old forms show an Aston to have originated in Aesc-tun, 'Farm of the Ash.' Hinton is another very common name, originating usually in Hean-tun, 'High Farm.' But the Suffolk Hinton was Hina-tun, 'Labourers' Farm.' Broughton is usually Broc-tun, 'Farm or Village of the Brook'; but the old forms of Broughton, Hants, show it to have been originally Burh-tun, 'Farm of the Fort.'†

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\* E.g. Aston, Warws. Oxon. (3 instances); Berks., Staffs. (3 instances); W. R. Yorks., Herts., Gloucs. (2 instances); Worcs. (3 instances).

† It is interesting to note that this place is the traditional site of the Roman Bridge.



Until the late Professor Skeat began his work on the village names of certain counties, the various attempts at their interpretation were of the nature of guesswork. He was the first capable philologist to deal with the subject on a large scale. Mr Duignan, a careful, though not a professed philologist, must have been at work at the same time. Two other philologists, Mr W. H. Stevenson and Dr Bradley, both of Oxford, had made considerable contributions to the enquiry; but unfortunately neither of them has had time to deal with the place-names of any county. But the references to their names in books published in recent years show the value of their work. It is to these men especially that the destruction of the old guesswork and the establishment of the enquiry on a scientific basis are mainly due. The old professed but fallacious etymology of place-names was the work of antiquaries who were ignorant of philology, and loved above all an interesting speculation.

The evolution of ordinary spoken language proceeds on definite lines which have been scientifically determined, and follows rules to which there are hardly any exceptions. With place-names this is also largely the case, save that the evolution is slower, and the exceptions, due to various causes, are more frequent. The place-name is attached in the mind of the user to a single definite object. If a dweller in a Hampshire village spoke of *Deop Denu*, 'Deep Dean,' he had not in his mind the various deep deans which are found in that and other counties, but a particular one in his own immediate neighbourhood. It was an individual name of an individual object; and the tendency was for the original pronunciation of the particular name to be handed down from father to son in an unchanged form. It is true that even such names could not wholly resist the unconscious working of sound-evolution in speech; but they offered a much more stubborn resistance to it than common terms in ordinary speech. While in ordinary speech 'deop' became 'deep,' and 'denu' became 'dean,' in the place-name 'deop' became 'dip' or 'dib,' and 'denu' became 'den.' And so there came a time when the name as pronounced, whether *Dipden* or *Dibden*, ceased to convey any meaning to later generations. The name had begun life as a common term;

it had ended as a singular term. It ceased to have any connotation. Hardly a villager in England could give a correct explanation of the name of the place in which he lives, though he would certainly pronounce it more correctly than one who knew it only from the map.

But villagers are not always passively obedient to inherited pronunciation. That very strong tendency has now and again been counteracted by another, the tendency to give a meaning to a name which conveys no meaning to later generations. In ordinary spoken language the Saxon term 'claefer' has produced 'clover'; but in place-names it has evolved into the forms 'claver'\* or 'cleaver.' This illustrates the relative slowness of sound-evolution in place-names. Here the evolution has never got beyond the Middle English form 'claver.' Thus there came a time when the man who spoke of 'clover' ceased to recognise the place-name forms as having that meaning; they had, in fact, no longer any definite meaning to him. Hence we find a *Cleverly* (Claefer-leah) Wood now standing in the Claefer-denu, 'Clover Dean,' of the charter of Droxford in Hampshire. 'Cleverly' merely represents the desire to give a meaning, however inapposite, to some meaningless term.† Sometimes regular evolution leads to apparent rationalisation by popular etymology. Ramsbury, a common name, owes its origin more frequently to Hraemesbyrig, 'Raven's Camp,' than to Rammesbyrig, 'Ram's Camp.' 'Shirt,' a field in the parish of Crawley, Hampshire, is Screot, a Saxon, after whom the hill on which it stands was named Screotes-dun, 'Screot's Down.' Harepath occurs several times in place-names for the Saxon 'herepath,' literally 'military way,' but used in the sense of 'highway.'

One very common cause of the loss of meaning in place-names is the customary law of English pronunciation, whereby a long vowel becomes short before two

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\* E.g. Claverdon, Warws.; Claefer-dun, 'Clover Down'; Cleaver Close, etc., in Hampshire field-names.

† Nursling, Hants, has no connexion with babies. It is a rationalised form of an original which, had it had its proper evolution, would have resulted in Nutshilling. This rationalisation is of comparatively frequent occurrence in local names.

consonants. This is peculiarly apt to happen in nomenclature of places, because the names are nearly always compounds, and a consonant at the beginning of the second element, if it followed a consonant at the end of the first, would bring about the shortening of any long vowel that happened to be in the first element. 'Brôc' produces 'brook'; but Broc-leah produces Brockley. Claeg-broc, however, produces Claybrook, owing to the weak sound of the Saxon 'g.' Redbridge, near Southampton, was Hreod-brycg, 'Reed Bridge,' in Saxon times. To this cause is due the evolution of Deop-denu, 'Deep Dean,' into the now meaningless Dibden.

It is fortunate for those who are curious about the meanings of names that the rustic is an unconsciously conservative philologist. It is also fortunate that it is only in recent times that he learned to read and write. Yet, despite his conservatism, his pronunciation is not free from those inexorable laws of change and evolution which govern spoken language. Those laws are known, and are in themselves invariable. The difficulty arises when they come to be applied to individual instances. The searcher after truth in place-names is largely dependent for his evidence on the written language of the past, since the speakers of former centuries cannot come back to us. Letters are at best an inadequate expression of spoken sounds; and, when the attempt to represent sounds is made by persons whose ideas of spelling are born and bred in their own inner consciousness, the evidence is apt to be confusing. Apart from this, it is clear that those who transcribed names transcribed them sometimes as they were pronounced, sometimes as they thought they ought to be pronounced. When to these general tendencies is added the fact that, during from one to two centuries after the Conquest, the evidence for English place-names is derived mainly from documents written by Norman-French scribes—who, if they knew any English at all, knew it imperfectly, and even then were wholly unable to pronounce some of the commonest sounds in the language, and still further made no attempt to do more than transcribe their own edition of this impossible English—then it will be understood that the evidence of the later 11th, of the 12th, and of the earlier part of the 13th century, is of a

difficulty commensurate with its importance. It is true that these Norman-French transcriptions follow in certain cases definite rules, especially when the scribe has come across an English sound which he cannot pronounce; but there are plenty of instances in the Domesday forms which show that the transcriber had either not attempted to grasp, or, at any rate, not succeeded in grasping, the form of a name.

It is very interesting to take the literary genealogy of place-names from Saxon times down to the 19th century. The Saxon evidence may be corrupted, because only too many of the extant copies of the Saxon land-charters date from a period subsequent to the Conquest, and were made by men who had but an imperfect acquaintance with the English of a century or two before their time. But in the majority of these cases the corruptions can be easily amended. Then follows the period of the Norman-French scribe, when French was the language of the majority of those who knew the art of writing, and above all of those who had to draw up official documents. During that period English names take what are apparently fantastic forms. But underneath this superficial current of written language is flowing the great irresistible stream of spoken English; and, when English comes to reassert its ascendancy even in official circles, written forms of names appear which are in much closer relation to Saxon originals—names transcribed by English scribes from the spoken language of their own day. Thus, taken as a whole, 14th and 15th century forms of place-names are better evidence for the forms of the originals than is to be found in documents of the centuries immediately preceding them.

The next period of corruption embraces the late 17th and the 18th centuries. It is due to the devastating energy of the amateur antiquary. People are wont to treat it as a period of temporary insanity, no traces of which survive on the modern map of England. Such an assumption would be a dangerous mistake for a worker on the subject of place-names. It is, as a fact, extraordinary how many important names have their origin in antiquarian figments, some of which go back even to those antiquaries of an earlier dispensation, the chroniclers of the Middle Ages. Isis, the famous name

of the Thames above its confluence with the Thame, is one of these inventions. This part of the river is mentioned eighteen times in Berkshire charters of Saxon date, and also in various Oxfordshire charters; and it is always called Temese or Tamese. The origin of 'Isis' is quite simple. Behold the unadorned beauty of the method! (1) Tamisis (or Tamesis) is the name of the whole river; (2) Thame is the name of part of the river. Subtracting (2) from (1), then (3) Isis is the name of the other part. Again, the Anton at Andover in Hampshire owes its name to East Anton, which suggested to an antiquary who knew his Tacitus the identification of the stream, the real name of which is Ann or Anna, with the river Antona, mentioned by the Roman author in his account of the preparations made to meet the revolt of the Iceni. The numerous Cæsar's Camps of the Ordnance map seem to bear striking testimony to the industry of that great general; but, unfortunately, many of them are not Roman, and the connexion with Cæsar's name of those that are Roman cannot be even remotely established. There are other well-known instances of such antiquarian inventions.

It was especially with the remains and nomenclature of Roman Britain that the furious activity of the 18th-century antiquary concerned itself. But the Anglo-Saxon and Danish invasions afforded an equally attractive field for the play of fancy. At a later date Celtic antiquities became fashionable, with results the strangeness of which can only be appreciated by those who have read Dr Guest's '*Origines Celticæ*.' Place-names were called into evidence in these fields of enquiry. They were explained to suit some interesting archæological hypothesis; but, worse than that, there is reason to believe that they were sometimes distorted, and, worst of all, that some of the distortions came to stay upon the map. It is not merely the antiquarian writer who has to be reckoned with; there is the antiquarian talker, a far more dangerous person, because far more difficult to detect. His methods were simple; and, human nature being what it is, only too effective. Mr So-and-so, reputed in his own neighbourhood to be a man of profound learning, asserted that the commonly used name of such and such a place was wrong, and ought to be something else. Among the

semi-educated of his neighbourhood the notion was accepted, though the blissful ignorance of the ignorant might perpetuate the old traditional name. Yet it is undoubtedly the case that some of these learned fictions got into some of those most miscellaneous maps which preceded the era of the Ordnance Survey, and from them in some cases made their way into the maps of the Survey itself. Others got into the modern map by way of personal enquiry.

Fortunately, when the Ordnance surveyor collected place-names from local enquiry, it was long odds that he applied for information to one of the ignorant many, who had inherited a tradition uncontaminated by the emendations and corruptions of reputed learning. There are many who criticise severely the information given in our Ordnance maps; but there can be very few indeed who have a thorough working knowledge of the large-scale series, for the very good reason that they are too expensive to buy in large quantities.\* The actual facts with respect to them are, firstly, that the information with regard to antiquities, a subject upon which the compilers consulted the professedly expert, requires considerable and wide revision; secondly, that the forms of place-names, which were not as a rule obtained from experts, are found to be singularly free from error, when tested by the evidence of Tithe Awards and Enclosure Acts.† The only error which is at all common is one which is just as common in the Tithe Awards, namely, the tendency to put names into the possessive case in instances in which they are supposed to be, but are not, personal names. This happens especially with names which have no longer a recognisable meaning. It is possible that this tendency goes far back into the past.

Any one who would appreciate the advance which has been made in little more than the last decade in the interpretation of place-names should compare the books which have been published within that time with

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\* The six-inch sheets for Oxfordshire alone cost about 18*l.*; for Berkshire about 19*l.*; for Hampshire about 24*l.*

† The present writer speaks from his experience of the correction of between five and six hundred sheets of the six-inch map.



such a work as Canon Isaac Taylor's 'Names and their History,' published twenty-three years ago. That book excited the most lively interest at the time at which it appeared, and it deserved the welcome which was accorded to it, for it was a work of great erudition; and, whatever its defects tested by the knowledge of twenty years later, it was a great advance on previous work of the kind. It was of far wider application than the books which have succeeded and to a certain extent superseded it, because it dealt with place-names all the world over, and not merely with those of England. But it comes within the area of the present review, because more than half of it is devoted to English nomenclature. In that part of it, be it said with regret, it is most misleading. It would take a long time to point out all the mistakes; and all that can be done here is to justify the criticism. Osney, near Oxford, has no connexion with the river-name Ouse; it is Osan-ig, 'Osa's Island.' Penhurst has nothing to do with the Celtic 'pen,' 'mountain,' or 'hill,' but with a commonplace cattle-pen. The ending -don in English place-names does not mean a 'fort,' but a 'down.' 'Combe,' as an element in place-names, does not occur 'especially in those counties in which the Celtic element is strong,' such as Devon and Cornwall. In Hampshire, for instance, where Celtic survivors of the Conquest must have been few in number, it is one of the commonest elements in names. Neither Lichfield in Staffordshire nor Litchfield in Hampshire has any nominal connexion with any word meaning 'corpse.' Hungerford has nothing to do with the Angles, but is a corruption of Hangra-ford, 'Ford of the Hanger' or 'Hanging Wood.'

Within ten years of the publication of 'Names and their History' Prof. Skeat published the beginnings of his work; and in the last fifteen years others have worked simultaneously on the place-names of various counties. Prof. Skeat's books deal with little more than the town and village names; and the same is more or less true of Mr Alexander's book on Oxfordshire, and Mr Roberts' on Sussex.\* The other authors† include a large number

\* Published respectively by the Oxford University Press, 1912, and the Cambridge University Press, 1914.

† E.g. Mr W. St Clair Baddeley, 'Place-Names of Gloucestershire' (Bellows, 1913); H. Mutschmann, 'Place-Names of Nottinghamshire'

of local names, which will be very valuable when sufficient data have been published to make it possible to draw general conclusions with regard to the distribution of names. Mr Duignan and Mr Baddeley have added archæological information of great interest—a very attractive feature in a subject which tends otherwise to become somewhat dry. It is impossible to foresee all the interesting results which would follow from a complete collection of the town, village, hamlet, local, and field names of this country, but two at least might be confidently expected; in the first place, the discovery of new regions of different dialect and usage in language; and, secondly, judging from the case of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, the discovery of various regions in Saxon England which differed in some degree from their neighbours in respect to language.

The books under review contain matter which is contentious, because the investigators have been confronted again and again with very obscure and difficult problems. The demonstrable errors are very few, and, for the most part, unimportant. Prof. Sedgefield will probably not repeat in a second edition his remarks on Cunning Garth, which he asserts to mean 'King's Garth or Enclosure,' whereas it is only a form of Coneygarth, 'Rabbit Warren,' a name which, even in the field-names of Hampshire alone, is spelt in six different ways—Coneygear, Coneger, Coneygre, Coneygar, Coneygeer, and Cunnigher. His somewhat widespread belief in the combination of Norse and Anglian elements in the same name is possibly right; but the phenomenon does not appear to occur frequently in other regions of Norse settlement in this country. Mr Roberts, too, might 'edit' his remarks on Arundel. But, after all, the truest criticism of these books on county names is that they show the wonderful progress which has been made in this still young twentieth century in this subject.

Of Mr Johnson's book on the place-names of England it may be said that it is as one born out of due time—not indeed too late, but too early. Enough has been said

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(Camb. Univ. Press, 1913); A. Goodall, 'Place-Names of S.W. Yorkshire' (Camb. Univ. Press, 1914); W. J. Sedgefield, 'Place-Names of Cumberland and Westmoreland' (Longmans, 1915).

to show that the whole subject is at this moment undergoing a revolution which is far from complete; and that fact alone is sufficient to stamp such a work as ill-timed. The author has followed such recent writers as had published their work before his was finished; and there he is on safe ground. But he seems to have had equal faith in much of the work of the darkness which preceded the present dawn; he has at any rate reproduced many of the most notorious errors of the past.

So far, modern investigation has been confined to but a few of all the counties of England, and therefore does not provide material for final generalisations on the distribution of Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Norse elements in place-names. But still some interesting and unexpected results have been obtained. It was a favourite theory in the past, a theory very conspicuous in Canon Taylor's work, that later immigrants into this country had frequently attached topographical terms of their own to pre-existing Celtic names. Torpenhow, the name of a village in Cumberland, was what might be called the 'supreme instance' of this theory. 'How' was originally the simple name of the local hill. New settlers of different race came; and, not knowing that 'how' meant 'hill,' called it 'Penhow,' 'Hill-hill.' A third stratum of settlers, ignorant, as indeed they might well be, of the meaning of 'Penhow,' called the hill 'Torpenhow,' 'Hill-hill-hill.' The theory was very interesting and very fallacious. The whole name is pure Norse, Torfin-haugr, 'Torfin's Grave-mound.'

Save in those parts of England which remained in Celtic occupation after the first period of the Anglo-Saxon conquest, Celtic names or elements in names are very rare, and are mostly those of rivers. It was still more rare for the Saxons to add any element of their own to a Celtic river-name they had adopted. Micheldever in Hampshire is one of these rare cases, the name being compounded of the Saxon 'micel,' 'great,' and the Celtic 'defr' or 'dofr,' 'river.' But it is still commonly supposed that only the larger rivers and streams, such as Avon, Ouse, Stour, and so forth, retained their Celtic names, which are said to be all different words meaning 'water.' That this supposition is wrong is shown by the fact that in certain Saxon charters of Berkshire

what is now called Appleton Brook, a stream in Appleton parish to the south-west of Oxford, is called Wasa or Wase; while in the Tithe Awards it is called Osse Ditch, both names being forms of the name 'Ouse.' Also in Buckland parish near Faringdon, Berkshire, the Tithe Award marks an Ouse Ditch which is the Wasa of the Saxon charter of Buckland. The river name Itchen occurs in both Hampshire and Warwickshire; but there is also a small stream in North Hampshire which probably had that name in Saxon times. Thus it is evident that even minute streams such as the Ouse Ditch in Buckland, a mere trickle of water, might retain their old names.

Of a more specific Celtic element we should expect to find traces in Cumberland, where the region was part of the British kingdom of Strathclyde in quite late Saxon times; in the West Riding of Yorkshire, where the mysterious little British kingdom of Elmet survived the Anglian invasion of the north-east; and all down the marches of Wales, in Cheshire, Shropshire, Herefordshire, and Gloucestershire, as well as on the marches of 'West Wales,' in Somerset and Devon. So far as these books cover this ground their evidence is interesting.

The pure Celtic element in Cumberland is very much smaller than might have been expected on historical grounds. Out of the several hundred names in the county which he cites, Prof. Sedgefield distinguishes only twenty-eight as purely Celtic, and only seven others as containing Celtic elements. The distribution of these names is somewhat noteworthy. They form a thin fringe round the basin of the Eden. It looks as if they were the homes of people who had been driven out of the river valley itself by new-comers who came up the river. The Norse is the strongest element in Cumberland and Westmoreland, but there are a great many names of Anglian origin. There is, too, a Danish element of places ending in -by, the distribution of which seems to show that their Danish founders made their way by the great pass through the Pennines from Yorkshire by way of Brough-under-Stainmore into the upper valley of the Eden.

In South-west Yorkshire the Celtic survival, apart from the usual river-names, is mainly confined to names

of some valleys, hills, woods, lanes, and hamlets. Of these there are a considerable number. The mountainous region at the junction of the Pennines and the Peak formed the stronghold of those Britons who maintained their independence against the first attacks of the Angles on northern Britain. The Scandinavian names in South-west Yorkshire are numerous; and, though there are always certain difficulties in distinguishing between names of Norse and those of Danish origin, they appear in this district to be mainly Norse. Mr Goodall's examination of them has led to one important conclusion, namely that, though in certain districts, as for instance in the neighbourhood of Huddersfield, the Domesday survey indicates a Scandinavian settlement of the period before the Conquest, in certain other districts, where there are numerous Scandinavian names not mentioned in Domesday, their presence is due to the repeopling of the district, after the devastation of William the Conqueror in 1069, by immigrants brought from Cumberland and the North-west.

The Scandinavian settlers who landed at the mouth of the Mersey, and settled in the Wirral between Mersey and Dee, and also in the neighbourhood of Liverpool, seem to have made their way to other parts of Lancashire, and even to have crossed the Pennines into Yorkshire, for the pre-conquest settlement near Huddersfield appears to have come from the west. Mr Duignan notices traces of them in a few names on the highlands of North Staffordshire. When the Cheshire place-names are thoroughly investigated we shall know more of these Norsemen; but already it is fairly clear that they made their way up the Mersey and its tributaries, reaching North Staffordshire by the line of the Weaver. The surviving Celtic element in Staffordshire is confined to a few scattered names, of which the best known is Cannock. There is no distinctly Celtic region in the county.

Mr Mutschmann draws a very interesting conclusion from consideration of the Scandinavian names in Nottinghamshire. The bulk of the names in the county are of Anglo-Saxon origin, 'but a considerable number of Scandinavian elements are present.' The distribution of the latter, he thinks, would show that the Scandinavian

invasion, which ultimately led to the settlement of the Norsemen in large numbers, was of a comparatively peaceful nature. The Northern new-comers apparently did not try to oust the original occupants of the land, but were satisfied to settle in the marshy, sandy, unattractive regions left vacant by the Anglo-Saxons.

If such results have accrued from the scientific survey of the names of a few English counties, then there is every hope that results of much greater historical importance may be attained when the survey is complete. Local interest will always attach itself to these books; but a rational summary of results when the series is complete will be of more general interest and much greater importance.

A study of the books which have been issued suggests a warning with regard to method of treatment. Mr Goodall's introduction is a model of what an introduction to such a work should be; for a reader of a book on place-names does not want merely a bald list of names and their etymology, but also a statement showing their general distribution and giving such general conclusions as the author has been led to form concerning them. Such introductions, together with the addition of archæological matter of the kind which Mr Duignan has inserted in his books, will take away from works on place-names that excessive dryness which creates an unsatisfied thirst for further knowledge. The subject after all is essentially a popular one, in the sense that it appeals to the interest of many people; and it is very desirable that it should continue to be so. But a series of visions of dry bones is only too suggestive of its death.

G. B. GRUNDY.



# Art. 5.—THE FINAL SETTLEMENT IN THE BALKANS.

‘WE shall not pause or falter until we have secured for the smaller states of Europe their Charter of Independence, and for Europe itself and for the world at large their final emancipation from the reign of force.’

These memorable words were addressed *urbi et orbi* by the head of the British Government on Nov. 9, 1915, when the war had already lasted more than a year and three months. Other British statesmen have been equally emphatic in their declarations both in the earlier and later periods of the war. Especially noteworthy in regard to the Balkan Peninsula are the words spoken on Sept. 28, 1915, by the then Foreign Minister in the House of Commons.

‘Our policy,’ said Sir Edward Grey, ‘has been to secure agreement between the Balkan States which would ensure to each of them not only independence but a brilliant future based as a general principle on the territorial and political union of kindred nationalities. To secure this agreement we have recognised that the legitimate aspirations of all the Balkan States must find satisfaction. . . . The policy of the Allies is to further the national aspirations of the Balkan States without sacrificing the independence of any of them.’

It is unnecessary to add to these quotations. The words which appear at the beginning of this article were spoken a few weeks after the rupture with Bulgaria, and show that the noble programme with which we undertook the war has not been modified, as indeed it could not be, by that unfortunate event. Whatever may have been the attitude of the Kings and Governments of Bulgaria, Greece and the other Balkan States in the course of the war, we are absolutely pledged to maintain the independence of all these states at its close and to ensure to each and all a just settlement based ‘on the territorial and political union of kindred nationalities.’ In other words, we are solemnly bound to carry out a complete readjustment of frontiers which will assign to each of these states the regions which rightly belong to them, in accordance with the sacred principle which we inscribed on our banner when drawing the sword.

Such is our duty if we win the war. We need not speculate on what will happen in the Balkans if we lose it. We must save the Balkan States from the dangers which await them under German domination, and assure to each of them a prosperous development within their respective racial limits. This is not a Utopian or altruistic policy. Our honour is engaged by our formal declarations; and, apart from this, it is our interest as well as our duty to remedy a state of affairs which has set Europe in flames, and to establish in the Balkans, the gateway of the East, a firm and enduring peace, the only sure guarantee for our own tranquillity in the future. This can only be attained by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Balkan nationalities. The settlement must be just, and free from any taint of vindictiveness; it must be imposed from above and maintained under penalties, perhaps even *manu militari*, for a certain time, until the military and chauvinistic elements have been brought to reason, which have so often stifled the voice of good sense and overborne the wishes of the majority in these states. With a just delimitation of frontiers the irredentist agitations in the various countries will cease to exist; and with their disappearance the chauvinists and militarists will lose much of the leverage with which they have hitherto worked on the various courts, governments and populations.

The animosities of the Balkan States, which Mr Asquith described in the House of Commons (Nov. 2, 1915) as 'an unhappy and still unliquidated legacy of two Balkan wars and especially of the Treaty of Bucarest,' must have time to subside under the working of a new and equitable arrangement. The doctrine of 'equilibrium,' the hypocritical theory advanced in 1913 in order to cover a series of lawless annexations, must be completely set aside. The populations of the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian kingdoms were almost equalised under the treaty, but the disparity already existing between Rumania and each of these states was increased, not diminished. With the incorporation of Transylvania, the Banat and Bukovina in Rumania, the disproportion would be farther increased, even if the other states should attain their rightful limits; that, of course, is no reason why the annexation of these

Rumanian regions should not be carried out, but the doctrine of equilibrium stands in the way. It has accordingly been discarded *sans phrase* by its former champions, who now once more invoke the principle of nationalities. Their repentance is welcome. Arithmetical parity will never bring happiness or peace to the Balkan countries, while whole populations are left to groan under the yoke of their bitterest enemies.

What arrangement shall we substitute for the faulty provisions of the Treaty of Bucarest? Before endeavouring to answer this question we may state the principles which should guide us in the delimitation of territories. The first and fundamental principle is that of nationality, which should never be abandoned in the case of large populations and as seldom as possible in the case of minor groups. On the observance of this rule depends the future peace of the Peninsula. Economic and commercial considerations take the second place. Each of the countries must possess a sufficient seaboard and an adequate number of ports. Fortunately this condition can be fulfilled without any serious infringement of the law of nationality, since most of the maritime towns are inhabited by mixed and more or less cosmopolitan populations. The needs of the back-country must, therefore, be the main consideration in the allocation of seaports. Care should also be taken not to separate the towns of the interior from the neighbourhoods to which they form distributing centres and from which they derive their supplies.

Thirdly, respect should be shown for the more recent decisions of Europe, which, except for the strongest reasons, should not be allowed to remain a dead letter. The Treaty of London, the protocol of Petrograd, and the decisions of the Conference of London regarding the frontiers of Albania, should all be respected, and only modified at points where specific local alterations are urgently needed. We hope to arrive at an epoch where international contracts and decisions will no longer be regarded as 'scraps of paper.' The treaties of Berlin and Bucarest are of course defunct; the former is obsolete by universal consent, the latter in reality was nothing more than a drum-head truce, drawn up in a few days

by a group of Balkan politicians aided by military officers fresh from the battlefield.

Fourthly, natural features, such as large rivers and mountain-chains, may be taken into account even when they do not precisely tally with racial limits. In such cases exchanges of villages in the corresponding riverain districts or mountain-slopes may sometimes be possible. Strategic requirements come last on the list, and need hardly be considered at all if a delimitation providing for the just satisfaction of national claims is arrived at. 'Equilibrium' and the vicious principle of 'compensation,' so dear to diplomatists, may be left aside altogether. History may be rejected; the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian empires of the past, all based on conquest, count for nothing; we do not propose to revive imperialism and the rule of force. 'Les Etats du moyen âge n'étaient pas constitués,' writes M. Cvijić, 'suivant le principe des nationalités. Leurs frontières ne correspondaient pas aux divisions nationales. . . . Les frontières de jadis n'ont ainsi aucune valeur ethnographique.' The political dreamers who tell us of Tsar Dushan's empire may ponder these words. That Michael the Brave united the Rumanian race under his sway for a little more than a year, that Scanderbeg rallied the Albanian tribes for a longer time to his standard—these are more interesting historical facts because the rulers were akin to the ruled and all belonged to the same nation, but they add no further validity to the just Rumanian and Albanian demands for national unity.

Proceeding generally on these lines, we may venture to sketch the main features of a possible Balkan settlement. In making this attempt it is best to discard statistics; on the one hand, the relative dimensions of the several states matter nothing; on the other, no trustworthy statistical data exist in regard to the populations of the regions under dispute. The old Turkish *nufuz-tefteri* and *salnamés* are worthless; the figures adduced in the controversial literature on the subject are as little deserving of notice as the data provided by the propagandist publications which have appeared in London and Paris since the beginning of the war. The best sources of information are the works of impartial and conscientious travellers who have spent some time

in the regions they describe, more especially those who in recent years have made a study of the various populations, languages and dialects for purely scientific purposes. In regard to Macedonia, some of the former consuls of the disinterested powers and some of their military officers who spent years in the heart of the country engaged in the application of the Mürzsteg reforms—among them may be mentioned especially Capt. Léon Lamouche, an excellent linguist and a careful student of the subject—are competent authorities in regard to local racial conditions. Sometimes it is possible to obtain a sidelight from statistics not intended for the outer world, such as the figures quoted in R. von Mach's '*Der Machtbereich des bulgarischen Exarchats*' (Leipzig, 1906), which were compiled for ecclesiastical-administrative purposes only.\*

To begin with Rumania. The natural boundary between the Ruman and the Bulgar is the Danube from Vidin to its mouth. To the north-west of Vidin, however, the Ruman population overlaps the Danube, extending to the Timok and spreading far into Serbia (the Kraina district). There are also Rumanian colonies on the south bank of the Danube near Rahova, Nikopolis and Sistova, and numerous settlements in the Dobrodja, many of recent date. On the other hand, there are considerable Bulgarian settlements in Rumania, in the neighbourhood of Craiova and Oltenitza, and even round Bucarest. The natural boundary, however, cannot be maintained as regards the lower Danube from Silistria to the sea, inasmuch as special treatment is necessary for the Dobrodja.

The Dobrodja, apart from its Rumanian colonists, introduced for the most part since 1878, is inhabited by Turks, Tartars, and Bulgarians, with a mixture of Gagaous (Turkish-speaking Christians of Kuman descent) in the south and with several isolated Russian colonies in the north. If it be true that in the portion of the country assigned to Rumania in 1878 the colonists now

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\* Cf. the '*Diagrammatic Map of Slav territories east of the Adriatic, showing ethnographical divisions*' [etc.], by Sir A. J. Evans (Sifton, Praed, 1915).

constitute more than half of the entire population, no objection can be raised against the retention of this region by Rumania. In any case it is necessary that Rumania should have full access to the sea, and that the channels of communication should be entirely Rumanian. This is not the case with regard to her ports on the Danube—Braila and Galatz—inasmuch as the lower course of the river from Reni to the apex of the delta is subject to Russian control. It is, therefore, desirable that Sulina, Constanza and Mangalia should continue to be Rumanian; Rumania has already incurred great expense in providing Constanza with a harbour and with railway access to the interior.

It is otherwise with the southern portion of the Dobrodja, assigned to Bulgaria by the Berlin Treaty, but appropriated by Rumania in 1913. The Bulgarian element in the Dobrodja is divided into two groups, the northern and the southern. The northern group, extending from a little north of Constanza to Tulcha, is isolated by Turkish and Tartar strata from the southern, which extends south and south-west in compact masses from near Mangalia to Baltchik and Dobritch, where it again encounters the Moslem element. Baltchik, Dobritch and Kavarna should obviously be returned to Bulgaria; and the best arrangement, from every point of view, would be a return to the decision of the European Conference at Petrograd in March, 1913, which accorded Silistria (mainly a Turkish town) to Rumania, together with a small circumjacent territory, and drew a line thence to the seacoast a little south of Mangalia. This arrangement would give back to Bulgaria a district which is mainly Bulgarian, wherever it is not Turkish, and would revive a European decision which ought not to have been set aside by the Treaty of Bucarest.

From its confluence with the Timok upwards to its junction with the Theiss, the Danube forms the natural boundary between Rumania and Serbia, and it is also the racial boundary, notwithstanding the overflow of the Ruman element into the Kraina district and the considerable Serb population in the south-western portion of the Banat, more especially in the county of Torontal. These groups may be regarded as balancing each other to some extent. In the Torontal there is a strange



mixture of races, the German and Hungarian elements being also represented, in considerable numbers. The Serb element is probably in a majority in the country from Weisskirchen to the confluence of the Danube and the Theiss; but the importance of allowing these rivers to constitute the future frontier can hardly be ignored. Serbia naturally desires to possess the region immediately confronting her capital; and perhaps some small concession might be made to her here. The district, however, is devoid of strategic importance; and, strangely enough, the Ruman element appears in the lowlands opposite Belgrade, with German and Hungarian villages on either side.

Further north, at a point some eighty kilometres south of Zenta, the Theiss becomes the racial boundary between the Ruman and Magyar elements. At Zenta the Hungarian population extends eastward across the river, and a line might be drawn from this point to Makó, on the Marosh, which river would form the boundary as far eastwards as Arad. The triangle formed by this line and the two rivers would have its apex at their confluence near Szegedin, and would enclose an area mainly inhabited by Magyars and important for the supply of that town. From Arad the frontier would leave the Marosh and, taking a line almost due north-east, would reach the western frontier of the Bukovina in the 'wooded Carpathians' not far from the source of the Sereth. The line would include the greater part of the Rumanian portion of the Maramuresh district, but would leave the town of Grosswardein, where the non-Ruman elements form the majority, to Hungary.

In the Bukovina the Sereth is locally regarded as the boundary between the Ruman and Ruthenian populations; the latter will naturally be absorbed by Russia. From the Sereth at Storogineti a line would be drawn to the Pruth a little below Czernovitz. That town, inhabited by a mixed population of Ruthenians, German Jews, Poles, Rumanians and Armenians, would fall to Russia. The Pruth and the Danube to its Kilia mouth will doubtless continue to furnish a frontier between Rumania and Russia, although the Dniester forms the real racial boundary, at least from Mogileff to considerably below Bender. The Ruman element spreads

far into central Bessarabia in the direction of Bender and Kishineff, and even extends beyond the Dniester, while, further south, the district of Cagul is almost entirely Ruman. It is useless, however, to discuss the question of Bessarabia as matters now stand. The southern portion of the province presents a wonderful medley of races, Bulgarians, Turks, Tartars and Germans, in fairly compact masses, being interposed between Rumans on the west and Russians on the east. Except in regard to Cagul, there can be no question of a change in the *status quo* in this region. So much for Rumania. The boundaries above suggested, if Bessarabia must be left out of account, form the nearest possible approach to an ethnical frontier, and would increase to about 14,000,000 the population of the kingdom, which would become by far the largest State in South-Eastern Europe.

Proceeding southwards, we encounter the problem of the future Bulgarian frontier in Eastern Thrace. Putting aside the question of Constantinople, there is, for this frontier, a recent European decision at hand. The Treaty of London (April 1913) traced the frontier line from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos on the *Ægean*. All the Great Powers signified their approval and agreed to appoint a commission to carry out the delimitation on the spot. But the war between the Balkan Allies followed; and the Young Turks determined to tear up the treaty, the ink of which was scarcely dry, and to flch from Bulgaria, now beset on all sides, the portion of Eastern Thrace assigned to her by its provisions and, above all, Adrianople. That they were secretly encouraged by the Powers which connived at, if they did not instigate, the invasion of Bulgaria by Rumania, is more than probable in view of what followed. The sequel forms one of the darkest pages in the history of European diplomacy. The same Powers, after blindly facilitating at Bucarest the preparation of an arrangement which sowed the seeds of permanent discord in the Balkans, which threw Bulgaria into the arms of Germany, and laid the mines for the great European explosion, with all its calamitous consequences for Serbia and Rumania, now proceeded to accept from the Young Turks certain stipulated concessions and other favours in return for their

acquiescence in the violation of the Treaty of London. The Treaty was sold for Turkish *bakshish*; and the chink of money, as a well-known journalist wrote at the time, was heard within the precincts of the Sublime Porte and in the Embassies at Constantinople.

The Enos-Midia line is perhaps the best that can be drawn in the circumstances, and hardly deserves the animadversions of its Greek critics. There is a Greek fringe on the Black Sea and Ægean coasts, but the Hellenic population is nowhere found in considerable numbers in the interior except on the western side of the Maritza valley, that is to say in western Thrace, where it extends from the sea to Soflu and Demotika, and even to the neighbourhood of Adrianople. But the greater portion of the interior between the treaty-line and the Maritza is inhabited by Turks and Bulgars; the Turks, by common consent, must disappear from Europe, and the Bulgars will remain the only considerable population in this territory. In the north the districts of Lozengrad (Kirkkilissé) and Malo Trnovo, extending to the old Bulgarian frontier, are almost exclusively Bulgarian. From the Maritza to the Mesta, which is generally recognised as the boundary of Macedonia, apart from the Greeks already mentioned, the mountainous interior is inhabited by Pomaks (Mahometan Bulgarians, who under pressure from the Turks embraced Islam, at various periods, in the 17th century and who still speak Bulgarian), Turks and Christian Bulgarians; further west, the valley of the Mesta is almost exclusively Bulgarian to within a few miles of the sea.

From the estuary of the Mesta to that of the Struma the Greek fringe on the seacoast is interrupted by compact Turkish populations in the districts of Sari-Shaban and Pravishta. The population of the interior is almost entirely Bulgarian, except at Melnik, where there is an isolated Greek colony; the Bulgarian element approaches the coast in sporadic groups near Kavala. That port must become Bulgarian if it is to fulfil its evident destiny as the outlet and inlet for the commerce of the Bulgarian and Rumanian back-country, the central region of the Peninsula. The necessity for this would be increased if Constantinople fell into non-Turkish hands, as the trade of the Bulgarian and Rumanian ports on

the Black Sea and the Danube would be at her mercy. We may look forward to a time when the lower Danube will be spanned by several bridges, and when the Danubian States, members of the future Balkan Confederation, will make commercial arrangements in their mutual interests. The hope of attaining free access to the *Ægean* is already entertained in the Rumanian commercial world. Again, if Salonika must remain Greek, Kavala will largely take the place of that port as the distributing centre for the Bulgarian populations of central and even western Macedonia. Greece can never possess the back-country of these important ports; and, if she is allowed to retain one of them, it is the most she can hope for. Furthermore it should be remembered that British and other foreign trade, which Germany and Austria-Hungary hope to oust from the Peninsula, will be excluded from these regions unless the Macedonian seaports are left in the hands of the state which controls the interior. The creation of a Greek Dalmatia on the *Ægean* coast would be alike injurious to the prospects of western commerce and to the prosperity of these ports and of the regions which derive their supplies from them.

The coast-line would therefore be Bulgarian from Enos to the mouth of the Strymon. The Greek boundary would begin here. The river, which broadens into Lake Tachyno, would form a convenient frontier, the boundary turning off to the west at the head of the lake so as to include Nigrita, which is a Greek town; it would then pass to the south of Kukush, which, before its destruction by ex-King Constantine, was inhabited by some 7000 Bulgarians; the surrounding district, also devastated by that monarch, was partly Bulgarian, partly Turkish. Conceivably the boundary might be carried over the head of Lake Tachyno so as to include the town of Serres, which is partly Turkish, partly Greek (the former Bulgarian minority here is probably extinct); but in that case the free navigation of the river should be guaranteed to Bulgaria. From below Kukush the frontier would deflect slightly to the south-west, leaving Yenidjé-Vardar and Vodena to Bulgaria, while Neausta and Verria would fall to Greece. Yenidjé-Vardar is a strong Bulgarian centre, possessing also a considerable Turkish population;

while Vodena, the 'Water-Town,' so called from its beautiful cascades, is Bulgarian in population as well as in name. Neausta, on the other hand, is mainly Greek, though the surrounding district is partly Vlach and partly Bulgarian, while Verria is Turkish and Greek. The frontier, continuing westward, would traverse the Turkish district of Kailar, the greater part of which, with the town of that name and Koshani, would fall to Greece, would advance in the direction of Lake Castoria, leaving Vlacho-Klisura (a Vlach town) with Zagoritchané and Mokreni (both Bulgarian) to the north, and, before reaching the lake, would deflect to the south-west, so as to separate the Bulgarian district of Khrupishta from the Greek Anaselitza, eventually meeting the Albanian frontier in Mount Grammos close to the source of the Devol. As in the case of Serres, a loop might be made at some sacrifice of symmetry so as to give the town of Castoria, where the Greeks predominate, to Greece.

The frontier thus indicated is perhaps the best possible ethnical boundary between the Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia, always assuming that Salonika is to remain Greek. It does not differ materially from the line offered by M. Venizelos at the time of the London Conference, which extended from the Gulf of Orfano to the southernmost point of Lake Prespa. At this time the intention of Serbia to repudiate the treaty of 1912 had not been disclosed; and M. Venizelos, concluding that central and western Macedonia would be Bulgarian in accordance with its terms, said to the writer that he fully admitted the Bulgarian claim to access to the *Ægean*, but that he could not give up Salonika; he was ready, however, to yield the other ports, which he believed would make a tolerable commercial substitute for the great Macedonian emporium.

The principle of nationality is not involved in the question: Is Salonika to be Greek? In this case, as in that of the other seaports, the paramount claims of the back-country take the first place. The Bulgarian peasant element, speaking a dialect which presents the nearest approach to the old Slavonic, the language of SS. Cyril and Methodius, descends to the sea-coast west of the town; but the fact, which was recognised by the Treaty of San Stefano, possesses no significance unless central

and western Macedonia accrue to Bulgaria. Greece is already abundantly provided with seaports and can never possess the Macedonian interior, on which Salonika depends for her future prosperity. A customs barrier must prove a serious drawback to that prosperity, which, in any case, Greece will hardly be disposed to encourage at the expense of Piræus. In the future, commercial rivalry between the Jews and Greeks will result in the impoverishment of the Hebrew element, hitherto by far the wealthiest in the city. The population was Jewish, Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, in the order named, before the Balkan wars; to-day, under Greek rule, the Turkish population has diminished, the Greek has increased, and the Bulgarian has been almost exterminated. The Jewish still remains the first in wealth and numbers, but its prosperity has declined; Greeks and Jews, as is well known, do not live happily together. The ideal solution would be a Jewish republic and a free port under the protection of the Powers.


We return to the Greek frontier, which, after reaching Albanian soil on Mount Grammos above the source of the Devol, now becomes the Greco-Albanian boundary from that point to the coast of the Adriatic opposite the northern end of Corfu. For this the line drawn by the London Conference of 1913 may be accepted, with certain modifications introduced by the report of the International Commission issued at Florence in the winter of that year. This line, which leaves Konitza and Jannina to Greece, and Kortcha (wrongly assigned to Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano), Argyrokastro and Delvino, with its port Santi Quaranta, to Albania, on the whole satisfies ethnical conditions. There is a Greek minority in Argyrokastro; and Khimara, with a few other villages on the coast, has been more or less Hellenised; but, on the other hand, the Albanian element extends sporadically as far south as Parga.

Returning once more to the source of the turbulent Devol, where Greek, Albanian and Bulgarian territories would meet, we may follow the northward trend of the Albanian frontier as traced by the London Conference. No change seems requisite till we reach Dibra. This town is mainly Albanian with a considerable Bulgarian minority, and should, with a portion at least of its *kaza*,



which forms a salient in Albanian territory, be restored to Albania. The existence of a strong Bulgarian element here was recognised by the Turkish Government in the creation of a Bulgarian archbishopric, and was further indicated by the numerous contingents of volunteers from this place which joined the Bulgarian army in 1912. But there can be no question as to the predominantly Albanian character of the town. Down to the middle of the last century the Drin might have been regarded as the natural eastern boundary of Albania; but the Albanians, encouraged by the Turkish Government, have pressed forward towards the north-east, and existing conditions must be taken into consideration.

Following the line laid down by the London Conference northwards, we arrive at the new Montenegrin frontier near Diakovo. Here considerable changes should be made. The towns and *kazas* of Diakovo and Ipek, together with Plava and Gusigne, should be assigned to Albania. The southern frontier of Montenegro, from Gusigne to the sea, and her Serbian and Bosnian (henceforth Serbian) frontiers would remain unchanged. It is on the side of Herzegovina and Dalmatia that Montenegro would receive her legitimate extension. The whole of southern Herzegovina from Gatsko to the sea-coast at a point between Metkovich and Gravosa might be added to the realm of King Nicholas, the frontier perhaps curving northwards so as to include Nevesinye, a cherished name in Montenegrin story. Montenegro would thus acquire Trebinje and the region of Krivoscia, and would obtain her natural sea-coast with Gravosa and Ragusa (the ports of Trebinje), Cattaro (the port of Cettigne and an ancient Montenegrin possession), with Risano (the port of Nikshich) and Castelnuovo, Budua and Spizza. These important acquisitions, which would open a new future to Montenegro, would more than console her for the loss of the Albanian regions mentioned above, notwithstanding the ecclesiastico-historical associations attached to the name of Ipek. She would retain Antivari and Dulcigno, the latter town being Albanian; but it is desirable, for commercial and other reasons, that Montenegrin territory should extend to the mouth of the Boyana.



The acquisitions to which Serbia may look forward

at the end of a successful war are immense, and would enable her to take rank after Rumania, as the second State in South-Eastern Europe. All Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia—the ancient *regnum triplex et unum*, with the exception of the portion of Dalmatia already specified as Montenegrin—all Bosnia and a large portion of Herzegovina would be united under the crown of King Peter. The frontier on the north would be the Danube and the Drave, and on the north-west the existing Croatian boundary from the Drave to the sea at Fiume. If that port, now a Hungarian *enclave* in Croatia, is to be Serbian, or rather Croatian, its commercial connexion with Hungary, which possesses no other maritime outlet, should not be severed.

The future of the Slovenes of Carinthia, Carniola, Styria and eastern Istria is as yet uncertain. Whether they will seek for government from Belgrade remains to be seen. They would probably prefer political independence as members of a Jugo-Slav confederation. The Catholic Croats of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, in accepting union with Serbia, will probably insist on autonomy with a separate parliament or parliaments. Bosnia, on the other hand, where the Orthodox element prevails, will doubtless undergo complete incorporation with Serbia. These details need not concern us at present; what is important is the realisation in some form or other of Jugo-Slav union.\* The Dalmatian ports would, of course, be available for Serbian commerce. Eastern Istria would probably attach itself to Fiume; the western half of the peninsula, which is Italian, would share the fortunes of Trieste. As to Trieste we

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\* According to advices, dated July 27, 1917, which appeared in the Press, Serb, Croat and Slovene delegates, after several conferences at Corfu, agreed to the formation of a free and independent kingdom with indivisible territory and unity of allegiance under the Karageorgevitch dynasty with a single coat of arms, a single flag and a single crown, but with the right to use special Serb, Croat and Slovene flags, the equality of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Moslem religions, and equality for the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. 'The territory of the new kingdom will include all territory compactly inhabited by our people' [the Jugo-Slavs]. The constitution is to be established after the conclusion of peace by a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage. 'The nation thus unified will form a State of some 12,000,000 inhabitants, which would be a powerful bulwark against German aggression.'

need say nothing in this connexion. Its future depends upon the arbitrament of war; it does not form part of a Balkan settlement, but primarily concerns Italy and the Central Powers.

It remains to trace the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Had this task been undertaken some forty or fifty years ago by an impartial committee of experts, they would probably have drawn their line from the western end of the Shar range, at the junction of the Black and White Drin, continuing it along the watershed and the course of the 'Bulgarian' Morava to a point (near Alexinatz) a little above its confluence with the 'Serbian' Morava. The popular names of these rivers betray the nationality of the dwellers on their banks. A line would have been drawn from this point to the confluence of the Timok and the Danube. The Timok valley, where it is not Rumanian, is Bulgarian. The Treaty of San Stefano gave Nish to Serbia, but otherwise closely followed the above hypothetical line. The San Stefano boundary, if it could be restored, would still make the best and most symmetrical frontier. But we must take into account the process of Serbisation which has taken place during nearly forty years in the regions east of this line given to Serbia by the Berlin Treaty. A new generation has sprung up, which regards itself as Serb. The line of the Berlin Treaty from the Danube southwards may therefore stand, except, perhaps, as regards the district of Pirot, which forms a salient into Bulgarian territory and should be restored to Bulgaria. At Mount Golem, a little west of Kustendil, the frontiers assigned by the Treaty of Berlin to Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey met; and from this point the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 drew the lines including the 'contested zone' left for Russian arbitration. The lines, as will be seen from the map of the secret annexe attached to the treaty, met at the northern end of Lake Ochrida. The treaty was set aside by Serbia owing to the disappointment of her hopes elsewhere, but those hopes will now be fully realised. In the circumstances, Russian arbitration would hardly be reverted to; and the best treatment of the 'contested zone' would probably be an equal division, effected by a line drawn from the westernmost point of the Dibra kaza to Mount Golem. This would give

Kalkandelen, Usküb and Kumanovo to Serbia, Kichevo and Kratovo to Bulgaria.

The other frontiers of Bulgaria have been already defined. They would include the genuinely Bulgarian element in the kingdom, in Macedonia, in Thrace, and in southern Dobrodja. Whether Bulgaria would rank third or fourth in the list of Balkan States would depend upon the treatment which Greece will receive at the hands of the future Congress. If Greece obtains her legitimate expansion in the islands of the Levant and on the coast of Asia Minor, she may take the third place. Room may be found for her repentance; and the concessions in these regions unwisely refused by King Constantine might be allowed to M. Venizelos. Albania, the youngest state and the oldest nation in the Balkan family, would come fifth on the list. She would receive a new dynasty and a cantonal system of government which would correspond best with the peculiar diversity of her local traditions and usages. Little Montenegro, enriched with her natural seaboard and a considerable increase of territory, would come last. All the Balkan States would be provided with abundant access to the sea, and their commercial future would be assured. Their frontiers would, in the main, be identical with ethnical limits, and would largely coincide with the boundaries furnished by natural features, while respect would be shown to recent European decisions.

A repartition of territories effected on the lines above indicated would furnish the basis for an enduring peace in the Balkans. The promulgation of such a scheme would be met with an outcry all round, especially on the part of those who desire to appropriate what is not theirs; but proposals for the dismemberment of any Balkan nation or nations could not be listened to at a moment when the world is meditating the reconstitution of unhappy Poland. Such proposals should be rejected as impolitic and as contrary to our declared programme; and the Balkan States, exhausted by the war, would soon settle down to the peaceful development of their new possessions. It is not too much to anticipate that consciousness of their mutual interests, aided by experience of the calamities resulting from their quarrels, would

soon bring them together in a new Balkan League, defensive in character and designed to resist encroachment from without. Such an alliance or confederation would form the best and surest barrier against German aggression in the East.

Meanwhile the outworks of the rampart against the *Drang nach Osten* would be supplied by a greater Serbia and a greater Rumania. These States would be strong because internally homogeneous. The idea of enlarging their boundaries by the inclusion of alien elements is radically unsound, inasmuch as the overgrown States thus constituted would be weakened by internal discontent on the one hand and by the hostility of despoiled neighbours on the other. What is needed in the Balkans is healthy homogeneous polities, not pinchbeck empires.

'La seconde guerre balkanique,' writes 'La Roumanie,' the organ of M. Také Jonesco, 'a été une faute capitale, une vraie erreur contre nos intérêts à tous. . . . Inutile de chercher à qui la faute; elle a été plus générale qu'on ne le croit, et tout le monde l'a payée et la paie encore. Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'à peine un an après cette guerre tous, même ceux qui en apparence y ont gagné le plus, préféreraient qu'elle n'ait jamais eu lieu. Ils auraient aujourd'hui des territoires plus restreints, peut-être, mais ils sentent bien qu'ils seraient plus forts et plus libres.'

It is too late to remedy much of the mischief resulting from the second Balkan war, but the Treaty of Bucarest, at least, should be consigned to the limbo of exploded absurdities. No arrangement can be tolerated in future which places one Balkan nationality under the rule of another; to sanction any such arrangement would be to play the game of the Central Powers, which have always sought to perpetuate discord in the Near East in pursuance of their own aggressive aims.

So great will be the numbers of questions which will come for solution before the future Congress, so loud will be the clash of jarring interests in all parts of the world, that it seems doubtful whether statesmanship will realise, or have time to realise, the greatness of the opportunity which will present itself for a permanent settlement in South-Eastern Europe, and the final laying of the Balkan spectre. The Near-Eastern question has been defined

as 'the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe.' After the Turks had been driven from their European possessions by the Balkan States in 1912, there was some reason to hope that the vacuum might be filled in the only way compatible with justice—the division of the Balkan lands among the Balkan peoples. There was, however, an underlying difficulty in the way of the fulfilment of this programme, which some who were behind the scenes had always feared would prove fatal to its realisation. The liquidation of Austria-Hungary had not yet taken place. While the larger share of the newly liberated territories would have fallen to Bulgaria in virtue of the principle of nationality, her neighbours, Serbia and Rumania, saw themselves deprived of the hope of realising their aspirations in other directions. They consequently sought compensation in Bulgarian territory, while Greece joined them with the object of pushing her frontier northwards in Macedonia.

Justice must prevail in the work of reconstruction in the Balkans. The principal obstacle to a sound and just arrangement will probably be found in the existence of certain preliminary compacts which have been made under the stress of circumstances and in the pressure which will be brought to bear on the future Congress for the satisfaction of vindictive and predatory aims. The preliminary compacts cannot be discussed at present; we must only hope that in some respects they will be found capable of modification. With regard to the other difficulty, we must trust to the firmness and statesmanship of our representatives and to the chivalrous sense of justice which will inspire the diplomacy of the Allies. 'Before we attempt to rebuild the temple of peace,' said the present Prime Minister at the Guildhall last January, 'we must see that the foundations are solid. . . . Henceforth, when the time for rebuilding comes, it must be on the rock of vindicated justice.' There can be no other basis for a permanent settlement in the Balkans.



Art. 6.—WORLD CONGESTION AND THE REAL ARMAGEDDON. ✓

1. *Studies in Statistics*. By G. B. Longstaff. Stanford, 1891.
2. *The Elements of Vital Statistics*. By A. Newsholme. 3rd ed. Sonnenschein, 1899.
3. *Dictionary of Statistics*. By M. G. Mulhall. Routledge, 1892.
4. *The New Dictionary of Statistics*. By A. D. Webb. Routledge, 1911.
5. *The Antiquity of Man*. By A. Keith. Williams & Norgate, 1915.

It is likely that we who live in the first quarter of the twentieth century may deem that these, in which our own lot is cast, are sufficiently strenuous and stirring times. Nevertheless, if we can but free our eyes of prejudice and look with a clear gaze on the future, we are obliged to perceive that the moment of extreme stress has by no means fallen upon humanity even now; that it has yet to come, and that it threatens the world in a not very remote future. I realise that this is prophecy of no smooth or popular kind. It is not thus that many people envisage the possibilities of the days when the great European war shall be a memory, and we shall have bequeathed, as we fondly hope, peace upon earth to our posterity for many generations. For a generation or two, it is true, the peace of exhaustion will perhaps be the portion of most of the nations engaged, but it is not the least use to close our eyes to the grim prospect that lies still further ahead.

In that admirable handy-book of reference Whitaker's Almanack, tucked away in the very smallest print at the bottom of a page, as though it were a matter of extremely little moment, is the laconic statement, 'It has been estimated that the Earth can maintain a population of 6,000,000,000, a total which will be reached about A.D. 2100 at the present rate of increase.' Of course no one who has the very slightest acquaintance with statistics can fail to be aware that their study is peculiarly beset with pitfalls. The editor of Whitaker does not give us his authority for the above conclusion, but it is an estimate which is in the main endorsed by a number of

census and rate-of-increase figures drawn from different sources. Moreover, if it be only approximately correct, it would still seem to point to a situation in the near future such as Man has never been faced with in all the ages of his history.

The chief difficulty in arriving at any trustworthy statistics consists in the fact that for the Mongolian family, comprising a very large section of the human race, no really trustworthy figures touching the rate of increase are available. We can conjecture the rate from that of other nations, chiefly of the Caucasian family, for which the figures are before us, from their observed expansion, and from such accounts of their progress as can be gathered from themselves and from foreigners who have lived among them. Mr Longstaff, in his 'Studies in Statistics,' deals closely with the population of Western Europe, but he leaves Russia and the Balkan peninsula alone, as factors too indefinite for his calculations. From the rest of the area under consideration he deduces a conclusion by which he is plainly and confessedly terrified—so much so that, in spite of the evidence, he hardly dares to accept it. Writing in 1891 and in respect of the last thirty years open to his enquiry, he finds (pp. 183 ff.) an increase at the rate of 21 per cent.—say  $1\frac{2}{3}$  millions per annum, or 6·6 per cent. in every decade. That is to say, if the population of that area continued to increase at the same rate as from 1850 to 1880 it would arrive in 1990 at close on 455 million.

Dr Newsholme, in 'Elements of Vital Statistics,' brings the story down rather later; but it is neither a strikingly different, nor a greatly more consoling story. He sets out at length the annual increase per cent. of a large number of countries. The last period under his review runs from 1891 to 1895. New Zealand and Ceylon give the highest mean annual increase for these years, the former 2·09 per cent. per annum, the latter 2·16. Immigration obviously is a main source of their increase, as also in the case of Chile, which comes next in order with 1·96. The rate for the United States was 1·73. And these accessions are achieved without any undue drain on the older countries from which the immigrants are taken. England and Wales, in spite of their emigration, show an increase of 1·15 a year. Germany does considerably

better, with 1.47. The kingdom of Prussia is higher again at 1.58. France is extraordinarily low, at 0.17; and Ireland shows the single instance of a decrease—one of 30 per cent.

From the whole list compiled for these years, and presuming the same rate of increase is maintained, Dr Newsholme foresees a doubling of the population of Prussia in 49.2 years, of England in 59.1 years, of Italy in 65.7, of Austria in 74.1, and of France, with her quite exceptional birthrate, in 591 years. Taking these figures one with another, they sufficiently show that, while filling the new countries, the old nations are very far from lowering their own population. We have put France in the above brief list as an example of the lowest rate of increase—very considerably the lowest, seeing that Spain comes next with 0.45. Ireland, as we have seen, has, uniquely, a decrease. But, if we were to estimate at one hundred years the time in which the population would double itself all the world over, we should then find, putting the present world population at 1623 millions, that in two hundred years it would come to 6492 millions, and thus we may arrive at approximately the result given in Whitaker of 6000 millions in 2100.

There is another and rather different comparison, also indicating the rate of increase of population, given in Mulhall's Statistical Dictionary. His table is of the number of inhabitants per square mile in various countries in the years 1820 and 1890 respectively. The United States, as is to be expected, shows the largest increase, rising from three to twenty inhabitants per square mile. Germany has nearly doubled its density in the same interval, but still stands at only 233 to the square mile. England, next to the United States, shows the largest addition, with 505 to the square mile in 1890 as compared with 237 seventy years before. Belgium's density is the highest, with 530 to the mile, and she has nearly doubled in the period under review. France shows an increase which is rather astonishing, and is certainly not above suspicion, when compared with the figures given by Longstaff—though of course the period is quite different—from 172 to 320. Russia (presumably the estimate is confined to Russia in Europe) has rather

more than doubled, with 42 inhabitants to the mile in 1890 as against 20 in 1820. Ireland again provides the single instance of a decline, with 212 to the mile at the earlier date, and no more than 148 at the latter. For Europe generally Mr Mulhall puts the increase at from 54 to 90.

Webb's Statistical Dictionary brings up most of the figures given by Mulhall to a later date. In the 1911 edition he estimates the average number of persons to every square mile in Europe at 110, in America at 10, and all the world over at 31. He assumes the total world population, for the purpose of this calculation, at 1610 millions, and presumably would confine his mileage estimate to what is considered the habitable portion of the globe—excluding the Arctic and Antarctic extremes.

This brings us back again to a consideration of the number of human inhabitants that the globe is capable of supporting. Longstaff makes a calculation under this head, basing it on figures that he quotes from Dr Parkes' Manual of Practical Hygiene. Dr Parkes estimates that each human being requires, on an average,  $5\frac{1}{2}$  bushels of wheat per year, besides animal food. Hence Longstaff makes the deduction that 1000 square miles are needed for the support of each million of the population. It is understood that he takes the good with the bad land, for the purpose of the calculation, and strikes an average of the wheat-producing capacity. He concludes, however, with the warning that the timber-supply will be exhausted far sooner than the wheat supply, as estimated above, giving as his authority Little's 'Forestry' (1883). Mankind may, however, conceivably exist in a dearth of timber. It has devised, and may devise, still further substitutes. But bread remains the staff of its life and appears to be its imperative need.

The 'Peking Gazette' publishes from time to time returns of the population from the various provincial governments, but the opinion of Europeans who have lived in China seems to be that they are anything but trustworthy. How little the native estimates are to be relied on may be gathered from a paper contributed by Mr E. H. Parker to the Royal Statistical Society's Journal for March 1899. It consists in the main of a translation of the returns of the population of China, collected by

the Government, from 1651 to 1860. In 1851 the total is put at 432 millions; in 1860 it is stated to have fallen to 261 millions—quite an incredible decrease. If we were to accept the latter figure, the increase in the subsequent years, up to the present time, would make no less tax on our credulity, for the general opinion of qualified students seems to be that for China proper the total is somewhere about 400 million. The Imperial Customs census in 1906 put it at 7½ millions higher; but Mr Rockhill, the American Minister at Peking at the time, considered this figure highly overstated.\* The probability seems to be that 400 millions is about the mark. Although the Chinese emigration to America and other lands held by Europeans has been checked, the Chinese continue their expansion into Manchuria, Mongolia and Turkestan. It is obvious that the difficulty of census-taking and of reckoning the rate of increase even approximately in an immense, loosely compacted and densely thronged empire such as that of China must be almost insuperable.

The more, then, we consider such statistics as are available, the greater reason we seem to find for taking as fairly well established the calculation that the world will be congested with humanity in something less than two centuries hence. Let us consider for a moment what that congestion must mean for us—or for our descendants in no very remote degree.

When a man of energy finds himself so cumbered and crowded to-day that there seems to be no room for him in this his own little island, what he does—presuming the country not to be at war—is to take out the atlas, or apply himself to one or other of the many colonising agencies, and see where, around the globe, within or without the British Empire, he may find a pleasant and a wider place. In a word, he emigrates. That is his solution of the crowding problem. And that is the solution which is going to serve us, of Britain, and those of other old European countries for a few more years to come, but it is a solution which, unless the unforeseen should happen, must fail us about the year 2100 A.D.

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\* 'Inquiry into the Population of China.' W. W. Rockhill. Washington, 1904.

I do not know whether this is likely to strike the reader as a point in some very far distant future. To me it makes rather the appeal of a menace as imminent as it is alarming. Of course, we may give these round figures a little latitude. By a score of years or so it is very possible that the actual congestion point may be delayed. It is equally possible that it may be advanced by a like short span. But what do a score or even fifty years amount to in the story? Every advance we make in reading the history of Creation, as it is stored for us in the rocks, seems to throw back its beginnings to a more immeasurably far past. The very story of Man himself, the youngest of all evolution's children, becomes respectably venerable in the pages of Dr Arthur Keith's recent book 'The Antiquity of Man.' Arguing from the strata in which human and humanoid remains have been found, and from the estimated rate of deposit of the strata, he calculates a million years ago to be, roundly, the date at which a creature with a brain capacity which might entitle it to the dignity of being called human was first developed on the earth. What is almost more extraordinary is that, so long ago as fifty thousand years Neanderthal man—that creature with a brain actually larger, though perhaps not so complexly convoluted, as our own—was already burying his dead with implements set beside the corpse in order to assist the spirit on its journey to the world beyond. Half a million of years ago had he thus begun to listen to the intimations of immortality to which many of his near kin are deaf even to-day. So strangely leisurely is the Creator at His work; so leaden-footed is the march of progress according to the tiny measures of time that we apply to it. Such an infinitesimal fraction of the whole are those two little centuries which must bring humanity to a point of congestion so extreme that no longer will the European, for whom the old world has no place, be able to say, 'I will go over-seas. There is space for me.' Only two centuries, at the most, will pass, and there will be no room for him. He will find footing, if at all, in a new land only on the condition of thrusting out from it—that is to say, thrusting to his death—some previous inhabitant. Is not the prospect sufficiently appalling?

Of course, there is nothing in any way novel about



a theory which merely supposes a tendency of population to increase faster than the means for its support. That the one progresses geometrically and the other arithmetically is the form—far too extreme—in which their mutual relation has been stated. It is the view specially associated with the name of Malthus, although, as Mr Udny Yale has pointed out,\* it was no novel doctrine that Malthus preached. Indeed it is Mr Yale's opinion that earlier writers, such as Arthur Young, were in advance of him. But it was Malthus who gave the view its emphasis and its wide publicity.

It has been held, as against Malthus, that man will inevitably check the natural rate of his multiplication when he begins to see it menacing him with imminent starvation; and in a few countries, in France most particularly, there is a strong tendency to arrest the pace of increase. But it would be very unwise to build wide hopes on such local and very likely only temporary manifestations. The diminished birthrate of France is, of course, included in the calculation on which is based the estimate of the date of world-congestion. Unfortunately the facts do not confirm the comfortable illusion held by Carey, the great American economist, in opposition to Malthus, that some benevolent influence tends to check undue multiplication. The popular belief that advancing civilisation automatically decreases the rate is quite untenable. On the contrary, we find Darwin writing in 'The Descent of Man':

'There is reason to suspect, as Malthus has remarked, that the reproductive power is actually less in barbarous than in civilised races. . . . I have shown in a former work ("Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication," vol. ii, pp. 111-118, 163) that all our domesticated quadrupeds and birds, and all our cultivated plants, are more fertile than the corresponding species in a state of nature. . . . We might therefore expect that civilised men, who in one sense are highly domesticated, would be more prolific than wild men. It is also probable that the increased fertility of civilised nations would become, as with our domestic animals, an inherited character.' (Vol. I. pp. 66, 67.)

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\* Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1906.

Obviously, we have to give up any prospect of a modification of the stress, which we might have been disposed to base on a natural tendency of civilisation to lessen the birthrate. Far from that, its trend is precisely in the opposite direction—to increase it. And the death rate, coincidentally, is lowered, by better care, better medical treatment, better sanitation, better food, in short, by all the advantages in the struggle for life that science can put at man's disposal.

Nor does there seem any better reason to suppose that the modern migration from the country to the towns will have effect in diminishing the pace of increase. In the number of the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* already cited, Mr Udny Yale observes (p. 63) that 'urbanisation is not, *per se*, a cause of lowered birthrate.' The whole paper is well worth study in connexion with this question. The writer ably discusses the effect of 'trade cycles,' of varying prosperity, on the marriage rate and on the birthrate. And, in every consideration of the general subject, the oft-quoted dictum of Dr Farr has to be borne in mind, that all who are born must come one day or other to the 'Urn of Death.' There must ever be this intrinsic difference between birth and death—that the former event may happen or it may not, but the latter is, humanly speaking, a certainty. In whatever direction, then, we look for our facts and figures, and granting all the latitude possible to the conclusions toward which they point, we nowhere find reason to depart widely from the deduction that the year 2100 A.D. must find the space of the world filled by man to its extreme capacity.

People are apt thoughtlessly to suppose that the loss of life in a great war will seriously affect the issue; but, fearful as the slaughter in this vast contest is, what, in sum, will it amount to? Even putting it at the very high figure of ten millions in all, what is even that in comparison with the numbers of our present world-population? For how long is it to defer the day of final congestion?

At the date of Malthus' writing it was scarcely possible for him to look forward so clearly as we are able and are even compelled to look, towards final world-congestion. The problem presented itself to him in rather a different

form. The multiplication of humanity since his time has been so rapid that it has assumed another aspect. We speak to-day in a Darwinian, rather than in a Malthusian, sense of 'the struggle for life'; and that struggle has been, as we fully recognise, inherent in all evolution. Man, with his acquisition of reason, gained so immensely over the rest of creation that the story of the last million years has been principally the story of his winning the kingship over them. Save for certain insects and microbes that still defy him, largely by virtue of their very minuteness, all others have been compelled to yield to him. That struggle lies behind him. The time has yet to come when he will be engaged in the most direful struggle of all—the veritable Armageddon—the struggle for life and for food with his own kind.

Humanity, as it would seem, may expect something like two centuries of respite before congestion becomes world-complete; yet, with every increasing generation, the stress must grow tighter. And, during those centuries, in what manner, we may ask, will man proceed with his evolution? Changes there will be, no doubt, but in one essential matter we may be very sure man will not change. There will be no modification, worthy of entering on the final balance sheet, in that which we commonly term his 'human nature.' Fifty thousand years ago, as we have seen, man was already burying with his dead their viaticum to another world. The period of two centuries is a very inadequate space for the working of any considerable alteration in a being whose development proceeds at the rate of which this most significant fact may give us some idea. Those critics are vastly wrong who deny moral progress to human nature. Despite all the cruelties of the present war, it is unthinkable that white men could now enjoy the spectacle of those gladiatorial shows in which the Romans had delight. The very fact that such a crime as the sinking of the 'Lusitania' horrified the whole world indicates a world-wide advance and quickening of the humane sentiment; but that progress is not set at a pace which will affect a modification of any importance in the brief space that remains.

Very greatly swifter is the pace of scientific invention and the development of every species of infernal machine.

It is indeed conceivable, though whether it is a conception to afford comfort may be more than doubtful, that the next century or two may see the discovery of some death-dealing influence or force such as Bulwer Lytton imagined in his 'Vril'—that fatal electrical emanation which a child could wield and which could carry death illimitably. It was as it were a wireless telegraphy of deadly voltage. The imagination shudders at the prospect of such a power in the hands of a being so utterly unfit to be entrusted with it as man even to-day is proving himself; yet it is a prospect of which we shall do well to recognise the possibility. It would be a stultifying conclusion indeed of all man's conquest of world-forces, if he were finally to employ them in the total destruction of human life upon the planet; and not of human life alone, but of every living creature whose sensibility was sufficiently developed to re-act to the deadly influence. Terrific and catastrophic as such a conclusion may be, it is not beyond the horizon of sane philosophy. Then, with the stage so swept, the drama of evolution might conceivably recommence from the opening scenes to work itself out anew towards who shall say what similar or what widely different conclusion?

We do not need to travel so far into the region of conjecture so speculative, though still perfectly possible, to foresee a future that will try the steadfastness, the courage, the organisation, the self-control and every highest quality of humanity as they have never before been tried. To-day we are filled with wonder at the madness and the wickedness of Germany, which has thrown more than half the world into misery unspeakable in a war wholly unnecessary. War in 1914 was in no sense a necessity for Germany, for the German, if crowded in his native country, had but to cross the sea, and there was ample room for him. In every land he found a footing, and well knew how to maintain it. With the passage of another century and a half that free footing will be his no longer. He and every man going from his own land will need to fight in order to gain a place in another. What is to be the issue? Can we question but that it will be war, bitter war, war not of a nation's choosing but thrust almost of necessity upon nations, war to conquer the very leave, the room,

to live? Conceivably it is possible that, should the nations perceive the imminence of an invention such as that 'Vril' fluid already noticed, they might impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance, prohibiting its use, breaking up the mechanism of its manufacture even as machines were destroyed as illegal engines by the wisdom of the rulers in 'Erewhon.' That is a possibility, though recent experience does not encourage the hope of an adherence to any ordinance of the kind. The proved disposition of warring humanity is, rather, to avail itself of the most diabolical mechanical and chemical agents that science can contrive. It is manifestly vain to build high hopes on any tenderness or mercy in our poor human nature, or to expect any change of heart in so short a time.

The battle, then, the inevitable battle, can hardly fail to be to the strong. It looks as though that nation or that race which is most populous, most prepared, most ruthless, is the nation that will win and will possess the earth. The preliminary skirmishes, it is to be presumed, will be not so much in the nature of any battles of giants as of the pitiful destruction of the lower races and of the less effective peoples. There will no longer be space to allow to the Red Indian his 'Reserves.' More and more will the white man thrust the man of colour—no matter what the hue—out of his rights as fellow-man. Gradually he will be shifted altogether from the scene, to make way for the more serious drama in which the best equipped and strongest nations will compete for final dominance.

Some years ago Mr Pearson startled the West with his theory of the 'yellow peril,' as enunciated in a book entitled 'National Life and Character.' It was written before the Russo-Japanese war had revealed the surprising power of the island yellow race. Its point was the menace to the peace and the civilisation of the West which the writer conceived would become urgent when China, with her vast population, awoke out of her stagnation, availed herself of the discoveries of Western science, and ranged herself for battle according to Western models. It was a forecast which had some vogue in its day. Its essential error was that it took no account of the element of time in its conclusions. It debated

terrestrial problems as if conditions were to remain unchanged almost indefinitely. It forgot that the moment was fast approaching when the world would be full, when the increasing nations must fight for the very right to live, when it would be too late for China to stir from her long sleep, when all that those newly awakened almond eyes could perceive would be the conqueror entering into possession and thrusting her people out of very existence by the power of his better equipment. It is now scarcely conceivable that she can wake so quickly and so effectively from that long sleep as to be a dangerous element in the wars for the world's final settlement.

It is increasingly likely, as locomotion and communication become ever easier, that the lordship of a world thus virtually reduced in its dimensions will fall into the hands of one sole authority. The extent of the Roman Empire, held all under one hand in the days when the Emperor's edict ran no faster than a horse can gallop, is a fact far more surprising—viewed in its right perspective, a fact far bigger—than world-domination by a single power would be even to-day. And still less will such world-domination be matter of exceeding difficulty or wonder with the scientific improvements likely to be available for man's use two centuries hence. It seems almost certain that we have to foresee the strongest nation dominating, decimating, finally exterminating all those that are weaker, until that nation itself shall eventually replenish the whole habitable surface of the globe.

Once again, thus arriving at the end of yet another chapter of the story, we have to ask ourselves: What then? What are we to find when we once more turn the page? That the struggle which has so far been for national predominance and possession has to take on itself a fratricidal character—brother fighting brother for a living space upon the earth? It is difficult to see how it can be otherwise. Out of the welter what is to issue forth? What *modus vivendi* in the form of a strict regulation of the birth-rate to match the death-rate will the world-masters then contrive so that conditions may be not altogether intolerable? These are questions to be asked; it is for them, not for us, to find the answer!



More than enough for us to realise that, before such an extreme of congestion can be reached, life, as we to-day envisage and enjoy it, will long have ceased to be worth the living. The 'open space,' 'the lungs of the cities,' will have been claimed for the inexorable necessity of building a dwelling upon them years before. Either that, or man must become again a race of troglodytes, living beneath the earth, in a manner more or less pre-figured by the life in the great prepared trenches separating the battle lines to-day. Dwelling beneath the earth and growing his food-stuffs upon its surface, man for a time may cheat the fate with which the world-congestion threatens him. It can but delay for a brief while the supreme hour. Save for a cataclysm which shall destroy terrestrial life as fatally as any development of the 'Vril' or some such power of human device, a new man will be able to find place on the earth only on condition of thrusting another off it. That, so far as his life on earth can take him, is the destiny towards which man manifestly is moving. Well, indeed, might Huxley say that evolution promises us no millennium.

It is a destiny from which two lessons, at least, are no less manifest than the fact itself. The first is a lesson which may point man more emphatically to the recognition that his ultimate destiny, the destiny which really matters, is not an affair of this earth at all. If this were all, then evolution, far from being on the road towards a millennium, would be an age-long journey to no goal at all, a means towards no end. A few may still, in spite of clear vision of the terrific stress that has to come, believe in the ultimate perfectibility of man upon this earth. They are souls endowed with a patience and long-sufferance that is passing marvellous when we consider that Neanderthal man was already so far advanced in thought as to hold distinct views of an after-life, and when we consider, beside that curious picture, the long space which seems to separate humanity from perfection to-day. With that comparison in mind, the believer in terrestrial perfectibility must appeal to most of us as a being gifted with an optimism which we can but admire, which we can never hope to rival.

That, as it seems to me, is one of the lessons, insisting  
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on a truth which a cloud of other witnesses presses on us—that the final destiny of man is to be achieved in an environment other than that of the planet of his present pilgrimage. The other is of a more material character, and our reading and acceptance of it will depend on the view that each of us may take of the conclusion of the terrestrial story. Will the inevitable struggle be worth the waging? Does it seem to us better to belong to the surviving and dominant, or to the beaten and extinguished race? Will the life that we can see imminent for our posterity be worth the living, or will it not?

Acceptance of the latter alternative is by far the easier way; it is the way of Mary, rather than of Martha; and we know what has been said in that regard. But, in the circumstances, it is also the way of national death. Are we prepared to accept this conclusion and to welcome it as the lesser evil? If so, very well. In that case we have no need to set our house in order. We may leave all in the hands of fortune. But, if we prefer the former choice, if it be our resolve to take our strenuous part in the struggle and, God helping us, to play eventually the dominant part, then, on the other hand, it behoves us to look to it very carefully that we are so organised, so prepared, that the day of battle shall find us at all points armed.

I know the first comment will be that it is useless, even fanciful, to look so far ahead. That is a comment most characteristically British. Whatever our virtues—and we believe them many, as a nation—that of long-sightedness, or of even a moderate quality of foresight, is not to be reckoned among them. There is only one nation of modern times that has shown prevision in any conspicuous degree—Germany. We commonly say that we cannot understand the madness which incited Germany to declare war at the moment which she chose. As the event is proving, it was not the most auspicious for her particular purpose. But that purpose, which was no less than world-domination, was thwarted by one mistake only in her calculation, the mistake of deeming that Great Britain, with Ireland, was too internally distracted to unite against a common foe, and that the tie which bound the Colonies with the Mother-country was not stout enough to stand the strain

of war. Had this calculation not been a mistaken one, Germany's immediate objects in the war would have been attained at comparatively little cost. No one who has intelligently followed the course of events in the great struggle can well have any illusions in that regard. It is almost as impossible to doubt, seeing the powerful German influence revealed in the South American States, that it was her more ultimate purpose, having established herself as dictator of terms to Europe, to impose her terms on the United States likewise, challenging that Monroe doctrine which the States were in no condition of naval and military readiness to uphold. Finally, she had but to harness the Balkans and Turkey to the wheels of her war-chariot in order to drive it in triumphal procession round the world. Her Eastern and her Western triumphs would have joined hands. Russia, enclosed within her own vast borders, would have been as inert as the United States. Germany's world-dominance would have been complete.

This is a grandiose scheme; but, grandiose as it is, they must be very blind to the logic of events and of demonstrated fact who can doubt that it was the scheme quite reasonably considered in the German mind—reasonably, because, save for Great Britain's intervention with her sea-power, it would have been even now in full course of realisation. It is, in fact, a huge failure, but it wanted only a little of being a huge success. Now Germany, among all modern nations, is most richly endowed with foresight. For fifty years, as we now know, she has been working, with world-domination, no less, as her goal. She is also—and it is a large factor in her successful prevenience—endowed with the statistical talent. It is not to be supposed that her statisticians have failed to work out the simple sum in world-acreage, in population and its rate of increase, to its arithmetically certain conclusion of world-congestion in or about the beginning of the 22nd century. Nor is it to be supposed that she did not have this conclusion vividly in view when she opened her campaign against the world's peace in the autumn of 1914. Had that campaign gone according to her perfectly reasonable expectation, there is no question as to the nation that would have conquered in the final Armageddon to settle

the mastery of a world crowded to the very limit of its life-supporting power. In that case there would hardly have been an Armageddon yet to fight. In that case she would have swallowed one day, as a small morsel, Great Britain, after all our present allies had been reduced to impotence. America, a vast helpless Colossus, would have been bound and fettered in due course; and the Junker would have triumphed as the insufferable tyrant of a stricken earth.

Happily, as becomes increasingly manifest, God in His mercy had other destinies for mankind on this planet. The real Armageddon is still to fight, and will in all human likelihood be set in array before the first hour of that fateful 22nd century shall strike. Is the idea of looking thus far ahead too fanciful to be entertained seriously, or is it only our nation's incapacity to see further than the length of its own nose, that will condemn such an idea as vain and unpractical? By 'practical' we are nationally ready to signify those things only that lie immediately before our eyes, and to deride as 'imaginative' those which loom in the future. That has been our British way, and it has cost us very dear. But even the most 'practical' can scarcely criticise as 'imaginative' a future to which those dull things, dear to the practical mind—figures—bear their arithmetical witness, not to be impeached. If no planetary change or convulsion intervenes, if the present rate of increase of population is at all maintained, it is as clear as facts and figures can make it that the world will be so filled with humanity as to leave no room for further increase in or about 2100. There is nothing imaginative in this forecast. Imagination may indeed begin to exercise itself—and it is very well that it should—on what is likely to happen as a result of that congestion, and on the means that it behoves us, as a nation, to take in view of its certain imminency. And if the imagination thus exercised does not suggest the probability that these happenings will be terrific and tragic beyond all that has been known in the story of the world, then, as it seems to me, it must needs be imagination conjoined with a gift of optimism that is altogether extraordinary.

But in sober truth it is no great way forward to look. Already, without any adequate conception in their minds

of the real Armageddon of the future, people are speaking of the present war that we are waging as 'for the sake of generations that are to come.' A very few of these generations will have come and gone before the stress of this very much more serious struggle is upon the world. 'For what,' we sometimes ask, 'are we fighting now?' And we answer readily enough, 'for liberty, for the right to live free.' But if we ask, for what our children's grandchildren—it is not likely to be much further deferred than that—will be fighting in their day, the answer is obvious: 'For life, for the right to live at all.' It will be no less a necessity than this; they will fight for space to live.

And with a future so immediate and so inevitable spread plain before their eyes, we may yet hear people speak with smug complacency of the course of the world, after the present war, as if humanity's development were to continue on it under precisely the same conditions as in the past when man was fulfilling his destiny of replenishing the earth. They are blind, as it appears, to the obvious, the necessary and the very drastic changes in the circumstances when that part of his fate shall have been accomplished and he shall proceed to the next and infinitely shrewder problem of his life on an already fully replenished earth. It is not an amusing prospect. But what would be amusing, were it not pathetic, is the talk of the 'general disarmament' and of the 'abiding peace,' which are to be among the natural consequences of the satisfactory termination of this war. Such talk is rife, and, pitiful as it seems, there are such talkers who believe in what they say. More pathetic still, in days of a not very remote future, will be the fate of our people if they and their rulers allow themselves to be hypnotised by the suggestion of this smooth folly, if they fail to realise the situation towards which humanity is most inevitably working, fail to prepare for the dire clash that is absolutely bound to come.

H. G. HUTCHINSON.

Art. 7.—A NEW INDIA; THE MALAY STATES.

1. *The Federated Malay States: Annual Report for 1916.*  
By Sir E. L. Brockman, K.C.M.G., Chief Secretary.
2. *F.M.S. Report on the Working of the Trade and Customs Department during the year 1916.*
3. *F.M.S. Railways. Annual Report for 1916.*
4. *Manual of Statistics relating to the F.M.S. 1916.*
5. *Trengganu Annual Report for the year 1915.* By J. L. Humphreys, British Agent.
6. *The Annual Report of the Adviser to the Kedah Government for the year 1334 A.H. (Nov. 1915—Oct. 1916).* By G. A. Hall, Acting Adviser to the Kedah Government.
7. *Kelantan Administration Report for the year 1916.* By R. J. Farrer, Acting British Adviser.
8. *Johore Government Gazette: Annual Report for 1915.\**  
F. J. Weld, Acting General Adviser.

LESS than a half century ago a body of British traders in the Straits Settlements were told that if they 'choose to run the risk of placing their persons and property in the jeopardy which they are aware attends them in this country (the Malay Peninsula), under the circumstances it is impossible for Government to be answerable for their protection or that of their property.'† The other day, at a meeting held at a town in the Federated Malay States to support the Malayan war loan, a speaker stated, as a reason for anticipating a generous response to war appeals of this character, that this self-same country within which the British trader of forty-five years ago could look for no protection is to-day *per capita* the wealthiest territory in the Empire. It is doubtful whether in the whole history of Imperial expansion, rich as it is in examples of progress, a more striking and significant example than this could be found. In sober truth the development of the region which is conveniently described under the comprehensive name of British

\* The above-mentioned works are published by the respective Governments, and may be purchased at the Federated Malay States Agency, 88, Cannon St, E.C.

† Reply of the Straits Settlements Government to the petition forwarded in July 1872 to the Government by the Singapore and Malacca Chambers of Commerce, protesting against the prevailing anarchy and asking for help.



Malaya is one of the marvels of latter-day civilisation. From a home of the most ruthless race of pirates the world has known the territory has become one of the principal supply grounds of international commerce. Considerably more than half the entire demand for tin of the world's manufactures is met by the produce of British Malayan mines. More astonishing still is the fact that this wild Alsatia of fifty years ago to-day produces 73 per cent. of the plantation rubber produced in the world—an amount that exceeds the entire export of wild rubber from Brazil, which once almost entirely monopolised the market for the commodity. We talk of the romance of Empire, but most of us little realise that it is to-day in the making just as much as it was in the stirring period when Clive and Stringer Lawrence and Coote were settling with their swords the destinies of a continent on the plains of the Carnatic and amid the mango-groves of Bengal. It is only when we dip into the pages of the official literature of our oversea possessions, and analyse the remarkable facts and figures there set out, that we see in full grandeur the splendid work of Empire building which is still proceeding under the successors of Hastings and Light and Raffles.

The Federated Malay States have a record rich in examples of that statesmanship which has made the British Empire what it is. By force of character—that strange mysterious quality of mind which gives individual Britons a dominating power over Asiatics—a group of Malay States, formerly distinguished by nothing but their fissiparous tendencies, have been welded together into a solid whole under a form of government which admirably compromises between an excess of interference and a dangerous freedom. And the feat has been accomplished not only without friction, but with a degree of cordial acquiescence on the part of the Malays, both rulers and ruled, which is astonishing when we recall their turbulent history. No longer is it a mere case of a few restricted 'settlements,' small islands of peace and commerce in a sea of anarchy, but of a great aggregation of territorial units of very great present value and with prospects which open up a majestic vista of future possibilities. Here are the partners in the 'Old Colony'—Singapore, Penang and Malacca—rich and potentially valuable as

strategic seats of Imperial power, in intimate association with a vast area of new territory—the familiarly known ‘F.M.S.’ (Federated Malay States)—whose immense resources of natural wealth give an increased importance to the development of British power in this part of the East. The process of accretion and consolidation continues. Slowly but surely in this former land of misrule is being built up an Imperial system, reaching out unerringly to the older portions of our Indian Empire with which, probably at a no distant period, it is destined to have a close physical connexion.

British Malaya has been developed in the characteristically loose way that has marked the growth of our Empire as a whole. It may, indeed, be said that it exists to-day in spite of, rather than because of, the following out of a well-conceived plan. Penang, the oldest British settlement in the Straits, was occupied by Francis Light in the face of marked official discouragement; and the policy pursued by the Supreme Government in India in the early days of that colony’s existence would have resulted in its evacuation but for the strong action and shrewd diplomacy of the eminent Empire builder on the spot. When Singapore was occupied and an incomparable strategical point in Eastern seas placed in British hands, Raffles, whose prescient genius had directed the selection of the island, met with the most violent opposition from the local Government in the Straits, and was afterwards subjected to severe censure by the home authorities for daring to be more farsighted and enterprising than his contemporaries. Malacca, again, would have been Dutch to this day, and would have driven a solid wedge into the British sphere of influence on the Malay Peninsula, but for the urgent representations of Raffles and others, who clearly realised the importance of keeping the mainland clear of rivals. In more recent times, when the present constitution of the Federated Malay States was in the making, the weight of official authority in Whitehall was repeatedly thrown into the balance against the progressive development of the system of control and administration which has produced such remarkable results. ‘The craven fear of being great’ appears often to have haunted the official mind

where British Malaya is concerned. But, happily our policy has at last been directed on to lines which are more in harmony with the vast British interests that centre in this part of the East. The story of the change from ignorant apathy to informed alertness is one which has a profound significance at this time, when we are daily becoming better acquainted with the enormous range of the Teutonic conspiracy against British trade and influence.

About ten years ago the British Foreign Office received definite information of a project in process of completion for the construction of a railway from Bangkok in Siam to Kelantan in the north-eastern part of the Malay Peninsula. The line was promoted under German auspices and financed with German capital, under conditions which made it practically certain that in the long run it would become virtually a German line. The news was sufficiently startling to awaken in Whitehall a sense of the dangers which threatened our Imperial position in a region which for generations had been regarded as lying within our sphere of influence. Abandoning the *laissez-faire* policy followed in regard to the north-eastern Peninsular States, the Imperial Government opened up negotiations with Siam for a territorial rearrangement based on the formal recognition of British influence in Kelantan and the contiguous State of Trengganu. Eventually an agreement was come to, by which, in exchange for the abandonment of our rights to extra-territorial jurisdiction in Siam, the Siamese Government conceded to us her somewhat nebulous claims to interference in Kelantan and Trengganu, and her better-defined title to influence in the States of Kedah and Perlis on the north-western side of the Peninsula.

In this Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 we have one of the most potent instruments of Imperial expansion and consolidation that the modern history of the Empire supplies. It has immediately brought into the region of practical policy that all-British Malay Peninsula which Raffles sighed for and which was long regarded as an unattainable dream by successive British administrators in the Straits. Although only eight years have elapsed since the treaty was ratified, British influence is to-day

paramount throughout the entire region. British officials are installed as 'advisers' to the ruling chiefs of the Protected States, and with firm but tactful insistence direct the administration along the lines of ordered government which have been followed by the States in the federated area and which have brought them to the highest pitch of prosperity. Merchants and traders are flocking to the States, and are establishing commercial connexions which promise in a few years to yield a rich harvest not only to British commerce but to the revenues of the local governments. Ports are being improved, roads are being constructed, and in a hundred ways life is being infused into the dry bones of a region which until a few years ago was an absolute *terra incognita* to the European. But by far the most important result of the recently concluded arrangement is the effect it has had in promoting what may be termed inter-Imperial land communications, for we have been brought by the rapid march of recent events within sight of the period when there will be direct railway communication between India and British Malaya.

A few words about the British Malayan Railway system are necessary as a preface to the story of this important Indo-Malayan trunk line. Less than thirty years ago, there was not a single mile of railway in the whole of the Malay Peninsula. To-day there are 993 miles of line, carrying every year about 15,000,000 passengers and earning sufficient money to pay a return of about five per cent. on the capital outlay. The Government of the Federated Malay States is the sole owner of the lines. It has financed them entirely from the beginning to the present time out of the surplus revenue of the States. The same overflowing Exchequer is being resorted to for the furtherance of the ambitious scheme, which has been in active progress in the past few years, of establishing a connexion between the Malayan and the Anglo-Siamese systems. For the purpose of constructing the necessary linking line in Siam, the Imperial Government sanctioned a loan of 4,750,000*l.* to the Siamese Government, out of the funds of the Federated Malay States. At the same time the Government of these States proceeded energetically with its project of railway extension northward by means of a line along

the eastern side of the Peninsula through Pahang and Kelantan to the Siamese border. So rapid has been the progress on the British side that in Kelantan the first portion of the northern section of the line has been opened, and the railhead has been carried some thirty-two miles southward from Tumpat, the principal port of the State. On the Siamese side work has proceeded steadily; and during the present year railway connexion will be established between Penang and Bangkok, the Federated Malay States Government having pushed on the railway extension from Bukit Mertajam, in Province Wellesley, through the western States of Kedah and Perlis, in preference to the east coast railway.

It is difficult to overrate the importance of the steps that have just been taken. The public convenience of the project will be enormous. It will make it possible for a traveller to disembark at Penang and proceed overland to Bangkok, avoiding what is during the prevalence of the north-east monsoon a rough sea-trip to the Siamese capital. The strategical value of the possible linking up of the Indian and Malayan lines, too, is considerable. But doubtless the most striking outcome of the enterprise will be the enormous impulse it will give to the development of the British Malayan region which is traversed by the lines.

The States which have been brought under British control by the Anglo-Siamese agreement of 1909 are in the main almost virgin soil. That the territory will prove as rich as the federated area is not expected by experts, but there is ample scope, short of the affluence of Perak and Selangor, for results which will give a powerful new element of stability to the great structure of British Malayan prosperity. Gold has hitherto proved a disappointingly elusive factor in the commercial development of Malaya. Nevertheless, it is worked in Trengganu and Kelantan; and remembering, as we must, that Ophir, the historic land of gold, was in Malaya, we cannot regard the possibility of new discoveries of the precious metal as mythical. Even if in this direction the fates are not propitious, there is no room for serious question that other mineral wealth will be discovered to contribute its quota to the resources of the States in a not distant future. New tin deposits may be revealed

in some of the untraversed regions of Trengganu; and, though the mineralogical experts do not hold out much hope of any considerable deposits in Kelantan, it is certain, from the existence of old workings in some of the central districts, that the Chinese in times past resorted to the State for supplies of the metal, in the manipulation of which they were for centuries supreme in the East. The probability of the discovery of oil is another contingency which may reasonably be kept in view, seeing that the Malay Peninsula is not far removed from the important oil-bearing regions of Dutch India, with which it has geological affinities. Whether these expectations as to mineral resources are realised or not, the States are sufficiently favoured by nature to be able to render a good account of themselves in days to come. The coconut flourishes in the coastal districts of all the States; and, with the immense increase in the demands made from Europe for the products of the tree for the manufacture of margarine and soap, the coconut-planting industry, which is already well established, bids fair to be a highly lucrative one. Rubber has come to the front a good deal of late; and if, as many shrewd observers think, the ultimate success of all sound undertakings is assured, the protected States, and particularly Kedah and Kelantan, will have a full share of the measure of prosperity that will fall to the Malayan rubber industry, for the conditions of climate and soil in them are exceptionally favourable to the growth of the Para rubber tree.

Trengganu, the more southern of the Protected States, has an individuality of its own which may be expected to assert itself in the final adjustment of the commercial relations of the States. In it some of the most interesting of the old Malayan industries are prosecuted with happy results. It is the home of the manufacture of the beautiful silk Malayan sarongs which captivate the lover of Eastern fabrics. There is also an extensive art metal industry in the State capital, and an important fishing enterprise which gives employment to hundreds of hardy Malayan seamen. How far these purely indigenous industries will bear the more intimate contact of the aggressive Western civilisation, which under the new political conditions is their lot, remains



to be seen. In other parts of the peninsula, the old arts and crafts have shown a regrettable tendency to flag with the advance of European influence; and it is possible that the experience will be repeated on the east coast. But the peculiar skill which marks the Trengganu worker will doubtless find its opening in some profitable way, either in association with a purely local enterprise or in the larger life of the peninsula which the construction of the railway will open up. It is not, at all events, an altogether visionary idea that some day, not long hence, 'the Birmingham of the Peninsula,' as Kuala Trengganu has been called, may develop an important manufacturing industry on Western lines, as Bombay and other Eastern cities have done.

In addition to the States which have recently come under the ægis of British influence, there is the considerable State of Johore lying at the extreme south of the Malay Peninsula, in close contact at its southern end with Singapore, with which it is historically connected. Johore has occupied a position of considerable political importance from the earliest period of British rule; and until recently it stood somewhat aloof from the current of commercial life which in the adjoining federated territory was producing such remarkable results. But the last few years have wrought a considerable change in the aspect of affairs. Rubber development has found a natural outlet in the vast expanses of almost virgin soil of which the State consists. Great tracts of land have been taken up and planted with Para rubber by Japanese as well as European planters; and a large immigrant population has sprung up in the coastal districts, with marked advantage to the revenue of the State. Commercial interests generally have undergone notable expansion in sympathy with the extension of rubber cultivation. Johore, in fact, seems at last to have awakened to its destiny as commercially the most important of all the States in the Malay Peninsula. But, with all its recent progress, it is still only on the threshold of its career as a modernised State. So little is the country known, although it lies at the very doors of Singapore, that until a few years ago, when the need was supplied, no trustworthy map of the territory existed.

A systematic scheme of road-construction, now in process of execution, will, when completed, materially promote the opening-up of the State. By means of this arterial system, communication will be established with the eastern and western coasts; and the capital will be brought into touch with towns which are at present only reached with difficulty. The completion of the East Coast Railway, too, will not be without its invigorating influence on the locality, for an important section of this future trunk-line consists of the Johore State Railway, built for Johore by the F.M.S. Railway Department, and afterwards leased to the Federated Malay States in furtherance of the wise policy of unifying the administration of all the railways in British Malaya.

Although the Protected States have been under British supervision only a short time, they are already showing in their improved administration the marked effects of the reforming influences that have been introduced. In Kedah the revenue has grown from \$402,638 in 1905 to \$3,276,732 in 1916; and the trade of the State, which a few years since was quite small, now reaches the respectable figure of \$5,500,000. In Kelantan and Trengganu, the progress has been slower, partly owing to local peculiarities; but the leaven of civilisation is nevertheless satisfactorily working, and in due time will produce the notable financial results observable in the Western State. Johore, though standing apart from the main group of Protected States, is advancing in sympathy with the movement which is influencing them. Its revenue has increased from about \$2,000,000 in 1909 and \$3,323,185 in 1910 to \$7,976,862 in 1916; and its trade has expanded in a remarkable way in the past few years. In 1915 the exports and imports amounted in value to \$40,397,294 as compared with \$25,228,184 in the previous year. The exports have more than doubled in four years, mainly owing to the greatly increased volume and enhanced value of the rubber and tin shipped. The tin production of the State has increased tenfold in five years, and in the last year covered by the report more than threefold. This extraordinary development is attributable to the recent discovery of extremely rich new deposits of the valuable metal in an isolated district on the east coast. From one mine alone in this locality

tin of the value of one and a half million dollars was extracted in seven months of 1915. These are striking facts. But to see the marvellous effect of British influence at its highest point we must go to the older federated area. Pahang, which is the youngest State in the federation—it joined in 1888—enjoys nearly four times the revenue it did ten years since, and if we carry the record back another ten years we find that the income of the State has increased fifteen-fold—from \$100,220 in 1894 to \$1,871,297 in 1916.

The position of the States as a whole is one of extraordinary financial progress. So late as 1880, the collective revenue of the States then comprising the Federation was only \$881,910; in 1916 it was \$51,121,856 against \$40,774,984 in 1915, and contrasting strikingly with the pre-war return of 1913, during which year revenue of the then record sum of \$44,332,711 was collected. It has to be admitted that the expenditure has more than kept pace with the Federation's income. The following figures, indeed, at the first glance are a little disquieting:

1912.	1913.	1914.	1915.	1916.
\$30,990,487	\$47,287,581	\$55,010,037	\$42,833,631	\$31,966,581

Here we have revealed a considerable increase in the expenditure of the years 1912-15. The explanation is a simple one. The Federation in the last few years has enormously increased its reproductive expenditure—outlay on railways, roads, etc.; it has financed a loan to Siam; and large contributions in respect of the battleship H.M.S. 'Malaya,' the splendid gift of the Malayan princes to the Navy, figure in the last three years' returns. The financing of public works out of revenue is a sound policy; and in this respect British Malaya occupies a unique position amongst the countries of the Empire, for she has no public debt, and, apart from accumulated funds amounting to \$60,631,511 (7,073,676*l.*), owns a railway system, on which \$92,560,398 (10,798,733*l.*) have been expended down to the end of 1916, and which bring in a return of 4·92 per cent. on capital. It should be explained, however, that during April of 1916 a local loan of \$15,000,000 was raised for the purpose of assisting the Imperial War Fund, it having been urged that the

wealthy native classes might be given an opportunity of showing their patriotism. The loan was over-subscribed; and one prominent Chinese resident, the late Towkay Loke Yew, C.M.G., contributed over one million dollars (about 120,000*l.*).

If we leave out of consideration the falling-off of revenue in 1914 and 1915, which is accounted for to a large extent by the derangement of trade owing to the war, the expansion of the resources of the Federation has been progressive almost from the beginning. Since 1888 the revenue has increased tenfold and the imports and exports more than fivefold, while the population has grown from 424,218 in 1891 to 1,172,336 in 1915.

Taking a wider survey, embracing the whole of the Malayan area under British influence—the 'old Colony' as well as the Federated States—we have a remarkable position disclosed in the trade returns. The following are the latest figures relative to Imports and Exports in connexion with the Straits Settlements:

	Imports.	Exports.	Total.
	£	£	£
1913	55,483,818	44,999,898	100,483,716
1914	46,121,866	39,944,540	86,066,406
1915	52,480,270	50,674,414	103,154,684
1916	67,496,356	62,678,724	130,175,080

The Federated Malay States figures are given below:

	Imports.	Exports.*	Total.
	£	£	£
1913	10,081,068	17,344,775	27,425,843
1914	8,607,862	14,401,662	23,009,524
1915	7,156,694	18,950,079	26,106,773
1916	8,338,510	25,730,613	34,069,123

It is noteworthy that the aggregate trade of British Malaya in 1916 (164,244,203*l.*) was in excess of the total seaborne trade of India twenty years ago. That the astonishing progress already made will be maintained at the rate that the past has witnessed is perhaps not to be expected. But we may reasonably hope that there will be a steady growth in the commerce of the area. The remarkable wealth of British Malaya in raw material

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\* Fluctuation in price of rubber and tin affects value of exports.

indispensable to the world's manufactures must insure for its trade an increasing predominance. For its rubber,\* its tin, its wolfram and other valuable mineral deposits, and for its copra, it has an assured market; and with the opening-up of the Peninsula by railways and roads these natural resources will be indefinitely multiplied.

One of the most encouraging facts of the war period is the relatively small effect that the cataclysm in Europe has had on our tropical possessions. In the first months of the war there was a temporary dislocation of trade relations, due partly to raiding enemy cruisers and partly to the natural timidity of the community in the presence of such exceptional conditions as those which the war brought about. But this wave of depression soon passed away; and to-day the position is quite satisfactory, save in a few special directions in which commerce is directly affected by the stoppage of trading with the enemy countries. As regards British Malaya, the outlook has never been brighter. Trade, as the figures cited show, not only recovered from the first effects of the war, but there was actually an improvement on the pre-war conditions, the returns for the Straits Settlements disclosing an increase in 1916 of 29,692,364*l.* over the excellent figures of 1913, and of 44,108,674*l.* over those of 1914. A further interesting point to be noted is that the exports from the Federated Malay States in 1915 formed a 'record.' This record in its turn was eclipsed by the figures for 1916. The phenomenon is largely explained by the enhanced price of rubber and the increased export of that invaluable commodity. Though in this instance the war's influence has been directly beneficial and the return of peace may produce a reaction, the remarkable fact remains that, in the second and third year of the

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\* *Hevea brasiliensis*, a South American tree of the order Euphorbiaceæ. A few plants of this tree were sent out from the Royal Gardens, Kew, in 1876, and were in the same year planted in the Singapore Botanic Gardens and also in the grounds behind the Residency at Kuala Kangsar, Perak. The seeds from these locally grown trees were distributed to various places in the neighbourhood, and ultimately plantations were formed which became the nucleus of the vast rubber industry in British Malaya. Last year's output from the Federated Malay States alone amounted to 62,764 tons, with an approximate value of 17½ million pounds sterling. The Malay Peninsula produces about two-thirds of the total of the world's production of plantation rubber.

great war, a British possession did a larger export trade than at any previous period in its history.

In a recent work,\* with the production of which the writer was associated, British Malaya was described as a miniature India, the old Straits Settlements—Singapore, Penang and Malacca—answering to the Presidency towns, the Federated Malay States to the British administered area, and the Protected States to the Native States. This idea of a new India arising outside the limits of the Indian Empire, it is not without significance to note, was developed in a lecture delivered just before the outbreak of war by a German Professor, Dr L. von Wiese, before the International Union for Comparative Law and Political Economy in Berlin. Adopting as the title of his lecture 'English Colonial Policy in Hinter-India,' the lecturer expressed regret that Germans had not given more attention to the fact that a new British Colonial Empire of the greatest economic capability was being erected, an Empire that would greatly strengthen England's political and strategic position as against the Powers of the Pacific Ocean, and also those Powers, like Germany, interested in the Far East. He went on to describe with what energy and foresight the Straits Settlements were gradually being united with the nominally still independent Malay States, and how by a later union with Burmah, after overcoming the opposition of Siam, a new English Colonial Empire would arise in the tropics, whose riches and favourable maritime position would reach far beyond the conditions of India. Prof. von Wiese, continuing, referred to what he called the astounding pitch of development to which what were forty years ago robber States had reached in Malaya under the direction of British advisers. This State federation is, therefore, he said, not directed against England, but is the result of a clever British policy. He went on to deal with the riches of the Federated Malay States, and described the way in which the Crown Colony and the protected States were being bound together by railways, which are being continued up the Peninsula.

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\* 'The Malay Peninsula,' by Arnold Wright and Thos H. Reid. Fisher Unwin, 1912.



The British had, he added, only one anxiety, viz. the Chinese problem. Describing the influx of the Chinese and their achievements, he said that, more and more, Singapore was becoming the great dividing line between Yellow and White world-domination, and therein lay the special importance of the ripening State organisation in that region.


Prof. von Wiese is quite wrong as to the Chinese in the Straits being a source of anxiety to the British. The Chinese are commercially the most stable element of the whole native community in British Malaya, and they are far more attached to British rule than are corresponding alien communities in other British possessions. As Sir Frank Swettenham shows in his well-known book ('British Malaya: an account of the origin and progress of British influence in Malaya'), they have played a conspicuous and useful part in the work of development in this region:

'Their energy and enterprise,' he says, 'have made the Malay States what they are to-day, and it would be impossible to overstate the obligation which the Malay Government and people are under to these hard-working, capable, and law-abiding aliens. They were already the miners and the traders, and in some instances the planters and the fishermen, before the white man had found his way to the Peninsula. . . . They brought all the capital into the country when Europeans feared to take the risk; they were the traders and shopkeepers; and it was their steamers which first opened regular communication between the ports of the colony and the ports of the Malay States. They introduced tens of thousands of their countrymen when the one great need was labour . . . and it is their work, the taxation of the luxuries they consume and of the pleasures they enjoy, which has provided something like nine-tenths of the revenue' (pp. 231-2).

Sir F. Swettenham's opinion of the Straits Chinese is substantially that of every authority on British Malaya. Their loyalty to the British connexion was never more apparent than in this present period of stress for the Empire. They have aided the Government in many ways, and not least by the example they have set of steadfast devotion to the cause of the Allies. In his main conclusions, however, the German Professor

takes a singularly accurate and farsighted view of the position. In the Malay Peninsula a vast edifice is being built up, the ultimate magnificent proportions of which may be clearly discerned in the startling growth of the past. Though it may never attain to the stately grandeur of Imperial India, whose immemorial traditions it cannot parallel in its own history, it is not a far-fetched supposition that the time will come when the stream of wealth flowing from and to the Malay Peninsula, measured by the value of imports and exports, will be as great as that which flows in and out of India, and it is conceivable that it may be even greater. The present enterprising policy of the British Malayan authorities is helping on the movement to the utmost. They are showing a prescience and a business-like promptitude in dealing with the problems of development which is worthy of the highest commendation, more especially as it is in striking contrast with the attitude of many leading men at home in things which pertain to Imperial consolidation. One conspicuous example of their enterprise is the taking of measures to establish a health resort in Malaya. The future Simla of this New India is to be at Gunong Tahan, a lofty mountain, 7186 feet high, in Pahang. Here on a great plateau, situated at an elevation of 5000 feet, a hill-station is to be established which will prove of inestimable value to those who are bearing the White Man's burden in Malaya. Generally speaking, the spirit of progress embodied in the proceedings relative to Gunong Tahan is reflected in almost every phase of British activity in this region. In fact, no great British possession has ever been built up at once with more energy and enthusiasm and less anxiety to the Imperial Government than British Malaya.

ARNOLD WRIGHT.



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# Art. 8.—GERMAN TRADE AFTER THE WAR.

THE abnormal conditions created by the war have favoured the foreign trade of some countries, and particularly our own, and injured that of others, notably Germany, which for practical purposes has been sea-locked and land-locked by hostile States. While German commerce has thus been held in check, there have been placed within the reach of British traders unique opportunities for careful stocktaking and for the consideration of the question how best they might adapt themselves to the *post-bellum* status and problems. These opportunities may not in all respects have been put to the fullest advantage, yet they have by no means been neglected. Much useful investigatory work has been done by organised effort of many kinds, governmental and private; several schemes of expansion, full of promise, have already come into existence, and others equally hopeful are under discussion; State credit has been sought for and pledged in various ways in the interest of industrial developments and research; the manufacturing interests of the country have become convinced of the disadvantages from which they have suffered from lack of organisation, and steps have been taken to supply the deficiency; and latterly the question of education has received from the Government the attention which it deserves. If, in some of these and other measures, the national faith in mechanism and the common belief that the surest way of solving the problem of national efficiency is to spend money freely—as if efficiency could be bought over the counter like tea or sugar—have received characteristic expression, it cannot be doubted that there has been a genuine awakening to the fact that England no longer stands where she did in industrial and commercial matters, and that so favourable an opportunity as the present one of making a new start may never occur again.

The time cannot now be far distant when the old commercial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany will be resumed, and it may therefore be useful to consider what sort of an antagonist we shall then have to reckon with. This may be done without any attempt to anticipate the precise issue of the war or the political

adjustments which may follow it. There are those who believe that Germany will be easy to beat in the future, since Great Britain has obtained a good lead. I do not believe it for a moment; and I have never met anyone who is conversant with the facts of German industrial life, and does not make the mistake of confusing intuition with knowledge, who thinks differently. On the contrary, it is safe to predict with great confidence that, in the absence of violent political changes, which some observers (of whom I am not one) foresee as a by-product of the war and the Russian revolution combined, Germany will quietly settle down to her old life as soon as peace is declared, and will surprise the world by the rapidity of her recovery. There is truth in the words—in many ways unhappily ambiguous—of that acute German publicist Friedrich Naumann, whose latest work, 'Mittel-Europa,' has given us so much food for thought: 'The war was only the continuation of our ordinary life, with other means but fundamentally with the same ends.'

In spite of all its sins, the German nation remains still (for that is what Naumann means) the best-organised community in the world. How often have German industrialists, as I have talked with them in their great factories, asserted the educational value of their military system, adding always, 'When my men come back from their military service [it was then three years, it is now two], their old places will be ready for them.' So it will be after the war for those fortunate enough to take up the broken threads of their eventful life and seek in work and play oblivion for the memories of a horrible ordeal. For the distinctive mark of German life in every direction is system; and, in industry, system has all the perfection of an instrument of precision. Not only so, but I doubt greatly whether the problem of female employment, complicated there as here by the war, will be allowed to stand in the way of as speedy and complete an adjustment as possible to the new conditions.

It will be interesting to observe how far the discipline of arms which our own gallant men are undergoing in a dozen fields of war will bear out in their after-life the unstinted eulogies bestowed upon military training by German employers. Even a Radical politician like Naumann, whose earlier bias against militarism will probably return as soon as the war is over, is constrained to admit



that 'Physically it is certainly true that the military years are of incalculable value for the industrial population; and, from the standpoint of organisation, it is incontestable that the discipline of our "great industry" grows on military soil, both in its virtues and its vices' ('*Neu-deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik*,' p. 368). I confess to a doubt whether the British workman, when he puts off his uniform and returns to the factory and the workshop, will prove any more docile and show a greater respect for officious authority than in the past; and I find myself hoping at times that he will not. If, however, he comes back with less of the old crude spirit of 'doing as he likes'—which, after all, is a national trait and not characteristic only of the working classes—and with a truer pride and self-respect, as he assuredly will, he will be a better workman because he will be a better man.

After the war, Germany will have her own special difficulties of recuperation and reconstruction to face; and some of these will not be easily overcome. Like other belligerent countries, she will suffer from the decimation of her best working strength, with the further disadvantage that it will be impossible for a long time to supplement her own labour force by foreign supplies. Hitherto Germany has found it necessary to draw largely upon immigrant labour both for industry and agriculture. The census of December 1910 showed that there were 1,250,000 foreigners resident in Germany, of whom 667,100 came from Austria-Hungary, 137,700 from Russia and Finland, 144,200 from the Netherlands, and 104,200 from Italy. It is impossible to say how many of these aliens were labourers, but the occupation census of June 12, 1907, showed the numbers of foreigners resident in Germany and engaged in the occupations specified to be as follow:

Occupations.	Total.	Of whom were born in		
		Russia.	Austria-Hungary.	Italy.
Agriculture, horticulture and forestry	279,940	153,095	93,732	864
Mining, smelting, salt-works, and turbaries	76,906	5,614	37,802	23,003
Other industries . . .	363,894	33,954	172,879	97,942
Trade . . . . .	45,205	4,258	20,292	2,760
Domestic service . . .	33,918	4,018	15,954	951
	799,863	200,939	340,659	125,520

Large as this total is, it does not represent the full extent of Germany's dependence upon foreign labour in the past. There remains in addition a considerable class of seasonal labourers, chiefly Poles from the Russian and Austrian frontier districts, who used to come in the spring and return home in the autumn, and the number of whom would probably make the aggregate little less than, even if it did not exceed, a million. It is likely that all the larger foreign sources of labour will for some time be practically closed to Germany; and, as soon as the economic life of the country returns to normal conditions, the effect may be seriously felt, though perhaps more by agriculture than by other industries.

Equal in importance to the question of man-power is that of money-power. The raising of the capital that will be necessary for the transformation of industrial works from a war to a peace organisation—for necessary extensions, new plants, repairs, the purchase of raw materials, and the like—will be made difficult by the inevitable stringency and consequent dearth of money, and the depreciation of the national credit. So much, however, depends upon factors which cannot now be estimated, that speculation on the subject would be premature and almost futile at the present stage. It is probable that, while the Governments, both Imperial and State, will come to the rescue, the great banks, already so intimately associated with industrial enterprise, will have a unique opportunity of demonstrating the ability of their distinctive methods, which hitherto have been watched with a good deal of justifiable scepticism in this country, to surmount a situation of great and unexampled difficulty.

Money, however, will be found somehow; for an enormous accumulation of urgent work will have to be taken in hand as soon as the war is over. In Germany, perhaps even more than in our own country, the productive activities of the nation have been increasingly diverted into channels chiefly destructive during the last three years, as the labour of millions of hands, which normally served the arts of peace, has been employed in supplying munitions and accoutrements of war and all the other wants created by inexorable military necessities. For a long time to come, the mines and blast furnaces,

the steel works and foundries, the factories and workshops will be kept fully engaged in liquidating the arrears of work so caused; and, except for the importance of regaining an entrance into the markets from which they have been excluded, many German industries will for a long time be sufficiently employed in meeting home demands.

Germany also may safely count upon a share in the great works of reparation which will be necessary in the territories of her allies, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as large as that which Great Britain is expecting in relation to Belgium, France, and Russia. It is also by no means certain that she will not have a hand in the reconstruction of the ruined railways of the countries her armies have invaded. That undertaking will be one of such large proportions that, after France, Belgium, and Russia have done all they can to help themselves, the remaining demand for rails and other material will far exceed the capacity of British works. Germany's output of rails is second only to that of the United States; there are works in the West of Prussia capable of turning out 10,000 tons of finished rails a week. Although the entire German demand for rails was supplied at home, the exports before the war ran to over 500,000 tons a year, to the value of nearly 3,000,000*L.*, while other railway material of more than twice that value, including rolling stock, was sent abroad. Hitherto America, occupied in supplying her own large needs, has fallen behind Germany in her exports of rails; and, if she, likewise, should be unable to meet the demands of the invaded countries, as she probably will, these may find themselves obliged, in self-interest, to obtain supplies from the enemy. If these supplies were delivered to France and Belgium as part of an indemnity for the wanton devastation committed in these countries, the transaction might be a good one.

Turning to the special obstacles which may stand in the way of German foreign trade after the war, prominence must be given to the action which the Allies are being urged to take, both collectively and individually, in order to prevent her from recovering her lost standing. Owing to their geographical position and their varied

resources, military and otherwise, the Allies have in many ways proved ideal partners for the purposes of war. It remains to be seen whether, when the military problems give place to the political and economic, they will prove as efficient and harmonious partners for the purposes of peace; certainly no one who does not wilfully ignore facts will deny that the path of peace is strewn with many serious difficulties.

That Germany will have to meet any such complete economic boycott as is adumbrated by the Paris resolutions I for one do not believe. However much one might be inclined to sympathise with the idea in the abstract, it will not materialise for two reasons, first, because it would prove impossible to enforce it effectively—and to carry out such a measure partially would rob retaliation of its sting and convert it into a fiasco—and, secondly, because the Allied nations would refuse to pay the price. As a weapon of commercial warfare, even a tariff of the ordinary kind is a device of questionable efficiency; far from being an arm of precision, it is at best a cumbersome blunderbuss, with an ugly kick and an evil way of scattering its shot indiscriminately. It is far worse with a trade boycott, whose object is not to regulate or restrict imports, but to destroy foreign trade altogether. The extent of the trade disturbance which would be caused by an effectual boycott of the Central Powers may be judged by the fact that in 1912 the aggregate commercial exchange (imports and exports) between the four principal Allied Powers, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the other hand, was of the value, at least, of 400,000,000*l.* The United States are omitted, since their Government has as yet admitted no responsibility for the Paris resolutions; but the total must be further increased by the trade of all the other members of the Allied group of States. In these figures no account is taken of the trade done by the colonies and dependencies of the Allied States with the Central Powers. It may be noted, however, that the trade between the British dominions and dependencies and Germany alone in 1913 was little less than 90,000,000*l.*, and that, if the boycott were extended to colonial territories, Germany would be almost entirely

deprived of her supplies of vegetable oils of various kinds, so indispensable for industrial purposes.

It needs a good deal of faith to believe that the British traders who in 1913 sold to Germany nearly 44,000,000*l.* worth of goods and bought back goods to the value of 72,000,000*l.*—a large part of the latter being raw materials and unfinished goods needed by our own industries—will be willing to forgo this trade without some reasonable assurance that it will be made good to them elsewhere. But where is the compensation to be found? The advocates of a trade boycott reply, 'Of course, the Allies will make up to one another all losses.' But in commerce nothing happens 'of course.'

Let us enquire how this principle of reciprocal dealing would work out in fact. Even supposing that Germany were entirely cut out of the Allies' markets, it is obvious that the restriction of competition would benefit neutral countries quite as much as, and in some cases far more than, Great Britain, for even the imagination of the advocates of a trade boycott has not as yet soared to the height of a general embargo upon the trade of enemies and neutrals alike. But, further, much of the trade of the Allies Great Britain could not take over even if she would. Every country buys the goods which it most needs, and sells those which it can best produce; however much our Allies may favour a policy of preferential trading, no one will expect that, when France, Russia and Italy are in need of certain goods which Great Britain cannot sell to them, they will be considerate enough to take goods of other kinds instead. But a large part of the goods purchased by our Allies from Germany has consisted of goods which Great Britain has not been in a position to supply; and this part of the boycotted trade with the enemy would obviously pass by us. It is only necessary to mention such articles as dyeing stuffs, potash and certain manufactured chemicals, sugar, optical, chemical and high-temperature glass, and electrical machinery of various kinds; to which may be added, as part of a still larger trade which for various reasons is not necessarily interchangeable, cotton, wool, books, corn, flour and other agricultural produce, even coal and coke.

When we consider the exports of the Allied countries, the difficulties are seen to be still more serious. Take

Russia only. If she is not to sell to Germany her huge surplus stocks of corn and timber, eggs and flax, hides and skins, who is to buy them? Before the war Germany took the greater part of Russia's surplus grain, her net purchases (i.e. balance of imports over exports to Russia) amounting to 22,250,000*l.* in 1913, though this figure was 14,000,000*l.* less than that of two years before. If Germany is to be refused the opportunity of buying this grain, who is to take it? It looks as though Great Britain will have to exclude the Russian grain ships, at least, from the preference which is to be given to the Colonies, though it is just in corn that Canada, Australia, and India expect to have a first claim upon our market. That this is the view held in Russia appears from the statement recently made by Prof. Bornatsky in the 'Russkoye Slovo,' that the Russian attitude on the boycott question would entirely depend upon Great Britain's attitude on the question of Colonial preference. As to Russia's past exports of corn and timber to Germany in particular, he added that she could 'hardly be expected to refuse to reopen commercial relations with Germany again unless England guaranteed to take not only all that she sent to Germany before, but also all that Russia is likely to want to send in the future.'

Altogether these boycott proposals suggest a bankruptcy of ideas which would bode ill for the future both of British trade and of peace if there were any reason to regard them as the last word of statesmanship on the subject. There is evidence, however, that a large section of commercial opinion is entirely antagonistic to such a weak and unpractical method of combating German competition, and wishes to see normal trade relationships reestablished as soon as possible after the war. In France the Free Trade party, led by M. Yves Guyot, is as thoroughly hostile as the same party in Great Britain; and in Russia likewise strong protests have been raised against the hasty endorsement of a proposal which is seen, the more it is examined, to be open to the gravest objections. Russia, in particular, has never taken kindly to the idea, and she does so now less than ever. Even a Germanophobe journal like the 'Novoye Vremya' has flatly described such a form of commercial warfare as absurd, while the declarations of the new



Government afford little ground for the belief that it will feel bound by the formal undertakings given by its predecessor at the Paris Conference.

The case is different with preferential trading, as regulated by differential tariffs. Whatever may be said of such tariffs, they are a recognised feature of fiscal policy, and their extension may be found necessary on the ground of financial needs quite as much as of public interest. At the same time this question, too, is fraught with immense difficulty, and perhaps in no country so much as in Great Britain, whose herculean task it will be to devise duties which will simultaneously satisfy, or at least be equitable to, the Dominions and our Allies.

It would, however, be unwise to assume that the Central Powers, and least of all Germany, will meekly accept all that the Allies may decide to award them in the way of commercial punishment. They, too, have their own ideas about trade boycotts and preferential tariffs, and we must expect that they will at least give as good as they get in the way of retaliation. Much will depend upon the relationship in which the German and Austrian Empires come out of the struggle. Should the old confidence continue unbroken, it is at least possible that the 'Central Europe' scheme may materialise—though not, perhaps, in the form proposed by Naumann—in which event the Allies would be confronted in turn by a powerful economic combination. Perhaps no action on the part of the Allies would be more effectual in helping that combination into life than an all-round prohibition of trade with the enemy Powers.

Above all, it should not be too readily taken for granted that the principal motive of the Allies in putting an end to Germany's policy of 'peaceful penetration' would be to instal Great Britain in her place. Any such assumption would not long survive the test of experience. The truth is that every country wishes to retain its own market for itself; and it will never for love, or for any other reason than interest, invite outsiders to enter it. Whatever concessions, therefore, may be made to us by our Allies will be the result of hard bargaining, free from any trace of sentiment; they will be made solely from reasons of interest, and will be continued only so long as interest is served. There is not one economic law for

Great Britain and another for the rest of mankind; and the idea that in the future, any more than in the past, there will be reserved in the markets of the world for this or any other country soft places or favoured preserves may as well be abandoned now as later.

In his address at Liverpool a short time ago, the Hon. F. M. B. Fisher, the New Zealand Minister of Trade, had the courage to tell an audience of hard-headed manufacturers and merchants that he 'did not think much was to be gained by a prohibitive or protective policy,' and that, 'if Germany's trade policy was to be checked after the war, it was necessary to have better machinery and better workers.' That is only another way of saying that our traders cannot hope to attain a permanent preeminence in the world's markets except by producing better goods at lower prices than their rivals; short cuts and royal roads to commercial preeminence do not exist. At the present time there are branches of production in which, as technical and other conditions are, English manufacturers cannot by any possibility hope to compete on favourable terms with Germany. Probably in no industries is the menace of German competition still so great as in the iron and steel industries and the dependent engineering and mechanical industries generally. It is upon iron, steel and coal, and not upon tea, coffee, or molasses, that the fabric of industrial prosperity is built in Great Britain, Germany and the United States alike; and the country which enjoys the most favourable conditions of production is the country which will be able to produce most cheaply. The most important of these conditions is the possession of ample stores of iron ore and fuel, easily accessible and easily worked.

Nature and political events have here played into Germany's hands in a singular way. The cession by France of the Saar district by the second Peace of Paris in 1815 gave to Prussia a new and rich coal basin, while the annexation of Eastern Lorraine in 1871 placed Germany in possession of a large part of the minette mines of that region. Both of these mineral-laden territories were, at the time of their appropriation, but little developed. The iron ore of Lorraine, indeed, owing to its highly phosphoric character, is naturally of inferior

quality; and it was only the discovery of the Thomas method of smelting that gave the ore the great value which it possesses to-day. In her control of a practically inexhaustible supply of iron ore, Germany enjoys advantages over this country which will grow rather than diminish as our dependence upon imported ores increases. How important is the part which the minette mines play in feeding the German iron industry will be seen from the following figures of output:

OUTPUT OF RAW IRON ORE.

	German Empire.	Lorraine district alone.
No. of mines in working .	340	46
Output of iron ore in raw state	22,964,800 metric tons	16,652,000 metric tons = 72.5 %
Estimated quantity of iron	6,940,400 „	4,789,900 „ = 69.0 %
Value at mines (in marks)	92,272,000 m.	45,155,000 m. = 48.9 %

It is true that the Rhineland and Westphalia, the principal seats of the iron and steel industries, are a long distance away from Lorraine; but that disadvantage is counterbalanced by cheap water transport, the Rhine being reached within 35 miles from the mines. Further, a large and increasing amount of smelting is done on the spot; and in Lorraine, as in Westphalia, the tendency is in the direction of the combination of iron-ore mines, smelting works, and rolling mills in large composite undertakings. Nevertheless, Germany, like Great Britain, is an increasing buyer of Spanish and Swedish iron ore; and it is likely that the competition between the two countries for the command of these sources of supply will become keener. A large amount of iron ore of high quality was being imported from Spain into Germany prior to the war. I happen to know that one German firm alone had a contract for the supply of 500,000 tons a year for twenty years. When the war began, the import of this ore was increased and expedited at a feverish rate; and it is estimated that, during the period which elapsed before the trade was cut off, enough ore was introduced into Germany, by way of Rotterdam, to meet all needs for at least three years.

Germany is also at an advantage owing to the fact that her Westphalian coal-measures can be worked at a much deeper level than is practicable or at least allowable in this country. A further considerable economy is effected by the scientific methods adopted in the utilisation of waste gases. It is estimated that this practice, which British smelting works are only slowly beginning to imitate—and that, be it said, by the use of German and American plant—alone represents a reduction of 5s. per ton of output in the case of pig iron, and one of several shillings in the case of steel, in connexion with the smelting and soaking processes alone, to which may be added a saving of from 4s. to 6s. a ton effected by the plan of hot charging now universal in German steelworks.

Further, the iron and steel trades will be assisted even more in the future than in the past by the powerful syndicates, directed by the best business brains of Germany, which regulate and coordinate production, fix and enforce prices, and control the entire process of distribution for the respective industries.\* Armed with full power over the associated works, these organisations are able, by modernising plant and methods of manufacture, to keep the works at the highest possible level of technical perfection, and to carry out specialisation to any degree required by efficiency and economy. It is true that the syndicates have not hitherto embraced the respective industries in their entirety; but the undertakings outside the range of their direct influence are now so few that the prices fixed by the associated works practically govern the entire home market. An important part of their work is the cultivation of the export trade. This is done by an efficient system of representation abroad, and still more by the grant of differential bounties, the scale of which is regulated by local conditions. If, as has been suggested, the Government, in its urgent need for new sources of taxation, should decide to levy large contributions from the syndicates and cartels generally, leaving them to recoup themselves in their dealings with their customers and the public, the influence of these combinations would be greatly

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\* Cf. the article on 'German Iron and Steel,' in the Q.R. for April 1917.

increased. Unquestionably these organisations, while they admirably serve the special interests of the industries concerned, are already attended by serious risks both to the dependent industries and to the public; and, in recognising their efficiency, I must not be understood to be suggesting their suitability for this country. Here I am concerned only with facts and explanations.

Even in trade associations of the ordinary kind Germany has long excelled; and, important as are our own institutes and federations, we have no organisations to compare with the German Association of Employers' Federations, representing over 50,000 employers and over 1,500,000 workpeople; the great Central Federation of German Industrialists, specially representing the interests of the colliery owners and ironmasters of the Rhineland and Westphalia; and the League of Industrialists, composed for the most part of firms of medium and small size engaged in the finished iron and steel trades. Special industries (e.g. the Iron and Steel Institute of Düsseldorf) have in addition their own organisations, but here the two countries have more in common. The great national federations not only watch and serve the interests of the affiliated trades in every possible way, but find it remunerative to maintain at considerable cost intelligence and statistical departments for the purpose of keeping their members abreast with all that is worth knowing as to trade movements and openings, and as to industrial questions generally in rival countries. Having occasion, a few years ago, to ask the very able director of one of the large German employers' federations for certain statistical information, needed for a purely scientific purpose, which I had not been able to obtain at home, I was met with the completest openness, and all the data desired were at once placed at my disposal. When, however, I offered to repay his courtesy by endeavouring to supply him with corresponding information relating to this country, he answered, with a quizzical smile, 'Thank you, but we have it already.'

German syndicates of all kinds have been accused of the wholesale 'dumping' of German goods in the British and other markets; and our good friends the Dutch, who have otherwise during the war so obligingly sent us just such news as seemed in their opinion most likely

to be acceptable, have assured us that, as soon as arms are laid down, the world will be deluged with the stocks which have been accumulating for three years in German warehouses. I am not convinced that the 'dumping' evil is as real as it is generally painted, and as to this imminent flood of German products I am altogether sceptical. As for 'dumping' in general, the practice of selling abroad at what are called in Germany 'give-away' (*Schleuder*) prices applies chiefly to industries which have passed under the control of syndicates having at command large resources and efficient distributive organisations. These industries are engaged in the production less of finished goods than of semi-manufactured goods serving as the raw materials of other industries. It is obvious, therefore, that the practice has advantages as well as disadvantages for the country which receives the 'dumped' goods. Producers of the same goods at home are injured, but the manufacturers who need them as raw materials are assisted to produce more cheaply, and thus both to hold their own more successfully against foreign competition and to enter foreign markets, including that of the 'dumping' country. The loss caused in one direction by 'dumping' of this kind is thus counterbalanced by gain in another; and in these circumstances it is hopeless to expect any general resistance to the practice.

Besides, there is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of defining precisely what may properly be regarded as 'dumped' goods. It is obvious that the question of price alone cannot be a criterion. A good deal of Germany's alleged 'dumping' in the past was really a legitimate sale of goods at prices which were low, not because of artificial and unfair methods of trading, but solely owing to specially favourable conditions and more efficient and economical methods of production. Those who presume to instruct the public as to the reasons which have favoured German competition in foreign markets in the past ought, at the least, to be sure about their facts. Upon this subject, however, a vast amount of groundless assumption and actual, though no doubt unintentional, misstatement is current. I may cite, as an illustration, an article on 'The commercial methods of Germany,' which was published a short time ago by a well-known London newspaper. The writer, after



attributing to German 'dumping' a far greater importance than is its due, proceeded to weaken his case by exaggerating the sacrifices which it entails for those who practise it, and yet added,

'We know that such sacrifices were made possible owing to the commercial policy of the German Government. Manufacturers who exported were backed by the German Government either openly, by concessions which amounted to absolute monopolies, by bonuses being given, by fiscal abatement being granted, or covertly by transport service and tariffs favouring the object in view.'

All but one of the assertions contained in this paragraph are either groundless or inexact. Exporting manufacturers are not backed by the German Government by 'concessions which amount to absolute monopolies,' for the German Government has given no monopolies or even half-monopolies, and has none to give. On the contrary, where there is any question of a monopoly being established, it takes care to be in first; Bismarck's attempts to establish tobacco and spirit monopolies, and the introduction (1912) of the oil monopoly proposal, are cases in point. Nor does the German Government give bonuses to exporters, though until recently there was a differential excise duty on spirit, greatly to the advantage of the landowner-distillers of Eastern Prussia. Finally, it does not back the exporters by the grant of cheap transport facilities, since it owns no railways except the Alsace-Lorraine lines. It is true, however, that the Prussian and other State railways carry export goods at preferential rates—and this is, perhaps, what the writer means, though it is not what he says—and it would be a poor recommendation of a nationalised railway system if it failed to serve so important a purpose, particularly in a country like Prussia, where the railways have always been worked less from the standpoint of profit, though good management has yielded that as well, than in the interest of efficient and cheap locomotion and transport.

On the other hand, there is no denying that the customs tariff is an important element in the case. From the first it has been so arranged as to protect and assist national production; but that surely is just what tariffs

are intended to do—whether they succeed or not—and is an object common to all countries which impose them; it will also be done in this country if the proposal that a commercial war should succeed the military struggle should be carried out. It cannot be too clearly understood, however, that the German Governments have not hitherto been in the habit of supporting the interests of industry and trade by direct money assistance, but have followed the indirect and far more efficient method of helping them to increase their efficiency. This question exercised the Committee of the new Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, in its early deliberations; but, as a result of all its enquiries, the only direct money grant of the kind of which it was possible to discover traces was a petty subsidy of 10,000*l.* made many years ago by the Prussian Government in aid of the experiments in the perfection of optical glass. On the other hand, the German Governments (though, again, not the Imperial Government, but the Governments of the federal States) do vote money, and vote it freely, in the more fertile channels of research, experiment, and scientific and technical education.

A far stronger case might be made out against the importation into this country of the products of 'sweated' labour. Of such goods, however, Germany is by no means the only or the largest exporter; and, directly the axe is put to the roots of this evil, we must be prepared to find that they spread in many more directions than is usually supposed. It will probably be found that, by a strict application of any accepted 'sweated-labour' test, a large part of the trade that comes to us from China, from our faithful ally Japan, and from our own dependency India will have to be classed in the index of forbidden imports. Nevertheless, the evil, such as it is, is remediable; and the more wages increase in this country the more will our manufacturers and working classes alike be entitled to claim that the remedy shall be applied.

When the worst has been said about Germany's methods of trading, her ingenious ways of capturing foreign markets, sources of raw materials, 'key industries,' and what not, the fact remains that her success

is in the main due to causes entirely creditable to her; and, having vainly preached sermons on efficiency for more years than I care to recall, with Germany as my text, I for one am disposed to say that she deserves all the success she has won. Of course, it would be far more agreeable to be able to say the reverse, but it is not possible. Trading is not a game of roulette, but a serious science; and, to be successful, it must be conducted on principles that are both scientific and upright. The man who tries to palm off upon the market shoddy wares by shoddy devices may deceive his little part of the public for a time, but he will not deceive all the public all the time. Sooner or later he is found out, and goes to his own place, while the honest men remain. To an entirely disinterested outsider, like myself, whose only claim to speak is that, having, from the first moment that I knew Germany, watched her commercial development with growing apprehension, I have, like many another, striven in vain to rouse my countrymen to a sense of danger and to the importance of combating their rival with her own weapons of brains, science, education, organisation and push, it seems pure childishness to pretend that any nation could have built up so large an industry and commerce as the Germans enjoyed before the war by any methods other than honest hard work and solid worth. That was how the pioneers of enterprise in the North of England created the great staple industries there, organised their factories, built towns, and amassed princely fortunes for softer hands and heads to dissipate; and no race of men under the sun has ever done it or ever will do it in a different way.

For much of the success of German traders in our own country we are ourselves to blame, for we have done our best to make their conquest easy. So long as English merchants were willing to employ German clerks at nominal wages, or to employ them at all—I uttered warnings on the subject over twenty years ago, in my first book dealing with the commercial and industrial side of German life—how could they grumble when these unassuming pioneers of 'peaceful penetration,' having learned all they wanted to know, returned home, taking with them as much of their employers' trade as they could carry away? If our laws allow aliens to own

our mineral fields, why should not Germans buy up all they can? The blame for ill results is not theirs but ours. If German capital is offered and English companies are willing to accept it, what right have we to complain if the foreigners choose to be masters in their own house? So long as British citizenship is sold for the price of an old song, why should we blame the alien who has been attracted to our shores by so good an investment? If he succeeds we pay tribute to him; if he fails, we support him by our Poor Law for the rest of his life. Even 'dumping' implies a two-fold transaction, voluntary on both sides; Germany cannot force us to buy her 'dumped' goods; she sends them here because we ask for them. The moral is that the remedies against undesirable foreign competition lie entirely in our own hands; if we refuse to apply them, we have no right to complain.

Bearing still in mind the immediate future, it may be useful to touch briefly upon several other matters which will operate in Germany's favour as factors in the problem of after-war recuperation and reconstruction. We may count with certainty upon a large reinforcement of the principle of organisation. Germany rightly attributes her success in protracting the war so long, in spite of blockade and boycott, to the wonderful faculty for organisation which is characteristic of her people, and is displayed in every department of her life. In economic life, in particular, organisation and combination have been carried out on a grandiose plan. The industrialists, as has been said, are organised on a scale equalled in no other country; but so also are the agriculturists, the merchants, the handicraftsmen, and the working classes. Reference has been made to the great industrial syndicates. The banking business of the country has also been organised so effectively that it is now concentrated in a handful of huge concerns, not a little despotic in the use which they make of their power, yet unquestionably wielding an immense influence favourable to the expansion of industrial and commercial enterprise. The cooperative movement has likewise been developed on far larger lines than in this country, though Germany learned her lessons in cooperation in the English school.

Organisation, combination, and State collectivism are

the distinguishing marks of German economic life, and I look for further progress on all these lines. It seems certain that there will be a large development in the State regulation of important 'key' industries, not only from the military standpoint, but from that of economic efficiency and public utility as well. It is not improbable that State monopolies will be established; and it will not be surprising if the Governments of those States in which the coal and lignite measures lie—particularly Prussia, Saxony, and Bavaria—should decide to take over the entire colliery industry, with a view to large contributions therefrom towards taxation, to the better development and at the same time conservation of these sources of national wealth, and to the protection of the public against undue exploitation. Already the Prussian and Saxon Governments are large colliery proprietors, and they have shown that State ownership is not inconsistent with efficient management. The potash mines, in which the Prussian State is likewise largely interested as a proprietor, may also be regarded as a fair subject for monopolist experiment. Already the problem of cheap power has been to a large extent solved by the development of central electrical works, some in private, others in public hands, others again conducted as joint undertakings; and further progress will no doubt be made on the same lines, perhaps with greater emphasis upon the principle of State ownership or at least cooperation.

As an instance of intelligent anticipation of *post-bellum* requirements, let me mention a striking measure which has just been adopted in Saxony, one of the two industrial 'hubs' of Germany, and a country which offers severe competition to our own in the textile, hosiery, and machine industries. Last October the Saxon Government passed two laws with the object of breaking down the power of the electrical trusts, and ensuring a cheaper supply of electric current throughout the whole country. For some time the trusts had been gaining ground too fast; and the communes in consequence appealed to the Government for help. Now the State has stepped in, and taken under its control the entire electrical power industry, in which it has a great interest because of the State railways. It has been empowered to buy up any undertakings it likes, to forbid the use of public roads,

forests and other land by private companies, and even to annul way-leaves and other rights of the kind already in existence. The idea is that electric current shall be produced wholesale by the State, but distributed locally by the communes to retail consumers; but the State will not make a profit on the business. Only existing undertakings in public hands are to have their rights respected. Further, as it is proposed to use for the generation of power the lignite which is found in such abundance in Saxony, a supplementary law was passed at the same time prohibiting the sale of lignite mines until the State had decided how far it should increase its own holding in collieries. It is significant that both these far-going laws were passed unanimously by the Saxon Lower House, and that even in the Upper House the electricity bill went through without any opposition, while against the colliery bill only eleven votes were recorded. Saxony is only following, on a more ambitious scale, the example set by the Government of Bavaria, which is using the abundant water resources of the kingdom in the production of electric current for industrial purposes.

Sooner or later, Germany will also profit largely by the practical faith in education which she has shown in the midst of the distractions and financial difficulties incidental to a great war. Instead of curtailing her education budgets, the Governments and public authorities have increased them, confident that the enterprise will bring its own reward. This subject is, however, too large for treatment here.

In the foregoing prognosis of the German industrial position I have purposely understated my true opinions on the subject of Germany's recuperative power and her ability to redeem the time which she has misspent, to others' hurt as well as her own, during the past three years. No one likes to be a false prophet; and an attitude that leans towards optimism rather than pessimism is the best and sanest working principle in all situations in life. I have never shared the alarmist views of those writers who periodically try to make the British trader's flesh creep with depressing stories of the doom which awaits him; and, moreover, appeals to fear are seldom stimulating. Rather I have always believed that Great Britain has allowed Germany to forge ahead



from sheer supineness, and a proud, 'devil-may-care' sense of national superiority. Yet I am convinced that it will be a fatal mistake to underrate Germany's competition in the future. We are at this moment paying a tribute to her superior equipment for the commercial struggle by imitating her; I may instance the new education reforms, the extension of facilities for financing trade, the endowment of industrial and scientific research, and the proposal, as yet in the stage of discussion, for the production upon a large scale of electric current for industrial purposes. In these and other matters of almost equal importance we are years behind Germany; and it will be years before we can hope to overtake her, if we ever succeed at all. For in the commercial struggle with this resourceful rival, as in the military struggle now in progress in France, an exclusive system of open warfare is no longer possible. We have allowed Germany to strengthen an otherwise powerful position by setting up a large and ingenious system of dug-outs—all those measures of so-called 'peaceful penetration,' some quite legitimate, others open to severe criticism, which have secured for her so strong a hold upon the territories she has commercially invaded; and to drive her from these will be a hard work of time. It may be remarked here that one of the most fertile causes of Germany's success in her policy of 'peaceful penetration' in this country was the amendment of the Patent Law, requiring foreigners who took out patents in the United Kingdom to exploit these patents here. The result was that Germans who held valuable patents set up their own works in this country, rather than sell their rights for a trifle.

For that reason alone it would be inexcusably short-sighted to assume that the war will permanently weaken Germany or incapacitate her for resuming her interrupted course directly peace returns. Those British traders whose comfortable philosophy has in the past been summed up in the words 'Go to, let us jog on as usual!' must shake off their apathy for ever if they hope to hold their own. How widespread and persistent this apathy still is! In a letter written on June 7, 1861, to Milner Gibson, then President of the Board of Trade, Lord Palmerston said, 'As to the manufacturers themselves,

they will do nothing unless directed and pushed on. They are some of the most helpless and shortsighted of men. They are like the people who held out their dishes and prayed that it might rain plum-puddings.' There can be no harm in recalling these cutting words, for where they do not apply they cannot hurt, and where they do apply the more they hurt the better. The words are certainly no longer true—if they ever were—for our manufacturers in general, yet it is to be feared that they still have far greater point than should be possible after so long a lapse of time. It is only by abandoning altogether a waiting-and-watching, 'The-Lord-will-provide!' attitude—as if the Deity were a commission agent—by ceasing to believe that miracles will happen, or that anything happens by itself in this world, by trusting less to chance and more to system, by allowing no advantage or opportunity of his own to pass unused and no device of his rivals to be unregarded, and above all by introducing into his business from first to last both the aid and the methods of science, and welcoming education as his best auxiliary and friend, that the British trader will 'make good' in the ever-increasing severity of commercial competition. In proportion as he does these things, however, even German rivalry may yet leave him all the share in the world's trade which he needs or has a right to expect.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

Art. 9.—LORD GEORGE HAMILTON AND SIR CHARLES DILKE.

1. *Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections*, 1868–1885. By Lord George Hamilton. Murray, 1917.
2. *The Life of Sir Charles W. Dilke*. By Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell. Two vols. Murray, 1917.

THE political Memoirs of the 19th century show the almost complete separation of the two camps. Only agreeable triflers and idlers had a foot in each at the same time. In one camp you hear only rumours of what is going on in the other. The relations between the Conservative and Liberal Parties were much like those between the men in Troy and the warriors in the Greek camp in the 'Iliad.' The Liberal Party in the 70's and 80's resembled the Greeks. There was on that side more variety, talent, personal ambition, individuality, intellectual vanity, tribal division, and consequently less unity and more quarrelling and rivalry. Mr Gladstone was their Achilles, a spoiled child of fortune, sometimes raging in the front of battle, sometimes sulking in his tent. Lord Hartington might be compared to Agamemnon; Sir William Harcourt to the weighty Ajax, if you add a cynical humour. Unfriendly critics might have likened Robert Lowe to Thersites; the virtuous Lord Selborne was a kind of Nestor; Lord Granville, the diplomatic go-between and pacificator, played somewhat the part of cunning Ulysses. On the other side, Disraeli was the unique and unmatched Hector, and he had a follower or two on the level of the pious Æneas—Lord Cairns, Gathorne Hardy, and, above that level, Lord Salisbury.

The strength of the Tory Party lay not in its intellect or eloquence or individualities, but in its natural unity and discipline. In this also it resembled the defenders of Troy. Every plain and healthy-minded English public-school boy has sympathised with the Trojans against the Greeks and, when he arrived at Thucydides, with the Spartans against the Athenians, because it is the nature of Englishmen of this class to prefer silent militarism, such as you see on the cricket or football field, to intellectual volubility, or, as they call it, 'jaw.'

Unity and discipline were everything to the Conservatives; and it was a sound instinct of self-preservation which induced them to expunge from their ranks Lord Randolph Churchill, who was always intriguing with sections of the other side, and, at a later date, to apply the same process to his versatile son. They could not afford divisions and sections so well as could the Liberals. Lord George Hamilton, in his 'Reminiscences and Reflections,' makes the following observation :

'I have carefully watched the polls of general elections for nearly fifty years, and this rule may safely be laid down, that the Conservatives get their parliamentary majorities on comparatively low polls, their opponents on big polls. The reason is obvious—the Conservative or Unionist Party is by far the strongest and most homogeneous single Party in the country, but, if everybody who is not a Conservative votes against it, the aggregate votes of all other parties will outnumber the votes of the one party. Our party can generally poll its full strength. If there be abstentions and disunion among the motley groups of our opponents, we are likely to win. In 1874, 1886, 1895 and 1900 there was this disunion and this abstention, and we won. Now those who lead us ought always to have this truism before their eyes. Recently a policy has been started which, whatever may be its intrinsic merits or defects, tends to split up the Unionist Party and to consolidate all other parties in a solid vote against it. The result has been that the Radical Party have obtained a majority at three successive general elections. . . .'

Lord George must have written this passage before the all-changing war, nor is it likely that the Tariff question had much to do with the last two elections. But his observations are true. The Trojans only won when Achilles would not fight because he had quarrelled with his official Chief and the majority in Council. Conservative unity was broken, in the end, by the strange series of events which introduced into their camp the very genius of change and movement in the personality of Mr Chamberlain. Troy fell at last, when, under the guise of Unionism, this spirit was drawn into the walls. Perhaps never again will there be a purely Conservative and aristocratic Cabinet, consisting of men educated at the old public schools and Universities, and intimately connected with each other by social ties and relationships,

with a bourgeois or two, like Mr W. H. Smith, of high respectability, introduced in order to give business capacity and to satisfy the middle classes. That form of government, when we had a Prime Minister of the weight, intellect, solidity and experience of the late Lord Salisbury, had merits. Nothing could be less like it than the present state of things.

Lord George Hamilton is an excellent type of the high-born Minister who, in the second line, flourished under the Trojan system. The son of an Irish Duke, belonging to one of the most wide-spreading of the aristocratic clans, he was a junior ensign in the Coldstream Guards at the age of twenty-two in the year 1868, when Disraeli was for the first time Prime Minister. He was asked to stand at the general election for the County of Middlesex, and won the seat owing to a quarrel between the local Whigs and Radicals. Disraeli had an unerring eye for capable youth, and, when he returned to power in 1874, appointed Lord George to be Under-Secretary in the India Office. In 1878 he was made Vice-President of the Council, and so, with the indifference of that time to the necessity for special qualification, placed at the head of the Education Department. During Lord Salisbury's short government in 1885, and his long one from 1886 to 1892, Lord George Hamilton was First Lord of the Admiralty; and in Lord Salisbury's third administration he was an admirable Secretary of State for India. He was capable, industrious, modest, loyal, not in the least degree inspired by personal vanity or ambition, of sound practical judgment, fair-minded; exactly the kind of man whom good permanent officials love to have for a chief. One does not find this type except among men who have been bred in the great political families, or who have been trained in great hereditary businesses. The late Duke of Devonshire was of this class. Lord George writes of him:

‘He was the stamp of man representative of the best type of English politicians and of the brightest and most patriotic side of the party system. He was the embodiment of truth, honour, and probity, with an intense sense of duty, a sportsman, a lover of the country and its pursuits, of racing, and with possessions and an independence which enabled him to get the best of everything he liked; yet he never for an

instant allowed the amusements or trivialities of life to interfere with the serious work of the rôle he had voluntarily and almost reluctantly undertaken. Though he cared little for office, he did not hesitate to accept its responsibility and limitations if he thought he could be of public use.'

The last sentence is exactly true. The great danger of pure democracy is that it will bring to high office men who are of no social weight or standing apart from office, and that they may be tempted, for the sake of renown and salaries, to actions or complaisances which would have been impossible to men like the Duke of Devonshire, or Lord Salisbury, or Lord George Hamilton. If they resist such temptations, all the greater will be the merit of their virtue. To naturally silent men of the Cavendish and Hamilton kind the 'exuberant verbosity' of a Gladstone was repellent. Lord George calculates that this orator, in a few days in 1879, during an election tour in Scotland, spoke 85,840 words in speeches; and he adds:

'This fecundity of speech is fortunately rare in our public life. Statesmen's words are supposed to derive influence, not from their volume, but their weight. No one, least of all a man of high-strung, nervous temperament, can speak in a few days 85,840 words to excitable audiences without himself unconsciously drifting towards the line that divides fact from fiction, sense and reason from rant and passion. But, when the orator is the foremost man of his party, when the subjects upon which he speaks affect the fortunes and destinies of nations, when the moral generalisations and principles perpetually evolved to meet every personal difficulty are to form the basis of legislation at home, and of foreign policy abroad, then this verbosity becomes a positive danger to the commonwealth. The process of degeneration is continuous and rapid. The statesman becomes more and more merged in the politician, the politician in the partisan, the partisan in the election agent, reckless as to the means by which he wins, provided only that he does win.'

Lord George takes a gloomy view of the future of the House of Commons. 'Under the present rules' (of procedure) 'aggregate ability and capacity of the House of Commons must continuously deteriorate; and it is a sad reflexion that the destiny of the British Empire



is in the hands of an authority which, so long as it declines to alter its methods, will continue to be on the down-grade.' If this decline does exist, and, if it is really due, which seems unlikely, merely to bad rules of procedure, the remedy is easy. In any case the destiny of the British Empire is less and less in the hands of the House of Commons at Westminster. What will be the position and functions of that assembly when we have 'home-rule all round' in the United Kingdom, and when imperial matters of defence, foreign policy and trade are virtually in the hands of an Imperial Council?

Lord George says that he is a Free-trader; and it was, indeed, upon this question that he finally ceased to be a Minister; but in these Memoirs he denounces with vigour all the principles of the 'Manchester school,' their anti-militarism, cosmopolitanism, and individualism. He says that the Gladstone Government from 1880 to 1885 'demonstrated the ineptitude and futility' of that creed.

'Tried and tested under the existing conditions of modern international policy, it utterly collapsed, bringing disaster and discredit upon its advocates and exponents. But we did not then learn wisdom or thoroughly amend our ways. For the last two years we have been fighting for our existence, endangered as it has been through adherence to this creed; and in this struggle for our very lives we are by force of circumstances compelled steadily to denounce and reverse its cardinal ideas one by one.'

Lord George would then, it seems, say that Mr Chamberlain, Lord Roberts, Lord Milner, and the Socialists, in their various ways, were not far ahead of their times, and that we ought long before the war to have brought our institutions and army nearer to the German model. Three great national interests, he says, 'Land, Army, Church,' were constantly assailed. 'Yet in most other countries, Land, Religion and the Army are the bulwarks of national defence and national existence,' and no adequate substitute can be found for them. But is this now true of many countries, except Germany and Austria? Is national existence in France based upon great estates and a national Church, or indeed upon any professed religion other than the religion of patriotism?

Lord George Hamilton's memoir is composed of reflexions upon events in which he has taken part, and sketches of men whom he has known. Well-bred reserve, good nature, and official reticence are not sacrificed in it for the sake of liveliness and the salt of satire or the revelation of secrets. One would have liked, indeed, rather more of personal 'reminiscences,' even at the cost of some 'reflexions.' But, unless a man has kept a diary, it is not easy towards the end of life to remember distinctly and vividly very many incidents or sayings. In this respect the 'Life of Sir Charles W. Dilke' is a great contrast. Lord George Hamilton and Sir Charles Dilke were exact contemporaries. Each entered Parliament at the General Election of 1868 at the age of little more than twenty-two, Lord George representing Middlesex, and Dilke representing the then radical Chelsea. Lord George says of Sir Charles Dilke, without enthusiasm :

'Though an able man, he was not in the first flight of the intellectuals. He was very modern, full of bustle and go, a born lobbyist, and he revelled in all the details of party wire-pulling. He was most industrious, and he had a craze for picking up masses of meticulous information which he used to parade with some pretension when speaking. Though the substance of his speeches was good and knowledgeable, his monotonous delivery and the total lack of brilliancy or originality in his phraseology prevented him from being an attractive or effective speaker.'

Charles Wentworth Dilke descended through younger branches from a Yorkshire landed family of old standing which also derived from the famous Wentworths. One direct ancestor had been a fanatical Puritan in the Civil War. Sir Charles' grandfather had been a clerk in the Admiralty, but his real occupation was literature. He wrote much in quarterly and monthly periodicals. He was a strong intellectual Radical with Republican tendencies, like Walter Savage Landor. This grandfather was disappointed in the career of his own son, Charles Dilke's father, a showy member of society and not much else; and he devoted himself to the education of his promising grandson. Charles Dilke, like Benjamin Disraeli, was thus educated under the influence of a man

of letters with strong political interests, although Isaac Disraeli held views in history diametrically opposite to those held by the old Charles Dilke. Lord Beaconsfield once said to Dilke that 'your grandfather and my father were the two last men in England who had a thorough knowledge of English letters.'

Charles Dilke went to no public school, only to tutors. He was really educated by his grandfather, with whom he travelled about a good deal at home and abroad. Consequently, when he went to Trinity Hall, he was much better educated and far more a man of the world than were his public school contemporaries. At Trinity Hall he came under the influence of two remarkable and original men, then dons there, Leslie Stephen and Fawcett. He read and rowed vigorously. He was number four in the Trinity Hall Boat which all but won the 'Grand Challenge' at Henley. In Long Vacations he would roam through France or elsewhere, and, after leaving Cambridge, in 1866 travelled through America, Australia, New Zealand, and embodied the pictures of men and scenes, and the ideas acquired in this voyage, in his book called 'Greater Britain.' In 1868 he entered Parliament as a strong Radical. In 1869 he travelled in Russia and Siberia. In the war of 1870 he went at once to the front, first serving in a German ambulance, and then transferring himself and his sympathies to the French side of the operations, with a second visit to Russia sandwiched between the two experiences. He was in Paris during the insurrection of the Commune.

In these and continued subsequent journeys, Charles Dilke came to know most of the distinguished men on the Continent. His special foreign friend was Gambetta. He inherited in 1869 the baronetcy which had been bestowed upon his father, and an ample income. He had all the advantages. He was rich enough, from the age of twenty-four, to sit in Parliament, keep a good house and table in London, and give as many political dinner parties as he liked, a most important aid to political advance in England, and—delightful privilege!—could travel as often and as far and as expensively as he chose. His industry was unbounded. He devoured Blue-books, amassed information through eyes and ears, and soon became a high authority in the House upon both

foreign and domestic business. He rose at such a pace that Lord Beaconsfield in his last romance was believed to have drawn from him the character and rise of Endymion. Beaconsfield himself hinted that this was true in his only conversation save one with Dilke; perhaps it was but his polite way. The charming but diffident Endymion, inspired by his daring ambitious sister, and pushed on by beautiful and high-born women, does not quite recall the vision of Sir Charles Dilke, whose career was good prose, but not romantic poetry.

During the Beaconsfield Government, 1874-1880, Dilke took much part in the controversy on the Near-Eastern question, which not only deepened the gulf between Tories and Liberals, but divided the Whigs from the Radicals. Dilke differed from his official leader, Lord Hartington, because he was more anti-Turk, and from Gladstone because he was anti-Russian, in the sense that he did not wish Russia to dominate the Balkans or possess the city of Constantine. His real desire was that Greece should be the Byzantine heir. On the whole, in these dissensions, Dilke followed Gladstone, who had, he says in his diary, 'that which the others lacked, moral conviction,' while Hartington 'was infected by moral indifferentism.' There was, indeed, something oriental about Lord Hartington, as, perhaps, about most aristocrats of long standing. Years later, at a Central Asia Committee meeting, when the discussion turned upon some dealings with Afghan Chiefs, Hartington said reflectively, 'I wonder what an Afghan Chief is like.' Sir Charles Dilke, with a glance at the high-nosed, bearded, deliberate face of his colleague, pushed a scribbled note to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, 'I expect an Afghan Chief is very like the Right Hon. the Marquis of Hartington.'

Men who have landed property in the blood are patriotic in the sense that they wish their country to hold all the territory it legitimately can, and are jealous of foreign aggression and rivalry. Besides, Lord Hartington had received his first impressions in Parliament as a supporter of Palmerston, the patriotic statesman whom Mr Gladstone abhorred more than any other except Disraeli. Foreigners never can understand that, in this peculiar country, there is one set of people who

talk a great deal, altruistically and pacifically, and another set who talk little, but act vigorously when real interests are endangered; and that one set or the other comes to the top in accordance with the nature of the times. The Pacifists dominate in peace, the Activists in times of war or danger. Gladstone belonged to the first class and Hartington to the second; and, by the queerness of fortune, they were coupled in the Government of 1880-1885.

When it was in formation, the two Radical chiefs, Dilke and Chamberlain, agreed that, unless one of them were admitted to the Cabinet, both would refuse to enter the Ministry. Gladstone was thus forced, against his will, to admit Mr Chamberlain. This choice between two evils, as Mr Gladstone thought it, was probably dictated by the Queen's special disapproval of Dilke, who had professed republican views and had criticised the Civil List. Dilke became Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, under Lord Granville, and at the end of 1882, in order to bring him into the Cabinet, was given the less congenial post of President of the Local Government Board. Before that, in May 1882, he had been asked to be Chief Secretary in Ireland, immediately after the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish, and had declined because the post was not to be accompanied by a seat in the Cabinet. Some men, Lord George Hamilton for instance, would not have declined for this reason to take that post of danger at that particular moment.

Afghan and Irish and Foreign and Egyptian and South African affairs supplied this Government with plenty of difficult business; and a great domestic quarrel between Lords and Commons as to franchise and redistribution was added. Gladstone had overthrown Lord Beaconsfield by unbridled denunciations of his imperialistic policy, and then, after all, had to follow in much the same line. If Beaconsfield annexed Cyprus, Mr Gladstone unwillingly laid the foundations for the absorption of Egypt and the Soudan. The difference was that Beaconsfield followed Fate freely and willingly, while Gladstone was dragged along the path of empire, protesting at every step. It was a truly majestic spectacle to see the British Empire advancing and extending itself against the will of its ruler and most of his party. Things

were badly done, in consequence of the Government's divisions and hesitations and reluctances, but, in the end, they were done. Soldiers like Wolseley and Gordon were on the true line of the future. So was Lord Hartington, for he did his best to back them, and was always in favour of a strong and clear line of foreign policy. Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville were of the opposite way of thinking. Dilke and Chamberlain, practical and patriotic men, but tied by Radical theories and speeches, held a rather wavering course.

Dilke was in favour of the armed intervention in Egypt in 1882, but was entirely against permanent occupation. Two years later he was in favour, together with almost all his colleagues, of making Egypt a kind of Belgium under international guarantee, and of declaring to the world that our troops should remain only one year more. Lord Hartington disagreed fiercely on both points, and fought in the Cabinet with unusual animation. Lord Granville had told the French Ambassador that we should not stay in Egypt beyond five years at most. This was taken as a settled maximum. But Mr Chamberlain wrote to Dilke, after a Cabinet on May 27, 1884, 'As usual, the question having been twice settled, Hartington, in a minority of one, raises the whole question again. It is direct, unmitigated and unconcealed obstruction.' Both Dilke and Chamberlain were, however, in favour of the expedition to Khartoum to save prestige and rescue Gordon, partly, perhaps, because they were in touch with and felt the force of public opinion. On these, and on Irish questions, Hartington was usually backed by all the Peers in the Cabinet and Gladstone by the Commons. Other strong influences were on the Hartington side. Queen Victoria, who was never in the least degree afraid to let her Ministry know her mind, was a strong Imperialist, and ever against surrender or retreat in any quarter of the world. Dilke saw much of her son the Prince of Wales. He notes in his diary in 1882:

'The Prince is, of course, in fact a strong Conservative and a still stronger Jingo, really agreeing in the Queen's politics, and wanting to take everything everywhere in the world and to keep everything if possible, but a good deal under the influence



of the last person who talks to him, so that he would sometimes reflect the Queen and sometimes me or Chamberlain, or some other Liberal who had been shaking his head at him.'

Dilke and Chamberlain were against coercion in Ireland, and here they came into collision with Sir William Harcourt, as well as with Mr Forster and Lord Hartington. Harcourt, says Dilke in his diary, told a Cabinet which in May 1882 discussed the Kilmainham arrangement with Parnell, that this treaty would not be popular when the public discovered that it had been negotiated by Captain O'Shea, 'the husband of Parnell's mistress.' This plain way of speaking must have been displeasing to the Prime Minister, who had himself had interviews with Mrs O'Shea, and to some of his colleagues.

So early as 1882 Mr Chamberlain quoted, as something which he was half-inclined to say himself, Lord Hartington's celebrated postscript, 'Thank God, we shall soon be out of this d—d Government'; and things became no better. During the autumn of 1884 and the spring of 1885 the Cabinet were constantly on the verge of break-up in consequence of the franchise question and then that of Irish policy. Dilke and Chamberlain keenly pressed a limited form of Irish Home Rule. When the Government were finally beaten on June 8, 1885, on a fiscal question, the resignations of these two Ministers on the ground of Irish policy had already been sent in. The fall of the Government was entirely due to its own internal dissensions.

Never has there been a Government in which so many Cabinet resignations were offered or threatened, although only those of Bright, Forster, and the Duke of Argyll were carried out. Hartington and others were continually threatening to resign on one side, and Dilke and Chamberlain on the other; and, throughout its whole existence, the Cabinet lived under a threat of Mr Gladstone's imminent retirement. The Life of Sir Charles Dilke is full of interesting and amusing details as to these violent dissensions. The history of no Cabinet in English history has been so fully illustrated and made public as that of 1880-1885. We now have the Lives of Mr Gladstone, Lord Granville, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord

Northbrook, Mr Bright, Mr Forster, and the reminiscences of Lord Selborne and the Duke of Argyll. If Lives of Mr Chamberlain and Sir William Harcourt are published, the story will have extraordinary completeness. The preceding Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield and the two succeeding Governments of Lord Salisbury are, compared to this, shrouded in darkness. And they always will be so, because the Conservatives, being more united, did not feel the need of constant explanations in writing, or of keeping the letters which they received. They transacted business more by conversation. They were more rarely, too, men who liked writing for its own sake.

The divorce case affair began in the summer of 1885 and reached its adverse conclusion in July 1886. Dilke's nearest friends never believed in the truth of a woman's accusation; and such incredulity is evidence in itself, for is it possible that a man should live intimately with friends for twenty-five following years under the shadow of an unconfessed and, if he were guilty, most dastardly, lie of this kind? It is, perhaps, possible, but difficult to believe or to imagine. In any case, the affair broke in two his political career.

This almost exactly coincided in time with the division of opinion on the Irish Home Rule Bill which severed Sir Charles Dilke's partnership with Mr Chamberlain in June 1886. On the second reading of that Bill Sir Charles voted with the Gladstonian minority, while Mr Chamberlain, with Lord Hartington, led the dissentient Liberals. His biographers think that this severance of Sir Charles Dilke from Mr Chamberlain was injurious to the latter, and so to public interests. Mr Chamberlain was above all the man of action. His mind was as quick, clear and decided as his voice. In speaking, writing, and acting he was a man of unusual unity of character and style. He could appeal to sentiment; he could invent the kind of phrase which sticks in the popular imagination and memory; he was a master in political organisation; he was open to new ideas, restless, impatient, and always in movement. He was a great debater, an unsparing fighter, a good hater, and an inspiring leader. He was a first-rate political tactician. He was not a man of wide reading, great acquired information, political philosophy, well-balanced thought, large knowledge of other

countries. These last attributes were possessed by Sir Charles Dilke in a high degree; he was probably the most industrious and best-informed statesman of his time.

Chamberlain and Dilke, added together and working in unison, made the 'complete statesman.' The combination resembled a man in whose constitution the masculine and feminine principles, genius and talent, are united in due proportions. Without Dilke, the authors of the *Life* suggest, Mr Chamberlain was like a pendulum clock which ticks away feverishly after the suspended weight has been removed from its hook. Perhaps this was not the case during the Government of 1895-1900, while Mr Chamberlain worked in close connexion with the massive Lord Salisbury, but was more or less so before and after that period. The personal friendship of Sir Charles Dilke and Mr Chamberlain was never broken, although after 1886 they were in opposing political camps and, of course, saw much less of each other. The last letters which they exchanged, just before the final breach in June 1886, are highly characteristic of the two men. Mr Chamberlain's letter of May 3 rings clear as a trumpet.

'It will do you harm on the whole [to go Gladstonian], but that cannot be helped, if you have made up your mind that it is right. But you must be prepared for unkind things said by those who know how closely we have been united hitherto. The present crisis is, of course, life and death to me. I shall win if I can; and, if I cannot, I will cultivate my garden. I do not care for the leadership of a party which should prove itself so fickle and so careless of national interests as to sacrifice the unity of the Empire to the precipitate impatience of an old man, careless of the future in which he can have no part, and to an uninstructed instinct which will not take the trouble to exercise judgment and criticism.'

Dilke's reply is that of a Radical Hamlet—too much reflexion, too many counterbalancing considerations, too much worry about future events, all the agony of a neatly balanced mind. 'You are stronger than I am,' he confesses. Would Sir Charles Dilke, as many thought, but for his strange disaster, have become leader of the Liberal Party, and eventually Prime Minister? Not in

1894, when Lord Rosebery would certainly have been chosen by the Queen in preference to him as well as to Sir William Harcourt. In 1905, then? Possibly; one cannot say. Sir Charles had all the mental equipment of a wise and influential adviser; but had he that last touch of imagination and decision and swift courage which is needed in a leader?

Sir Charles Dilke lost his seat for Chelsea at the General Election of 1886, and did not return to the House of Commons until that of 1892. He filled up this interval by a great deal of writing on political subjects, travelling in Turkey, Greece, India, and elsewhere, and in other activities. From 1892 until his death in 1911 he sat as a private Member of Parliament. Mr Gladstone did not invite him to join the administration in 1892, nor did Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman ask him to join that of 1905. His biographers suggest that the latter Prime Minister had not forgiven him for the vote of censure on cordite which brought about the defeat of the Liberal Government in 1895. There must have been some bitterness for a man who had been expected to succeed to Mr Gladstone as Prime Minister, in seeing himself passed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, so much his inferior in intellect and renown, and by Mr Asquith, so much his junior in Parliament; but Dilke bore his fate well and uncomplainingly. Perhaps, as a private and independent member, his peculiar gifts were of more service to the nation than if, as a Minister or leader of Opposition, he had been obliged to spend his time in details of administration and tactics. A man of great knowledge and unweariable perseverance can really, by constantly pressing upon Ministers and departments, do more than a tied and harassed official to shape public ends.

Sir Charles Dilke cultivated three great fields of activity—foreign affairs, defence questions, and all questions connected with labour and the social welfare of the poorer classes. His enormous industry made him a master of facts, and a skilled adviser in each of these spheres of political life.

The fierceness of the struggle about Ireland was due to the fact that it was a phase in the ancient contest between the imperialistic and democratic inclinations of the British nation, a struggle which once more became

marked under the preceding administration of Lord Beaconsfield. The defeat of Gladstone in 1886 was followed by a period during which the imperialistic inclination was dominant. Mr Gladstone said mournfully to Sir Charles Dilke in 1893, 'Jingoism is stronger than ever. It is no longer war-fever, but earth-hunger.' In fact, the British Empire had become self-conscious, aware of destiny, like the Roman in the days of Augustus. Poets and historians voiced the creed. Men like Cecil Rhodes and Sir George Goldie acted in Africa, not blindly but inspired by a theory. It became clear that Egypt, under whatever covering name, was to remain part of the Empire; and the Sudan was subdued and taken over. Great 'hinterlands,' like Rhodesia and Nigeria and East Africa, were virtually or formally annexed; and, finally, events led to the absorption of the Dutch Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. In the East, Burmah was added to our vast Empire.

Sir Charles Dilke was, on the whole, averse to extensions of this kind, mainly on the ground that, unless we changed our whole military system, they might weaken the Empire instead of strengthening it. So late as 1893 he was still pressing the Government to evacuate Egypt. He believed, he wrote to Mr Gladstone, 'that the long-lasting occupation of Egypt by our forces is the cause of all the difficulties by which our foreign policy, and even our position in Europe are oppressed. Our hands are not free, and never will be free so long as the occupation continues.' It certainly made it difficult for us to object to annexations or occupations by other Powers. At the same time Sir Charles always advocated strong maintenance of all our existing rights against all challengers. The hostile point of British policy during the last twenty years of the 19th century was directed against France and Russia. Once during that period we were on the brink of war with Russia, and thrice at least on that of war with France. Our relations with the German Powers until almost the end of the period were very friendly. Lord Salisbury said that the alliance of the German and Austrian Empires (1879) was 'glad tidings of great joy.' He made African and other concessions to Germany, of which Dilke disapproved as bad bargaining, especially of the cession of Heligoland.

Sir Charles Dilke advocated a strong front towards excessive French pretensions, but from 1870 onwards his real sympathies were with France and he had, perhaps, more personal friendships in that country than any Englishman of his time. He predicted that, in the end, France would have to choose between Germany and England; and, when the great change in our policy came after the Boer war, he was in favour of the Entente. But he dreaded 'entangling alliances' for unspecified objects, especially if they were to be with more than one Power. He thought that, if England were at all formally allied with France and Russia, this would either tempt France to attack Germany or Germany to cut the knot by attacking France. He was alarmed by the somewhat ostentatious foreign tours of King Edward VII, and their too apparent tendencies. He wrote in 1908 these words:

'That Germany, however ambitious, and however boastful of her military strength, should be rendered nervous by the menace of Franco-Russian cooperation is a consideration modified only by the universal recognition of the desire of France for self-respecting peace. As soon as another Power is suspected of any intention of making use of the Franco-Russian cooperation for the purpose of isolating Germany, a dangerous situation has arisen. We are so confident in our own profound knowledge of our wish for European peace that we hardly realise the extreme danger for the future which is caused by all suggestion that we have succeeded in isolating Germany, or are striving to bring about that result. The London articles written in violent support of a supposed alliance did the harm; and, to any one who keeps touch for himself of Continental opinion, the harm was undoubted, and tended to produce several undesirable results. . . . Those who crowed over the isolation of Germany took the best means of increasing the German Fleet.'

Sir Charles thought it much to our interest to remain on good terms with Austria. He admired Russia and believed in her destinies, but in policy was always somewhat anti-Russian, because he thought Russia dangerous to the free evolution of Greece and the Balkan States, and because he distrusted Tsardom.

For a Radical, Sir Charles Dilke entertained two unorthodox views. One was that he doubted the merits of a party form of government, that is, of government



by a Party Committee; the other was that, so long as there was a House of Lords, he thought that the Prime Minister should be in it, so as to be out of the dust of the popular arena. His reason was that matters of foreign policy and defence were of primary and paramount importance. He thought that both these closely connected spheres of things should be outside the region of party conflict. It was due in part to his efforts that the Imperial Committee of Defence, under the Prime Minister, was evolved, in order to coordinate policy and military and naval preparations. The breakdown of the old system in the South African war proved the necessity of this. Allied with Mr Arnold Forster and Mr Spencer Wilkinson, Sir Charles Dilke brought incessant pressure to bear on the reform of our military system. He was never tired of pointing out that, while we were spending more than Germany, we were getting far less for our money, for want of intelligent application of means to ends. He was a Home Ruler 'all round,' for, among others, the best of reasons, that he wished to separate business of imperial importance from domestic issues and from social policy. He was entirely in the right. British government has hitherto been too much centralised, far more so than that of the German Empire; and both in provincial and municipal matters we ought now to have boldly extensive decentralisation of control.

There is no space in this review to deal with Sir Charles Dilke's extraordinary activity in regard to all social and industrial questions. He spent the last evening of his life studying and marking a blue book on this class of question, 'the ruling passion, strong in death.' In the last year of his life was passed the Trade Boards Act, the 'first instalment of the principle of the Minimum Wage,' due mainly to his exertions. At the end of this same year, 1910, Sir Charles Dilke, in his sixty-eighth year, in miserable health, and with a heart which could only just carry on, fought and won his last election in the Forest of Dean; and the effort killed him within a few weeks. Is it best to die thus 'in harness,' or to retire and 'make one's salvation,' as the French say? The answer depends upon one's view as to the nature of life and death. It is a question of values. Sir Charles

Dilke, like most Radicals, was an optimist about this world; and it was everything to him.

Sir Charles devoted much of his never-ending energy to the protection of the interests of native coloured populations against exploitation by capitalists in our own tropical possessions, the Belgian Congo, and elsewhere. It is truly valuable service to stir up lethargic Government Departments in these matters, because such populations have far less means of self-protection than have the working-classes at home. Dilke had a true and passionate sympathy with the 'under dog' everywhere; it was, perhaps, the leading motive of his life.

There is much in this Memoir to show the character and tastes of Dilke. He was a man of very great charm, kind and generous, feeling and inspiring true affection. His experience of men and affairs and various regions of the world was almost, or quite, unrivalled in his day; his memory was powerful, and his conversation vigorous, cheerful, and fed by an inexhaustible stream of ideas and varied knowledge. The contribution to the book made by his second wife's brother-in-law (the Rev. W. Tuckwell, gives excellent samples of his table talk. His favourite study was history, especially that of modern times, and, locally, that of his favourite region of Provence. In literature his tastes were limited but strong. He knew much of the science of trees and plants, and was fond of animals, especially of cats. This should be noted. Sympathy with, or antipathy to, cats is one of the main divisions of the human race. He was a fencer and an oarsman, carrying on both pursuits much later than most men, quite to the end of his life. He was also fond of horses and riding; and he had a true eye for the beauties of Nature.

If all the writings and letters and speeches of Sir Charles Dilke were printed together, they would make a very long array of volumes, something like the Works of St Chrysostom in cubic contents. He only published three or four books of the political kind, but wrote countless reviews and articles on many subjects in the 'Athenæum'—a family property—and in the 'Quarterly Review' and monthly periodicals. He certainly had not an original turn of style, either in speaking or writing, and was intent always on the subject, not the art. He said to

Mr Tuckwell one morning, after rapidly finishing a newspaper article to his satisfaction, that 'papers dashed off under an impulse are always the best.' Mr Tuckwell demurred. 'Those papers of mine,' he said, 'specially praised by you have been always the fruit of long labour.' 'Ah,' said Dilke, 'but you have style, a rare accomplishment; that is what I have admired in yours.'

Sir Charles Dilke himself compiled his Memoirs from private diaries which, till 1892, he kept very fully, and from letters. The Memoirs were unfinished; and, after 1892, he made but few entries in his note-books. The present book uses the Memoirs very fully, so that it is nearer in character to autobiography than are most Lives; and this adds very much to its charm and interest. Sir Charles Dilke, in his Will, appointed Miss Gertrude Tuckwell to be his literary executrix, and added that 'it would be inconsistent with my life-long views that she should seek assistance in editing from any one closely connected with either the Liberal or the Conservative Party, so as to import into the publications anything of the conventional attitude of the old parties.' Therefore 'Mr Stephen Gwynn, M.P., whose name was among those suggested by Sir Charles Dilke, was asked to undertake the work of arranging the Memoirs, and supplementing them where necessary.' This work was far advanced when Mr Gwynn joined the forces at the beginning of the war; and Miss Tuckwell herself, with the assistance of friends, has completed the book. Evidently the greatest care and trouble have been taken to render the work as perfect and accurate as possible; the editorial writing is in good style and taste, and extremely sound. The book should hold a permanent place in our political literature, both as the portrait of an interesting man, and as a most valuable contribution to historical knowledge.

BERNARD HOLLAND.

## Art. 10.—NATIONAL EDUCATION AND NATIONAL LIFE.

1. *A Bill [89] to make further provision with respect to Education in England and Wales, and for purposes connected therewith.* H.M. Stationery Office, 1917.
2. *Notes on certain clauses of the Education Bill, 1917. White Paper.* [Cd. 8713.] H.M. Stationery Office, 1917.
3. *Federal Aid for Vocational Education.* By I. L. Kandel. Carnegie Trust: Bulletin 10, 1917.
4. *Education of Apprentices: Report of the Committee appointed by the Council of the North-East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders upon the Education of Apprentices.* 1917.
5. *Truancy and Non-Attendance in the Chicago Schools.* By Edith Abbott and S. P. Breckinridge. Cambridge University Press, 1917.
6. *Education Reform. Being the Report of the Education Reform Council.* King, 1917.
7. *The Times Educational Supplement, 1915, 1916, 1917* [contains texts of educational reform documents].

THE Bill introduced by Mr Herbert Fisher on Aug. 10 on behalf of the Government, 'to make further provision with respect to Education in England and Wales, and for purposes connected therewith,' marks the opening of a new stage in the history of English education. It is not possible to understand this lengthy Bill without some reference to the streams of events that have met in its provisions, and in their new unity give hope of a larger outlook in national life.

One of our earliest historical documents is an edict of the Emperor Gratian regulating the salaries of teachers. That subject has been ever with us, and stands in the forefront of the educational question to-day. The teachers of the Middle Ages were for the most part priests or monks, men without family responsibilities. They were paid on that footing; and the Reformers, while they swept away the compulsory celibacy of the clergy, failed to enlarge the stipends of the teachers. The idea of reasonable remuneration, though the need for it echoes through post-Reformation literature, never presented itself in a practical form to the

private benefactor. In the Elizabethan age the State did what it could. It relieved the teacher of almost every form of tax, but the pious founder whose legacy supplied the stipend still contemplated a celibate profession. Stipends, as the 17th and 18th centuries passed by, did not rise with the rise in prices; and, when the reform movement of the early 19th century began, even so earnest a reformer as Brougham proposed salaries too low to attract even poor scholars. It was the poor scholars who had kept education at its high level in the age of Elizabeth; but there were very few scholars, rich or poor, when the social disasters of the Industrial Revolution brought Mr Whitbread and his Bill for universal schools on the scene in 1807. At that moment the new monitorial schools, introduced by Joseph Lancaster and Andrew Bell, were beginning to gather momentum. The scarcity of teachers had necessitated the revival of a device that had met the lack of masters in the 13th and again in the 16th century—the teaching of children by children. At the present day there are those who advocate, in the increasing dearth of teachers, yet another return to this desperate expedient. One of Mr Fisher's chief difficulties is this question of the supply of teachers; and it is with much satisfaction that we observe his intention to revert to the methods of Gratian rather than to those which the Plantagenet Bishop Poore of Sarum, Richard Mulcaster the Elizabethan, and the Georgian Societies founded by Bell and Lancaster, were compelled to advocate and adopt.

If history illuminates the persistent difficulties of the supply of teachers, it is not less valuable in relation to the vexed question of teaching areas, with respect to which Lord Haldane has made during the last few months some suggestions that recall the legislative theorisings of the Abbe Siéyès. Lord Haldane, unwisely departing from the safe fields of tradition and continuity in action, has advocated the division of England into an educational Heptarchy, and has been supported in half-hearted fashion by the Education Reform Council, but by no other reform body. He desires to divide the country into educational provinces, and to create new administrative areas unknown to history, with the view of relieving by the slippery methods of devolution the

burdens of Whitehall. But the records of English educational and local history have given us a guide in this matter that must not be swept away. We have had educational areas from the earliest times. The Romans in Britain had definite restricted areas, and adjusted salaries to meet the scale of life in these areas. When the Church became a power in the land, the question of educational areas grew in importance; and we find a gradual evolution that created the parochial area, the episcopal area, and areas governed by the larger secular and monastic houses. In effect, it may be said that the great episcopal cities became areas, that the counties roughly became areas, that parishes which largely coincided with groups of hundreds became areas. There was a tendency for the area to coincide with the mediæval local government unit; and after the Reformation, when that system had almost broken down, we find that the Bishops, in their strict educational control, preserved for education much that had been lost for local government. But episcopal control of education vanished as a universal persistent fact early in the 18th century, after the law courts had whittled away the provisions of the Conformity Acts; and from that time until 1902 the whole question of educational areas was in abeyance.

The Local Government Act of 1888 restored all the best features of the mediæval local government system, with its parochial and district and county and borough councils; and Mr Balfour in 1902, with deep insight, restored to the local government system its educational duties. History did not repeat itself. The new system which is at work to-day is not the mediæval system with an ecclesiastical hierarchy controlling the various phases of education; but it is an evolution of the part that local government in the Middle Ages had played in its relationship to that system, an evolution from the days when the parish priest was the chief spokesman of the vill, and the Bishop led the old council of the shire. Folk tradition rarely dies, and the English tradition of local government came again readily to life; it had, indeed, lingered on, while the close interest of the Bishops, the clergy and the non-conforming ministers in education had revived long before the local government system. The fact that Church and State—the Church



in its largest aspect including Communions other than that of the Establishment, the State in its local as well as its central aspect—are to-day cooperating to secure an educated nation, recalls the remarkable effort made three centuries ago to secure the same end.

Elizabeth's new statesmen and her Bishops attacked this problem as deliberately as we are attacking it, and at one moment were on the verge of success. That they failed ultimately was due to the fact that there was no free public opinion on which the policy could be ridden to the goal. Democracy was even then in the making, but it was dominated by great personalities who never saw that the drift of human endeavour was towards personal freedom rather than personal efficiency. Milton came in the end to see that true liberty resides in the soul, but all his earlier work shows that his great democratic mind was aiming rather at freedom from the physical fetters of Church and State than at the freedom which springs from the unfettered soul. Education was not the goal of the people. Political freedom was their goal; and it was not until that goal was nearly reached, almost four centuries later, that they could turn to education as the next stage of national evolution. It is no mere coincidence that revolutionary franchise and revolutionary education measures have been introduced in the same session, though the basic connexion is not yet generally recognised.

That is where we stand to-day. Had Elizabeth succeeded in her educational policy, she would have produced a England not unlike modern Germany from certain points of view—an unfree well-trained race in slavery to the State. She attacked the problem, as Germany attacked it, from the point of view of the secondary school and the University. She found two Universities, even then endowed with ancient traditions; she found a network of grammar schools, many of great antiquity. Both grades were corrupted almost beyond use. With splendid vigour she cleansed by a series of statutes both the schools and the Universities, while she added in plentiful measure to the number of the schools. She extended every possible favour to the teaching profession, and placed schools and Universities alike in the strictest ecclesiastical tutelage. That tutelage was wisely exercised

on the whole. The Bishop's licence to teach secured for the most part a competent race of teachers; and so efficient did the system become that the Universities at the opening of the 17th century contained as many undergraduates as were supplied three centuries later by a quintupled population. Every facility for education was given to all classes. Every child in the land had either to be at school or to be apprenticed; and it will not be denied that scholarship flourished with amazing vigour in an age when the dramatist, the poet and the divine competed for the suffrages of the people. The Universities were fed from schools in every corner of the kingdom; and there appeared to lie before the nation an age not only of efficiency and virtue worthy of the vigour of the race, but one adorned with all the beauties of art and the allurements of literature, when Andrew's State of Christianopolis seemed at hand. Yet half a century saw the end of these superb pretensions. The nation flung aside the fetters; and when, on the return of the second Charles, it resumed the garb of obedience, education was forgotten in the intrigues of politics and the foibles of an Erastian age.

Yet all was not lost. In a century of educational darkness the winter wheat, that we may reap if we will, was sown. From 1660 to 1730 a new school endowment movement, which gave us more than 1000 schools, took place in the teeth of the legislature, with the help of judges who knew how to evade ill-drawn Acts of Parliament. These schools are alive to-day. From 1662 onwards, from the year of the foundation of the Royal Society, we may date that revival of scientific thought which carried on the ideals of the mediæval Friar Bacon and of his Elizabethan namesake, and laid the basis and supplied through the minds of Newton and his fellows the principles and the whole framework of modern physical science. The 18th century, barren though it was in regard to the education of the people, yet kept alive in some schools and in the depleted Universities a stream of scholarship that sufficed to produce some of the greatest of England's scholars and thinkers, men such as Gray, Gibbon, Porson and Johnson, Wesley, Blackstone, Bentham, Eldon and Stowell. Not even in the darkest days had the threefold educational tradition

that marks every stage of English education failed—the tradition of religion, humanism and science. It was preserved intact for our use, and, if we have the wisdom of our ancestors, can be applied to the regeneration of the people.

Nothing of use, indeed, was destroyed. It is true that the Reformation involved the destruction of a number of schools, but the loss was more than repaired by Elizabeth. It is true that the school endowment movement between 1660 and 1730 gave little healing to the generations that saw it. But the schools were not lost, the educational instinct was not lost; and from the days when Brougham began his campaign for the resuscitation of the old educational charities, to 1868 and 1869, when the Endowed Schools Acts came into operation, English thinkers never lost sight of the fact that it was their duty to preserve intact a priceless heritage. Our own generation must awaken to the national significance of Secondary Education; it must learn, as the Elizabethans learnt, to regard it as a whole. It is here that Mr Fisher's proposals of April 19 and Aug. 10 have almost their widest significance.

It must, indeed, never be forgotten that the Universities and the Secondary Schools form an integral whole. The Elizabethans grasped that fact; and forthwith University life reflected every facet of national life. It has never since been grasped. It is hardly realised at all to-day, despite the fact that never in the history of European education have there been such admirable Secondary Schools as we now possess. But they are separate one from another. They know little or nothing of joint action. The separate schools are justly proud of their traditions; but the great school of, say, the 15th century has nothing to say to the little Grammar School that has, perhaps, handed on the torch from the 12th century, and is unconscious even of the existence of the 20th century school which is just beginning to find its own personality. The great school is also, perhaps, a little scornful of new methods, and hardly gives Science the humanistic opportunity that has been for centuries the prerogative of two highly inflected tongues, dead in speech but immortal in literature. Yet Science is as

capable of humanistic application as literature. None knew this better than Virgil himself; none knew it better than the great Greeks.

Secondary education, as a whole, has been scornful of science and pedagogy, forgetful of the fact that the great mediæval thinkers, who were the first begetters of the ancient Grammar Schools, were primarily scientists and not classicists, grammarians often enough but pedagogists always. Our Secondary System needs to regard all learning as successive aspects of one unity; it is not doing its work if it hands on only one aspect of the threefold tradition of English education. Yet it cannot hand on the complete tradition unless it, as a whole, is inspired with the nobility of aspiration which was the gift of Thomas Arnold and Edward Thring to English education, unless it realises that humanism is the science of life and that science is the life of humanism, unless these goals are secured by the joint action of the schools, members of one family—to use Mr Fisher's words when advocating Advanced Courses for Secondary Schools.

Hitherto our Universities have suffered from the want of a continuous secondary system which by combined effort could supply them with the best and most adequately trained scholars from every class. The Universities have had to fight their way single-handed. It is impossible to measure all that Oxford and Cambridge have meant to national life in the eight centuries or so that have passed since Vacarius was lecturing on law at Oxford. It is a story of almost magical significance, since these Universities have literally been wells from which the nation has in every necessity drawn up the gleaming waters of life. But we may freely prophesy that the old Universities and our younger seats of academic learning have a future which will excel the past in the exact measure of their larger relationship to all classes of the community. The awakening of Oxford and Cambridge has gone steadily on for, perhaps, a century and a quarter, but it is less than a century since Coplestone boldly declared that the University of Oxford was not a national institution. Despite the anger of John Henry Newman, the assertion was at the moment true; and in one sense it is still true of our University grade of education. And it must remain true until we have such a secondary system

of education as will with almost automatic precision supply the Universities with the men and women who are capable of profiting by the opportunities offered by a *studium generale*.

The New Regulations for Secondary Schools issued by the Board of Education offer for the first time to the nation a secondary system that can produce this result. If the endowed and other secondary schools combine with one another and with the local education authorities to make the system of Advanced Courses in Secondary Schools one that is really alive throughout the length and breadth of the land, then the Universities, old and new, will at last become national institutions crowning and reacting on a really national system of education. But if governing bodies, headmasters and headmistresses, and local authorities lack vision, scorn the joint action of independent schools, shrink from the difficulties of turning our secondary schools into a system of what has been called Secondary Universities, in which separate schools are colleges that retain their own tradition and personality while forming part of a larger personality, then the goal will still be far off. But the opportunity is now offered to the country for the first time to win this goal; and that in itself is an achievement. Up till now we have never in any organised fashion tried to bring the poor scholar to the University. That was Mark Pattison's complaint many years ago. Mr Fisher is trying. That is a main point of his Bill and of his Secondary School Regulations. The thing can be done. Two years of prolonged agitation have shown how it can be done; and Mr Fisher, with commendable courage, is prepared to adopt the views of the reformers, if he has the backing of the House of Commons and of the country.

The Bill, indeed, is the culmination of a great 19th century movement, and is the latest attempt to solve the problem set more than a century ago by the apparently sinister success of the Industrial Revolution. That a success which gave a world-wide economic significance to the British Isles was really sinister we do not believe, but its effect on many generations of English children was disastrous indeed. Here and now it is unnecessary to describe the intolerable results of our industrial system on the child life of England. It is written

at large in Government reports from 1833 onwards; it is the theme of innumerable books; it stands out in the reports of the great school inspectors, such as Allen and Tremeneere, of the mid-nineteenth century; it is the chief monument of our national reluctance to deal boldly with great social evils. From the days when the poor-law children, atoms of seven years and upwards, were sent in open carts from London to the factories of the North, to this present hour, when two million children between the ages of 12 and 17 years are left to grow up without physical, mental or spiritual supervision, we have been warned, year after year, by novelists, social reformers, parliamentarians, civil servants and the members of endless committees and commissions, of the intolerable loss of national capital involved. It is wastage that not only saps the strength of the whole rising generation, not only casts an ever-increasing burden on prisons, poor-law institutions and hospitals, but also so disorganises the economic market, by the creation of an immense surplus of unskilled labour, that men over fifty years of age are practically driven out of the field.

The passion for cheap labour has brought its own reward. Physically we are not a healthy nation. That was known during and after the Crimean War; again during and after the South African War; but the full revelation has been reserved for our own day, when the reports of Sir George Newman and his colleagues on the disastrous state of the health of school-children have been, in every town and county, supplemented by the reports of Army doctors on recruits. Despite the strenuous and partially successful efforts of local government authorities during more than half a century to secure better sanitary and housing conditions, the physical condition of the people is evil in the extreme. It has been reserved for the past decade to detect the true causes. The evil is due partly to the ignorance of women in respect to the rearing of children; partly to the almost universal system of child labour which claims service for long hours, even during the period of compulsory school attendance, and condemns children, already physically unfit to a degree entirely unsuspected by the heedless public, to all sorts of heavy unskilled labour that renders them in a great percentage of cases unfit



for social life and almost totally unemployable long before the age of thirty years. Official evidence to that effect was presented to the country in 1906 and was entirely ignored by Parliament and People alike. It is these evils that Mr Fisher's Bill, after a long and fiery campaign in the press, is intended to destroy.

It is not altogether inexplicable that the evils of which we have written have so long gone unchecked. The Industrial Revolution not only had the start of the State system of education, but it proceeded at a pace that no voluntary system could hope to overtake. The English people do not like compulsion; and that dislike is the source of many of the admirable qualities of our race. But in certain fields the rooted hatred of State interference has actually forged the very fetters that Englishmen most detest. This was peculiarly the case in education. Matters were very desperate when the first State grant, a school-building grant, came to the aid of the monitorial schools in 1833. But that annual grant was not increased until 1839; and in that year it was only by a majority of five in a House of 555 members that the appointment of a Committee of the Privy Council on Education was sanctioned by the House of Commons. Gladstone, Disraeli and Peel united to oppose the departure that laid the basis of our present system. For thirty years the voluntary system, supplemented by State grants, survived, and was worked with skill and energy by successive administrators. But, all the while, the demand for child-labour multiplied much faster than the opportunities of education, despite all the attention of the House of Commons to the subject.

In 1869 it was at last realised that, if England was to survive as a great nation, childhood must be saved. Mr W. G. Forster denounced 'this fearful state of things'; Mr Melly prophetically quoted from the 'Talmud,' 'By the breath of the school children shall the State be saved.' The state of things was indeed fearful. In 1870 there were 1,450,000 children on the school registers. Of these 400,000 were under six, and only 390,000 were over ten years. Moreover, nearly a million children between the ages of six and ten years, and over half a million between the ages of ten and twelve, were not on the registers at all. In fact, only two-fifths of the

total number of children between six and ten, and one-third of the total between ten and twelve, were on the registers of the aided schools, while the proportion actually receiving education was much smaller, since attendance was voluntary. Organised continuation education was non-existent. There were evening schools, but there were less than 60,000 children in attendance. Yet it would be unjust to under-rate the value of the voluntary schools. In many ways the work done was of surprising efficiency; and the religious teaching in the schools of the great school societies representing the Establishment and Nonconformity respectively was excellent in itself and admirably inspected. The work was wonderfully supplemented by the Sunday Schools, which also developed weekday evening classes; and it may be said without fear of contradiction that the old voluntary system kept alive the religious side of the great English educational tradition. But by 1870 it had become essential, if the nation was to remain one of the leading forces of civilisation, that education should be universal; and this was achieved by the Acts of 1870 and 1876.

Reform was in the air. The decade from 1868 to 1878 saw the revival of the secondary school system and the opening of the doors of the Universities. Then began the half-century of effort which has led at last to the great reforms now before Parliament, reforms intended to secure within some ten years a national system of education which will prove not a mere ladder for ability and ambition destined to desiccate successive strata of society, but a system deliberately intended to raise to a higher social level the entire structure of each stratum. The intention of the reformers is in one sense revolutionary and in another profoundly conservative. It is revolutionary in the sense that it is intended to throw open to every member of the nation full opportunities to develop under the best physical conditions his or her peculiar aptitudes, thus carrying individualism to a point hitherto totally unknown to English education. That is revolutionary. But it is in the nature of a counter-revolution. Conditions before the war had reached a stage in which social revolution, unguided and without foresight for the interests of the nation and all that the

nation and the Empire mean to the world, was becoming the subject of prophecy and indeed the object of agitation. The war has made possible a revolution, the whole purpose of which is the conservation of our national and imperial life as one of the great assets of civilisation. We call this revolution Reconstruction. It is in effect the higher unity that reconciles the apparently conflicting efforts of the great parties in the State, a unity intended to solve some, at least, of the tragedies of national life. As the basis of this Reconstruction we must establish a great system of Universal Education.

Mr Fisher's Bill is not revolutionary in the sense that it proposes to start a new system. It is the legitimate development of the existing system, and in particular of that aspect of the system associated with the name of Mr Balfour, who in 1902, as a believer in local government and in local administrators, gave large educational powers to the administrative bodies created by the Act of 1888. The present Bill develops this idea to the fullest measure. Mr Fisher is a believer in local effort and in the ability of an area with ancient traditions to develop these traditions with the intention of stimulating and coordinating local life. He clearly regards the Board of Education as a great coordinating authority whose main function is to bring all local effort into a coordinated scheme. The principle is laid down in the first section of the Bill :

'With a view to the establishment of a national system of public education available for all persons capable of profiting thereby, it shall be the duty of the Council of every County and County Borough so far as their powers extend to contribute thereto by providing for the progressive development and comprehensive organisation of education in respect of their area, and with that object to submit to the Board of Education, when required by the Board, schemes showing the mode in which their duties and powers under the Education Acts are to be performed and exercised, whether separately or in cooperation with other authorities.'

It would not be possible for the local education authorities to carry out this great policy without the acquisition of very extended powers and the assured

command of adequate financial means covering the whole range of education. The powers are given by the Bill, but unhappily the provisions as to finance contained in the Bill and in the Appropriation Bill do not adequately supplement the new powers. Before referring to the question of finance it is necessary to see how wide are the powers conferred by the Bill. First as to the question of areas. The local education authority of a county will have to take into account the action of authorities in the county (known as Part III Authorities, from the fact that they are created by Part III of the Act of 1902) responsible for elementary education in comparatively small borough and urban district areas. In a great number of cases these smaller authorities have done such valuable work during the past fifteen years that there has been a demand by them for powers in the region of higher education. On the other hand, there has been a demand by the greater authorities that these lesser councils should be extinguished. Mr. Fisher wisely preserves the Part III authorities, gives them a considerable extension of powers and duties in respect to continued education, and directs that there shall be close cooperation between them and the county authorities.

It is very doubtful if the system of compulsory continuation schools for children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen could become universally effective without the cooperation of the Part III authorities. But a larger field of cooperation is also contemplated. The various local authorities of course overlap, especially in the great urban areas; and cooperation is essential. Mr Fisher pays lip-service to Lord Haldane's idea of provincial councils by providing facilities for the establishment and incorporation of provincial associations 'for such areas as the Board may direct.' The powers of such associations would be delegated by local authorities in the area; and grants would be provided by Parliament and by the voluntary contributions of the local authorities. We may pass this form of coordination by with the simple comment: that at the very moment when the United States of America is struggling to overcome the dangers and difficulties involved in the existence of educational provinces, and is seeking the centralisation

of powers for the whole Union, it is inopportune and unfortunate to attempt to create the machinery that may fix upon us the very fetters which the Federal Government is struggling, so far without success, to cast aside. We know from the case of Wales that the first effort of a province will be to cast aside the central control of Whitehall. America has found to her cost that the absence of complete central control is disastrous. Chicago to-day is still suffering acutely, even in the simple matter of school attendance, from the absence of a central authority.

The proposal to create educational provinces illustrates the dangers that threaten any system of reconstruction. Whisper but the word, and the faddist, the charlatan, the theorist and the educational *ingénu* appear upon the scene with remedies discredited by experience and unknown to the pharmacopœia of history. We trust that these proposals, even in the restricted form contained in Mr Fisher's Bill, will be dropped. If men came into power pledged to the outlook newly assumed by Lord Haldane after years of useful and unobtrusive work in the field of higher education, we should, were these clauses passed, at once have imposed upon us by the Board of Education educational provinces and a new and dangerous policy of devolution. It may, perhaps, be presumed that these proposals were inserted to be dropped like the sand-bags in a balloon. But the Bill goes on to provide for real cooperation and combination between the various local education authorities 'in the performance of any duty or the exercise of any power relating to education on such terms as they think fit.' This idea of cooperation was included in the Act of 1870, and was extended by the Acts of 1907 and 1909. These restricted powers are now replaced by perfect freedom of combination for all purposes. Such a provision renders totally unnecessary the really dangerous proposals for provincial associations. We may, therefore, assume that the machinery of co-operation under the Bill is all that is needed to secure an all-pervasive, highly articulated, and well-graded national system, provided that the local authorities receive the necessary powers.

Now, it must be noticed that the term 'necessary powers' involves not only powers to provide schools, not

only powers to compel attendance, but powers to secure in the schools children and adolescents who are in a condition to take the fullest advantage of the schools. The Bill considers all these points. It makes provision for such new schools as are necessary for continued education; it provides for the formation of such curricula as are necessary for the carrying out of the theoretical, physical and practical side of continued education; it abolishes the old abomination of 'marking time' in the higher standards of the elementary schools; it provides improved machinery for linking-up elementary education with the higher education contemplated by the new Regulations for Secondary Schools; it creates (with one rather astonishing exception—the case of aided secondary schools) machinery that will bring all school children and school adolescents under the supervision of a widely extended school medical service; it in effect makes provision for the abolition of the infant schools that have for so many decades struggled so nobly but too often ineffectually against adverse circumstances, and substitutes nursery schools that will be the bed-rock of a system intended to secure a healthy school population.

All this provision of machinery for an effective system would, however, miss its mark unless it was certain that children fit to undertake strenuous school life would be available. The Bill in a series of drastic sections secures this. It abolishes all exemptions from attendance at school in the case of any child between the ages of five and fourteen years, and makes the conclusion of the term after the fourteenth birthday the end of the full-time compulsory period. No child can be taken from school for the purpose of labour, either full-time or half-time, during a period of at least nine years after the age of five. But, if this provision stood alone, the Bill would still be entirely ineffective, since the worst aspect of child labour, the labour that produces heart disease, curvature of the spine and other fundamental causes of crippled lives, would still remain—the labour of little children, who fill every moment, without even reasonable provision for sleep and meals, with work out of school hours. In the great towns, children at school are exploited in the most shameless fashion; from five in the morning till



the school opens, the little milk-boys are at work, and very often their only breakfast is milk illicitly taken from the cans. But these are the least hard cases. Children under twelve—even under ten—are to be seen carrying back-breaking burdens; and firms of the most respectable character do not hesitate to employ children in work totally unfitted to their powers. Heavy wash-baskets are entrusted to little bands of children of nine and eight years or less; children under twelve are ordered to carry coals out in heavy handcarts and deliver the fuel in flats up many flights of stairs.

These are only illustrations, and not excessive illustrations, of unskilled work that should be carried out by adults, work which is now the burden of the little slaves of retailers of all kinds. This evil will be abolished by the Bill. No child under twelve may be employed at all; and no child, as defined by the Bill, may be employed in a factory, workshop, mine, or quarry after the Act begins to take effect. But Mr Fisher is prepared to allow a certain amount of work for children at school over twelve years. They may work on Saturdays, Sundays, and on all school holidays from six in the morning till eight in the evening, and on ordinary school days from the close of school hours till eight in the evening, that is to say from 3.30 or 4.0 till 8.0 p.m. We are sure that Sunday work should be forbidden altogether. It is the one chance of the religious denominations to supply their quota to national education. We are equally sure that work on Saturdays and in the vacations should be restricted to six hours a day, to be completed before four o'clock; and that work on days when school attendance is required should be limited to two hours, ending at 7 p.m. Unless this is done, the provision for correlating the work of Scouts, Girl Guides and Clubs with the schools will be ineffective. Mr Fisher, perhaps, does not realise the extraordinary and unscrupulous demand that there is for child labour. When the proposed restrictions take effect, the children still available will be exploited in every possible way. The Bill enables a school medical officer to forbid or limit any employment that is prejudicial to health or physical development; but the responsibility should not be entirely thrown on the medical officer. There should be such limitations of hours and of classes of employment

as to make it only necessary for the medical officer to intervene in the case of children of poor physique.

We may assume, however, that the Bill in this respect will receive necessary amendment in the House of Commons, and that the labour of children in full school attendance will be in effect abolished. Thus we shall secure a class of children between the ages of five and fourteen who will be able to give their full attention to a school life directed towards the physical as well as the mental and moral and religious ends of education. But this is still inadequate. The school must have seisin of the children before the age of five, if they are to secure a really healthy school population. The period between birth and five years is peculiarly perilous. It is a period not only of a high death-rate but of many diseases and accidents that have life-long effect. The proposed system of nursery schools for children between the ages of two and five years will do much to make this period a really preparatory period for school life. The local education authorities are to have power to supply, or aid the supply of, nursery schools for children 'whose home conditions are such that attendance at such a school is necessary or desirable for their healthy physical and mental development'; and they are also to have power to attend 'to the health, nourishment and physical welfare' of these children. If these schools become universal and are closely related to the schools for mothers now springing up all over the country, we may anticipate such an increase of effective population and such a heightened standard of national health as will repay rapidly a hundredfold the cost of these very obvious reforms. We thus see that comparatively small modifications of the Act of 1902 are capable of securing at a small cost a really fundamental reform in national life. Child-life from birth to adolescence will be secured.

But what about the great plague spot of our social system at the present time—the totally uncared-for children, two million of them, an army steadily increasing in numbers and in moral and physical unhealthiness, who now leave the elementary school between the ages of twelve and fourteen years and are the great reserve of unskilled labour until the age of eighteen? This

problem is partly solved by the restrictions on child-labour in the case of children still at school; but it can only be fully solved by the provision of compulsory education between the ages of fourteen and eighteen that will give the adolescents of both sexes something equivalent to that 'outfit for life' which is implied in the curriculum of an adequate secondary school. Can this be done? can something in the nature of humane instruction and apprenticeship combined be given to the millions of children who now, between the ages of twelve and eighteen, run to waste? From the point of view of moral and physical development these six years are the period when the health of the race is made certain. If in these years the young of both sexes can acquire a clear and interested mental outlook, healthy bodies, well-trained minds and hands, the reaction on national life will be of permanent value.

To secure this, the local authorities must cooperate with the employers. Mr Fisher's Bill provides a system of continuation schools which all children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years whose further education is not otherwise provided for must attend for 20 hours in each year, that is to say for eight hours a week. These children will have all the advantages of the school medical service, and must come to school from their employment fit and ready for all the activities, pleasures and interests of a largely conceived public school life, which will be specially designed to supplement from every point of view the work of the child in the mill, factory, or workshop. We believe that Mr Fisher's goal can be achieved, and chiefly for this reason, that the great manufacturing class of the country, who, we venture to think, have always been a highly patriotic class, will see the triple benefits of the proposal—the benefit to the individual child and to his or her class, the benefit to industry as a whole, the benefit to the nation to which fit employers and fit employees are equally necessary. The wide question of continuation education cannot be dealt with in detail here; Mr Fisher's proposals are only the beginning of a great movement designed to give an outfit for life to every child in the country, and to give to peculiar aptitudes the peculiar opportunities that are necessary for their full development.

The results of really vast national importance achieved by the famous Dockyard Schools, schools that have supplied some of the leading figures in our organisation of naval warfare on a scientific basis, should prove a source of inspiration to the education authorities who will be responsible for the efficient working of this great new departure.

But, if the children of the country as a whole need on all grounds adequate protection and training, this policy requires to be worked out on a sufficient scale in the case of that higher or continued education which is whole-time education and which is now carried on by means of the secondary schools. It would be idle to deny that Mr Fisher's scheme, as represented by this Bill and by his new Regulations for Secondary Schools, is inadequate; and it is inadequate for the simple reason that, in the case of secondary education, the Government have not had the courage of Mr Fisher's opinions. The evil of our present system of secondary education is, in fact, that it is not a system and cannot produce the national results that spring from systematic organisation. The schools themselves are, generally speaking, admirable. It has long been the fashion to attack our secondary grade of education, but the attack has often been belated and unjust. The head-masters and head-mistresses and governing authorities of these schools have laboured long and in most cases with notable success to render the schools not only efficient so far as curricula are concerned, but real centres of life in which each school has become a personality reflecting in hundreds of cases educational traditions that go back for centuries. But these schools are solitary; they do not share their traditions with other schools; they are not parts of a larger whole.

Mr Fisher is aware of this, and hopes by means of the new system of Advanced Courses in Classics, Modern Subjects, and Mathematics and Science to secure permanent inter-relations between the schools. But his proposed legislation will not secure this end. It cannot really be secured unless the schools and the local authorities who already supply, in most cases, grants to the schools are indissolubly connected. At present the link is a grant coupled with occasional inspection. The connexion creates no common life between the various

schools that receive grants, nor will it do so unless something more than a mere cash nexus relates the school to the authority. The new secondary schools created by local authorities are made to feel that a great gulf, social and financial, stands between them and the older schools. In view of this situation the local authorities simply cannot 'provide for the progressive development and comprehensive organisation of education' in respect to their areas. This can only be done when the diocesan conception of education is restored, when the Education Authority becomes in reality the *Magister scholarum*, a paternal authority to all the schools of all grades in its area. This cannot be so long as the Board of Education requires the finance of elementary and secondary education to be separated. If we are to trust local authorities at all, we must trust them thoroughly, and give block grants to the authorities intended to cover all the educational purposes contained in the schemes of general education that each authority must submit for approval to the Board of Education.

At present an extraordinary financial position exists. The endowed schools receive direct grants from the Board of Education; and similar grants are made to the local authorities in respect to secondary schools created by them. Under the Bill, the authorities are given at last full rating power for secondary education; but there is no provision that the rate should be supplemented by state grants, with the result that adequate rates will rarely be levied. But the rate for elementary education, in accordance with an old and evil tradition, is supplemented by grants varying from area to area in accordance with certain incomprehensible rules as to the local value of a penny rate. This system is now modified by the application of the so-called Kempe Formula, a method presumably intended to secure an equitable distribution of the Government grant for elementary education, but a method which, in fact, is a rule of thumb that produces—especially in the case of London—the grossest injustice. This is a democratic age, and it is absurd to maintain a system of educational finance that not even the augurs understand.

When, on April 19, Mr Fisher introduced his estimates, he clearly did not apprehend the incidence of the Kempe

Formula; and it is doubtful if any one but a first-class mathematician could do so. Certainly the House of Commons gladly accepted Mr Fisher's jest in lieu of an explanation. It is essential that the whole business should be simplified; that there should be one grant to each authority for all grades of education; that the authority should, within the limits of its approved scheme, be authorised to spend and distribute it; that that grant should consist of half the gross expenditure of the Council on education, plus such a further percentage of the total expenditure as should be sanctioned by the Board of Education in considering the scheme submitted by the Council and taking into account the value of a penny rate in the area involved. This system is simple; it is equitable; it would give every inducement to a local authority so to develop its educational work as to add to the rateable value of the area; it would at once place secondary education on a sound financial and a sound educational footing. Direct grants from the Board to the endowed schools should cease. The Board in retaining the power and duty of inspection and of revising from year to year the local schemes of education would retain the power requisite for the maintenance of an organic national system, and at the same time would secure that freedom of local development which is equally necessary.

If Mr Fisher's Bill fails, it will be because of the financial muddle that mars it. To secure success for his great scheme he needs the enthusiastic support of the local education authorities. As things stand, it is not at all certain that he will have this support in the measure and degree that is essential. London is frankly discontented; and that discontent will rightly spread. It would be a sad thing if a great scheme of educational reconstruction, which at last brings to the doors of the people the larger hope that is essential to a great democracy, were to fail because, in a comparatively small matter of money, the Government lacked that courage which is as needful for the conduct of peace as it is for the prosecution of war.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.



## Art. 11.—THE STATE AND THE MOTHER.

1. *Carnegie United Kingdom Trust: Report on the Physical Welfare of Mothers and Children.* Two vols. By E. W. Hope, M.D., D.Sc., Medical Officer of Health, Liverpool, and Janet M. Campbell, M.D., M.S., one of the Senior Medical Officers of the Board of Education. 1917.
2. *Report to the Local Government Board on the Provision of Midwifery Service in the County of London.* By Janet E. Lane Claypon, M.D., D.Sc., formerly a Medical Inspector of the Local Government Board. 1917.
3. *Report of Medical Officer of Local Government Board on Maternal Mortality in connection with Child-bearing.* 1915. [Cd. 8085.]
4. *Memorandum on the National Care of Maternity.* Women's Cooperative Guild; May, 1917.
5. *Maternity: Letters from Working Women.* Bell, 1915.
6. *The Health of the People: A New National Policy.* By Waldorf Astor, M.P., and others.

SOME months ago there was published a remarkable little book consisting of 160 letters from working women, describing their experience of child-birth. 'These letters,' wrote Mr Herbert Samuel in a prefatory note, 'give an intimate picture of the difficulties, the troubles, often the miseries, sometimes the agonies, that afflict many millions of our people, as a consequence of normal functions of their lives.' The women correspondents were the wives of men earning a weekly wage varying from eleven shillings to five pounds in upwards of a hundred different occupations. On the whole, they represented a group of working-class families above rather than below the social level of their class. The letters reveal the manifold problems of the working-man's home life, the centre and vitals of a nation. Politicians, reformers and administrators are apt to forget that their schemes are not seldom misconceived and misapplied, for the simple reason that they ignore the real, living issues of human society. Their plans are concerned with people in the mass; and frequently the problem itself is viewed too exclusively from the outside, from the administrative standpoint. The real issue, however, is often individualistic and possessing characters hidden and inherent in

the social and industrial system, coloured, and sometimes inspired, by deeply rooted aspirations of considerable potential value.

For instance, the problem of child-birth in the home of the well-to-do is an entirely different proposition, in theory and in practice, from that which presents itself in the poverty-stricken, over-crowded home of the workman. Yet, of the 850,000 births occurring in England and Wales every year, probably eighty per cent. take place under grave limiting conditions. These letters tell their own tragic story of how grave and limiting and all-but universal are such conditions. It is a story of perpetual over-work, of ever-recurring illness, of almost incredible suffering of the slow and chronic order. There are, it is true, many bright patches, many happy domestic episodes, a persistence of hopefulness, and a splendid loyalty, but the grey and the shadow predominate. The evidence cannot be doubted or impugned. It points unhesitatingly and with certainty to the broad fact that to bear children under such conditions is to bear a deterrent and intolerable burden of suffering. 'There is no joy in the prospect of a child,' says one. 'What with worry and feeling bad, I am never surprised at hearing of an expectant mother committing suicide,' writes another. 'Oh, the horrors,' exclaims a third, 'we suffer when men and women are ignorant'; and a fourth says 'I am a ruined woman through having children.' The Women's Cooperative Guild, which has rendered noble service in behalf of these women, writes as follows:

'It is vital to the welfare of the country that an enlightened and generous care of Maternity should replace the present indifference and neglect. The vast majority of women have to bear children under conditions which are most unfavourable to the mother and child. Out of the ordinary workman's wage there is no margin to provide for the expenses which would be necessary to secure healthy conditions of child-birth; while, if the husband is ill or out of work, the wage disappears partially or entirely, and the fate of the mother is tragic.

'For the upper or middle-class woman it would be thought an outrage if she were deprived of the possibility of sufficient nourishment, rest, exercise, medical advice, skilled attendance, relief through nurses and others from ordinary

cares, and the provision of an adequate outfit and other necessities for the infant and herself. Among the workers, during the months of pregnancy, the woman must learn by "experience and ignorance," usually being told that all her troubles are "natural." In order to scrape together a few shillings she often goes out to char or sits at her sewing machine or takes in washing; she puts by pence in money boxes; she saves little stores of tea, soap, oatmeal, and other dry goods; when times are bad she goes without, providing for her husband and children before herself. If not working long hours in a factory, her home work may be more injurious, when, ill or well, she washes, mangles, lifts heavy weights, and may still be carrying an infant in arms. She may, at the same time, have to nurse a sick husband or child. Up to the last minute before child-birth she has to wash and dress the children, cook the meals she is sometimes too tired to eat, and do all her own housework.

'At her confinement often only an untrained midwife is available, who sometimes has to make use of a child's help. In the poorest cases there is no preparation of any kind; and in some parts, as regards the baby's clothes, the custom is to get 1s. bundles from the pawnbroker. In the areas where bad housing causes the family in hundreds of thousands of cases to live in two or three rooms (not to speak of those living in one), privacy and quiet are impossible. Husband or children may be sleeping in the same room, while often lack of help in the house leads her to lie in the living room, with her purse under her pillow, superintending her house and children as best she may. When dependent on neighbours, she may lie neglected for hours; she may get out of bed the third day to make her own gruel, fainting in doing so; she will be doing her washing and cooking within the week, or she will be found mixing a pudding or sewing while in bed, or with a bowl of washing at the bedside. All these circumstances lead to mental worry and depression, of which the women feel the greatest desire to be relieved, so that the birth of their children may be welcomed and not dreaded. It is obvious that such conditions must react on the child, and constantly leave both mother and child a legacy of ill-health in one form or another.'

When we come to consider the details lying at the back of these 160 letters we find, as we should expect, a complex medley of influences and conditions implicating the social and economic system—inadequate

wages, bad housing, domestic labour, the practice of artificial prevention of child-birth, a defective food and milk supply, lack of hospital accommodation, and so forth. But over and above all else there emerge two predominant evils—ignorance of, and under-equipment for, maternity, and an absence of proper and available attention at child-birth. The mother seems to come to her supreme function almost entirely unready and uninformed; and she fulfils it, somehow or other, without sufficient skilled assistance. It is, indeed, an amazing story of improvisation and incompetence. *Yet this is the source of the nation.* The domestic problem here unfolded must be solved, first, in order to avoid this great mass of preventible suffering, and secondly, to remove the discouragement of and deterrence from child-birth. We have, and it must be added we deserve to have, a declining birth-rate. But the Empire needs an increasing birth-rate, a growing and virile population.

'The conclusion,' adds Mr Samuel, 'is clear, that it is the duty of the community, so far as it can, to relieve motherhood of its burdens, to spread the knowledge of mother-craft that is so often lacking, to make medical aid available when it is needed, to watch over the health of the infant. And since this is the duty of the community, it is also the duty of the State. The infant cannot indeed be saved by the State. It can only be saved by the mother. But the mother can be helped and can be taught by the State.'

Such is the social side of the problem. But there is a scientific side also. The progress of Preventive Medicine has now for a generation drawn attention to the vital importance of racial health. Nature breeds true, and on the whole she appears to breed soundly. It is estimated that 80 per cent. of children are 'born healthy.' The balance of diseased births are due to unhealthy, overworked or injured mothers, to alcoholism and various toxæmias, to syphilis and other constitutional hereditary diseases and predispositions, and to unwholesome antenatal conditions, all of which play havoc with healthy maternity and are the active cause of a certain amount of the distress revealed in the letters to which reference has been made. The Royal Commission on Venereal Disease (1916) recorded

'the grave and far-reaching effects of venereal disease upon the individual and the race. The evidence we have taken proves conclusively that these effects cannot be too seriously regarded, and that they result in a heavy loss not only of actual but of potential population, of productive power and of expenditure actually entailed. . . . We wish to lay stress upon the needs of the future. The diminution of the best manhood of the nation, due to the losses of the war, must tell heavily upon the birth-rate—already declining—and upon the numbers of efficient workers. The reasons for combating, by every possible means, diseases which in normal times operate with disastrous effects alike upon the birth-rate and upon working efficiency are, therefore, far more urgent than ever before.'

There is, then, this large care of the woman as type and producer of the race, what may be called the 'eugenic' factor which may be, and to some extent is, injured or destroyed by alcoholism, syphilis, and the racial poisons. That is the first fundamental point to bear in mind in relation to our mismanagement of maternity. Closely allied to it is the hitherto unsuspected volume of women's disease and invalidism associated directly and indirectly with child-birth and its neglect or mismanagement. A visit to the out-patient department of any general hospital, and particularly of any special hospital for women, will make manifest at a glance the magnitude and frequency of gynecological disease and disability. The National Insurance Commission has found to its cost that the promoters of the Act which led to the establishment of the scheme of national insurance underestimated the degree, character, and disabling influence of these maladies. Two further facts may be added on this point. These peculiar disabilities occur both in the pregnant and the non-pregnant mother, and are widely distributed through great masses of the poorer population; and it is also known that a substantial proportion of them are due to unskilful treatment and insufficient attention, or no attention at all, at the time of child-birth.

We come next to the large question of maternal mortality. Some 3500 mothers die in England and Wales every year from conditions associated with pregnancy and parturition. A third of these deaths are due to puerperal fever alone, and there are another 800 or more

deaths associated with but not directly classified with mortality from pregnancy and child-birth. The commonest of these are strains of heart or lung, and constitutional weakness caused or accentuated by pregnancy. This toll of death means that one mother dies to every 250 births. The incidence of these deaths, as the Registrar-General has pointed out, varies considerably. Wales stands out in an unhappy preeminence in this matter. Lancashire, too, is bad, particularly Rochdale, Bury, Burnley, Blackburn and Oldham. But Manchester and Liverpool occupy a relatively favourable position. It is clear that there are local circumstances and preventible conditions which affect the mother; and this is confirmed by the fact that in recent years there has been considerable decline in the total mortality from child-bearing. In England, between 1881-1890 and 1911-1914, a decline of 17 per cent. took place.

What these controlling conditions are is not fully established, but it is evident that they are closely associated with the conditions which produce a high rate of infant deaths or still-births, with inadequate or inferior midwifery, with the occupation of women, domestic as well as industrial,\* and with the general circumstances of insanitation, overcrowding and poverty. Far-reaching disabilities of social and industrial life tend to undermine the resistance and impair the health of the expectant mother. Long years of under-nourishment, prolonged factory work, and still more prolonged domestic drudgery during pregnancy, much standing, lack of rest, the sequelæ of previous disease—all these things materially affect the pregnant woman and substantially increase her risks and her suffering before, at, and after child-birth. It is this general state of affairs which must be borne in mind as always lying in the background, before we seize exclusively upon maternal ignorance and absence or inadequacy of attention at child-birth as the beginning and end of the problem.

Lastly, there is the relation between maternity and infant mortality. The year 1916 is remarkable in the annals of mortal statistics as having the lowest infant

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\* The Factory Act, 1901, s. 61, prohibits a woman from being employed in a factory or workshop within four weeks after child-birth.



death-rate hitherto recorded. In 1896 as many as 148 children under one year of age died per 1000 births; in 1906 that figure had fallen to 132, and in 1916 it was 91. That is really a wonderful and most encouraging record. It must not, however, be assumed that mortality has declined uniformly at this ratio, or that it will continue at the same rate, or that it is equally distributed geographically or within the first twelve months of life. In point of fact one-fifth of the total deaths of all infants occurs in the first week of life, that is, in closest association with the act of child-birth. We cannot here discuss the whole question of infant mortality, but the outstanding facts are that it is higher by 25 per cent. in urban areas than in rural; it is usually higher in the third quarter of the year; it is higher in the first three months of life than in any other trimestrial period; it is higher among boys than girls, and highest of all among illegitimate children.

The principal causes of the death of infants under one year of age are (a) premature birth, congenital defects, atrophy and debility, (b) diarrhoeal disease, and (c) bronchitis and pneumonia. Speaking generally, the first-named cause accounts for between 35 and 40 per cent. of the deaths; the diarrhoeal and all infective diseases are responsible for about 20 per cent., and the respiratory diseases account for another 20 per cent., with perhaps 10 per cent. due to 'convulsions.' Here we have, then, the cause of some 85 per cent. of all infant deaths. It is clear that many of the first group of deaths are related to the health of the mother. The effect of environment can have little or no direct opportunity in causing death due to prematurity or congenital defect or disease within the first few hours of life. Diarrhoeal deaths are largely caused by unsuitable feeding or infective agents; and mortality from respiratory disease is due to exposure, to variation of temperatures, or to infection. Domestic insanitation undoubtedly exerts influence on the susceptible body of the infant; but, speaking generally, there is good ground for believing that the principal factors are personal. Both personal and environmental factors are jointly responsible for the fact, as shown by the Registrar-General in 1911, that infant mortality varied in accordance with social class,

being, in that year, 76·4 per 1000 births in the upper and middle classes, and 132·5 in the wage-earning class. Nor must we fail to add the invisible cloud of still-births, abortions, and miscarriages—the might-have-beens.

That, then, is the case. The problem of maternity has many extraordinary ramifications, but its principal features for the majority of women are social disability, a heavy burden of invalidism, a declining birth-rate, with an ever-increasing discouragement of child-bearing, and an excessive mortality among mothers and their infants. Yet now, more than ever, Great Britain needs a strong, healthy, virile race of men and women. It needs them for its maintenance and growth; and they are needed also for all that they can bring to the human family of English life, tradition and genius.

One thing is certain. These grave national losses, recurring year by year, and amounting to upwards of a quarter of million of dead babies since the war began, must be stopped. It is a drain on the resources of the nation which cannot be accepted. Somehow or other the nation must grow healthy women, well equipped and instructed in sound principles of maternity, and encouraged and aided in the fulfilment of their supreme national function. The State organises industry, commerce, education, sanitation, army and navy; in these matters it seeks to leave nothing to chance, which leads inevitably to drift and chaos. It must organise maternity, not, as some enthusiastic eugenists would desire, by a system of compulsory selection and of compulsory control; but by providing opportunity and facility for the encouragement and protection of maternity, adequate, available, effective. How is it to be done?

### *Healthy Childhood and Girlhood.*

'I owe my good health,' writes one of the working women, 'to being well nourished and looked after by my mother when I was a growing girl. I think, if the young girls of to-day are properly cared for, it will make all the difference to the mothers of the future, and save much suffering during pregnancy and after.' Common experience would probably endorse this shrewd explanation and wise prognosis. The first step in this maternity

business is to safeguard the health of girls. For, contrary to certain Oriental traditions, the girl-child is of immense potential value to the State. Therefore great care should be taken of her health and physique. The School Medical Service seems the natural instrument for this purpose; and we ought soon to be obtaining by this means substantial improvement.

There are two chief necessities, nourishment and exercise. There is no reason why the recent remarkable improvement which has taken place in the physique of the girl of the well-to-do classes should not be shared by the girlhood of the working class. We should like to see the Local Education Authorities giving careful consideration to the inspection and (where necessary) medical treatment of girls, combined with substantial progress in physical exercise. The proposals for physical training and medical supervision for young people up to 18 years of age, introduced in the new Education Bill by Mr Fisher, may do much in this respect.

'I believe,' said Mr Francis Acland in the House of Commons on Aug. 10, 1917, 'that there will be an enormous gain in the health of the whole community from what the Right Honourable gentleman [Mr Fisher] proposes, not only from the courses of physical training but from the provision upon which he so rightly insisted, that these young persons ought to have their health watched by trained medical officers attached to the schools. I cannot conceive any single thing more likely to improve the whole future of the physical efficiency of the race than having the development of girls up to eighteen watched by trained and qualified women medical education officers.'

The premature employment of girls in factories should be forbidden; and any employment undertaken by them should be subject to supervision and control. The enormous increase in the employment of girls in munition works and otherwise is fraught with considerable danger. The medical examination of such workers by the Health of Munition Workers Committee, as shown in the recently issued Interim Report, reveals a good deal of fatigue, anæmia and digestive trouble which cannot fail to undermine the physique, and which should be a warning that we may pay too high a price for women's employment

unless effectually safeguarded. The same sort of evidence was placed before Parliament a century ago in the reports of Peel's Committee and the Commission on the Employment of Children in factories. The suicidal policy of uncontrolled employment of women and girls in the early days of the Industrial Revolution must never be repeated. Its cost in maternal and infant mortality is beyond computation.

*Education in Mothercraft.*

So long ago as 1910 the Board of Education issued a Special Memorandum on the Teaching of Infant Care and Management in Public Elementary Schools. 'Education is concerned with the bodies as well as the minds of the scholars,' wrote Sir Robert Morant; 'and a practical knowledge of the common conditions which affect health and physical efficiency is as necessary a part of the purposes of a school education as intellectual attainment.' We may, if we like, teach the girl of the working class all manner of things, as a luxury; we must, of necessity, teach her the elements of the hygiene of maternity and infant management. In many schools the Board's advice has been followed; and considerable progress has, it is understood, been made in certain areas. The Board is also providing for the proper teaching of Hygiene in its Training Colleges. The time has come for advance. The experiments of the pioneering authorities have been entirely successful; and all that is needed is to extend the work to all areas and to the classes for elder girls in all Elementary Schools. We trust that Mr Fisher will take steps in this direction, as well as in his proposed Continuation Schools.

Nor must the young married woman be forgotten. Probably the best place to train her in these matters, in which it will be found she is deeply interested, is the School for Mothers. It is reported by the Local Government Board that there have now been established 842 of these 'centres,' as they are rather curiously called; 396 of them are municipal, and 446 owe their origin to voluntary societies. All these 'centres' should be schools and training-places in maternal and infant hygiene. They should not become dispensaries; they should be

places for medical advice and instruction in the preventive sense. As Mr Samuel says, 'The infant cannot be saved by the State. *It can only be saved by the mother.* But the mother can be helped and taught by the State.'

*Assistance at Child-birth.*

'Although the conclusion does not admit of direct statistical proof,' writes Sir Arthur Newsholme, the Medical Officer of the Local Government Board, 'there can, I think, be no substantial doubt that a chief factor concerned in causing the excessive mortality from child-bearing, and the serious chronic debility or invalidism which in many instances follows child-bearing, is lack of skilled medical and midwifery assistance before and during child-birth.' Such assistance may be obtained in two ways, namely, attendance at home by a doctor, a midwife, or a medical student, and attendance in a maternity home or lying-in institution. Speaking generally, something like 60 per cent. of all births are attended by midwives, and in not a few districts this practice is well-nigh universal. Much depends on habit and custom, and much on the availability of the different means. In London, where institutional treatment is accessible, 10 per cent. of the child-births take place in hospitals, where the mothers are received as in-patients; another 35 or 40 per cent. are attended in their homes by doctors; and only some 30 per cent. are dealt with by midwives, leaving 20 per cent. by medical students and otherwise. The tendency is for midwife attendance to increase, though in remote country districts many confinements take place without any skilled attention.

There are several reasons why midwifery practice is increasing. First, there is not only a shortage of doctors, but an increasing number of them do not practise obstetrics or find themselves unable to be present at confinements which they have undertaken. Secondly, the preference of women in child-birth to be attended by women is reverting to the old tradition. Thirdly, the fees of the midwife are lower than those of the doctor; and fourthly, the advantages of midwife attendance are very material. She is required by the Rules of the Central Midwives Board of the Privy Council, under

whose authority she works, to be present throughout the confinement; she renders to the patient various services, domestic and other, beyond the competence of a doctor or a medical student; she must, by the rules of the Board, enquire into the maternal history of her patient, and advise her before the confinement as to her health and as to personal and general arrangements for the confinement; and she must nurse her during the lying-in period for ten days after the birth of the child. These provisions are of the highest value to the mother and child. It is the custom of pregnant women among the working class to 'book' with the midwife they select some three or four months before confinement. These are precious months of ante-natal opportunity, which must not as heretofore be wasted, but used to full advantage. Some of this invaluable ante-natal work is now carried out at the special 'centres' to which reference has been made, but owing to various circumstances they cannot take the place of the midwife, nor should they do so. The only satisfactory way seems to be to associate her with them.

The post-natal period is, perhaps, more immediately important than the ante-natal as regards the actual child-birth. Maternity nursing includes attention to many matters urgent and remote. The cleanliness of the mother, her dietary, the prevention of sepsis, the management of lactation, domestic supervision, medical aid, may all call for the midwife's service in addition to the delivery of the child, its hygiene and its protection from *ophthalmia neonatorum* or umbilical complication. The occasion is clearly the supreme opportunity for the inculcation of sound principles and good practice in all that concerns the health of maternity and infancy. The midwife is in a position of peculiar advantage. She has a unique claim on the mother, and initiates her into the mysteries of her craft.

But all this means that the midwife must be skilled, competent and well-trained. She must be experienced in the management of her practice and vigilant in the discharge of her duties to the C. M. B. and the Local Supervising authority of the area in which she practises.

'The midwife occupies an exceptional position in the



nursing profession,' says Dr Janet Campbell, 'in that she is called upon during her ordinary work to be directly responsible for the lives of two patients, mother and child. The most apparently straightforward case may unexpectedly develop complications; and a safe and satisfactory sequel often depends entirely on the watchfulness, skill, resourcefulness and good judgment of the midwife. Her work makes large claims upon health, time and leisure. For the single-handed midwife there is no such thing as being "off duty." She must respond by day or night, if called; she must never relax her vigilant alertness, must often forgo rest, food, relaxation, while always there is the anxious fear of danger to her patient which may result in disaster, if she fails to exercise a wise discretion. The highest devotion and self-sacrifice are demanded from her, and she needs a high sense of vocation and a love of her profession for its own sake to enable her cheerfully to meet her numerous difficulties. It is small wonder that many are unwilling to incur these responsibilities, and choose an easier form of service.'

Over and above these professional claims there are the worries and embarrassments of professional practice, the heavy incidental expenses, the bad debts, delayed payment, low fees, poor status, the loneliness and isolation, the continuously hard work. If the midwife takes enough cases at 15s. a case to earn a decent livelihood, she must be over-worked or give insufficient attention to her patients. She is caught in a vicious circle. Actual individual budgets cited by Dr Lane Claypon show that circumstances alter cases, but that the character of the work of a midwife and its reward leaves much to be desired. The fact is that a trained midwife can seldom obtain adequate fees without undertaking such a large number of cases that life is intolerable or the work not fully efficient. The price of this sort of thing is bad midwifery—and also unsatisfactory maternity.

The Carnegie Report by Dr Janet M. Campbell, well known as one of the Senior Medical Officers of the Board of Education, gives an admirable account of the present position of English Midwifery. It is the history of the inter-relationship of three dominating sets of ideas, (a) the conception of child-birth on the one hand as a wholly natural process and on the other as a form of disease, (b) the view that the practice of midwifery can be left

entirely to the midwife or that its proper conduct demand the science and experience of the physician, and (c) the relation of the part played in child-birth by nature and art respectively.

'The fact that child-birth is a natural physiological process has caused men from earliest times until comparatively recently to treat accompanying abnormalities as unavoidable accidents. Because child-bearing could not be assigned to the only category, namely disease, which gave it a claim upon the physician's art, knowledge of the management of child-birth made scarcely any progress from the time of Hippocrates for nearly two thousand years.

'Again, the nature—as opposed to illness—of child-bearing, placed matters relating to child-birth from earliest times in the hands of women. Secondary factors, such as religion and convention, have assisted in keeping them there. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that for the best part of two thousand years midwifery was mainly controlled by women. Only during the last three hundred years has there been a growing movement towards the specialised study of the whole subject of child-bearing by medical practitioners, and towards the relegation of the midwife from the position of untutored monopolist to that of a specially trained nurse acting strictly under medical supervision.'

Of the last three hundred years, the 17th century brought foreign learning, midwifery forceps, and 'men-midwives'; the 18th century brought midwifery training, schools of obstetrics and lying-in hospitals; and in the 19th came regulations, examinations, and the control and supervision of midwives, culminating in the establishment of the Central Midwives Board. But the midwife still needs (1) an appropriate and assured standard of wage, (2) improved training and status, and (3) proper recognition in relation to State Medicine.

As to the first of these requirements—there are some 40,000 midwives on the Roll (of whom 30,000 are trained), but of these only 14,000 are in practice as midwives. The distribution of births per midwife is, however, very unequal. It is estimated that a midwife cannot suitably be responsible in a town for more than 120 cases a year, which at the ordinary fee of 15s. a case brings 90l., out of which expenses and fees must be paid—obviously an inadequate income to attract or keep trained women in

the service. In so far as private midwifery practice is to be continued, Dr Campbell recommends that certain expenses of equipment, and even rent, might be paid by the local authority, which should also be responsible for the fees for medical aid in difficult cases. On the other side Dr Campbell would impose certain clinical duties for which additional fees would be paid. Another method is to provide a bonus or monetary benefit through the mother or through the local authority, by which the fee to the midwife might be raised to 25s. Partly to bring relief to the midwife, and partly to encourage the creation by the local authority of a proper midwife service in their area, the Local Government Board have obtained Treasury permission to pay grants in aid at the rate of one-half of the expenditure incurred with the Board's approval on (a) salaries and expenses of inspectors of midwives, and health visitors and nurses engaged in maternity and child-welfare work; (b) the provision of a midwife for necessitous women in confinement, and for areas which are insufficiently supplied with this service; (c) medical aid in confinement of necessitous women; (d) the expenses of a 'centre'; and (e) hospital treatment of complicated lying-in cases. Grants are also payable to voluntary agencies engaged in this work.

We come next to the need for improved training and status. The present training course extends over six months and includes attendance at twenty maternity cases and a series of lectures. The examination is held and the diploma is granted by the Central Midwives Board. What seems to be required is more practical and clinical experience, practice under supervision, and subsequent training after qualification. This would mean more time and a course extending to not less than twelve months (in France the training occupies two years), which in its turn means that the remuneration of practice must be such as to offer compensatory inducement. It is high time that the Government should establish a system of grants in aid, under the Board of Education, for the proper training of midwives; and there is much to be said for paying such grants direct to training institutions. Improved status will follow naturally on improved training and remuneration.

Finally, the administrative control of midwives calls

for amendment, and this in two respects. First, there is the local supervision authorised by § 8 of the Midwives Act, by which County Councils and County Borough Councils act as the supervising authorities to exercise general supervision, to investigate charges of malpractice, and to report to the C. M. B. It is necessary for these local authorities to appoint Inspectors of Midwives, a duty which has not always been fulfilled with discretion, discrimination, and good judgment, with the result that irritation has been roused among midwives in some areas by the appointment of persons of unsuitable qualifications and insufficient experience. It is obvious that an inspector should be a person in whom confidence may be placed, and one who brings to her work ripe experience and high qualifications. She should be the friend and helper of the midwives in her area, and not merely a detective of irregularities. Then, again, under the Act the local authority may delegate its powers or duties to any district council or committee appointed by it, upon which women and members of the district council may serve. It appears that the Local Government Board has encouraged such delegation, which is resented by the midwives as placing them at the mercy of less responsible and smaller bodies, and numerous and inferior inspectors. On the whole, there seem good grounds for discouraging such delegation, which is inadvisable for various reasons.

The whole question of administration is indeed difficult; and not a few competent authorities are coming to the view that some sort of State Midwifery Service may be the most satisfactory solution. The Midwives Institute, after much enquiry and considerable experience, conclude that in towns the institution of independent or private-practice midwives is on the whole the best method, provided always that they are under effective inspection. This gives free choice to the mother, whose confidences are respected; and it leads to healthy competition and independence among midwives. Conditions in rural districts differ greatly, and more organisation is necessary. The Institute recommend a combination of duties—midwife, school nurse, health visitor and tuberculosis inspector—as likely to provide a livelihood for a well-qualified person; as an alternative to this nurse-midwife method they suggest that an officially appointed

and properly salaried midwife from a central county maternity home, subsidised by the County Council, should visit the isolated cases of child-birth. Dr Janet Campbell describes various alternative schemes for rural areas, including (a) village midwives, usually married women who are only partially dependent on their earnings, and who may obtain their training on a county scholarship basis; (b) independent, well-trained midwives, as salaried officers of the County Council; (c) cottage nurse-midwives, as supplied through the agency of the Rural Midwives Association; or (d) village nurses fulfilling other functions in addition to midwifery, as school nurse, health visitor, etc. One method will be effective in one area, another in another.

We do not despair of seeing the rural problem solved if some way is found for the solution of the national problem. As to this, Dr Lane Claypon would introduce a State Midwifery Service working under a public authority, and comprising (a) free provision of midwifery to all women whose husband's income falls below a prescribed figure, whether medically attended or not; (b) a fixed fee of 20s. to 25s. per case and assured minimum income; (c) payment of emergency medical aid under Rule 20; (d) a limited number of patients per midwife; and (e) effective inspection. Dr Lane Claypon believes such a scheme would be economical, for in a short time it would greatly reduce the expenditure now incurred by the approved societies of the Insurance Commission on pre-natal sickness, and simultaneously the infant mortality rate from pre-natal causes. Such a scheme as this has much to commend it, though special consideration would have to be given to the personal nature of midwifery, the construction of the panel, the necessity of some degree of free choice of midwife, the relation of the medical profession, and the creation of sufficient incentive to keep the midwife up to the mark. There is also the question of cost and administration. On a basis of, say, 800,000 confinements, the sum needed for remuneration would be 800,000*l.* or 1,000,000*l.* per annum—a large sum for the State to find, though without question an economical investment yielding high interest. The administration also raises difficult questions. Should the public authority be the Local Sanitary Authority

or the Local Insurance Committee, or both? And what should be the Central Authority?

Such a national scheme as this would include suitable provision of maternity homes for the lying-in of normal cases with or without crèches for the babies,\* and hospital beds for complicated cases requiring special treatment. Dr Janet Campbell's statement of the position and claims of the maternity home (as instituted in New Zealand) is very convincing—it is obvious that the number of workmen's homes where the minimum of appropriate accommodation for confinement can be provided is extremely few—and there is not less need for hospital treatment.

'The supply of Maternity Hospitals and Wards,' says the Women's Cooperative Guild, 'is totally insufficient, and causes great suffering to women. In many places Poor Law Infirmaries are the only provision for maternity cases; and self-respecting women have the greatest aversion to entering them, and will not do so, unless obliged. It is imperative that adequate hospital accommodation for complicated cases should be brought into existence. A careful survey of the present accommodation should be made; and, where there is deficiency, provision must be made, and so distributed as to cover all districts. Maternity Hospitals would provide opportunities for the research work which is so badly needed, and would increase the training centres for doctors and midwives.'

#### *Maternity Benefit or Pension.*

The National Insurance Act, 1911, included among its benefits payment in the case of the confinement of the wife of an insured person, or any woman who is herself an insured person, a sum of thirty shillings ('maternity benefit') to be paid in cash or otherwise by the approved society of which she is a member, or if she is not a member by the Insurance Committee. In 1915 the number of persons who received the grant was 731,687. Much discussion has arisen as to the use or abuse of this benefit, which is cash only and does not include attendance of doctor or midwife. No doubt some of it goes towards

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\* The Maternity Hospital at Plymouth is an admirable example of what can be done in this direction.



the fees of doctor or midwife, some towards domestic expenses incurred and assistance rendered in connexion with child-birth, while some is spent on ordinary household or personal expenditure, or is squandered. There is reason to believe that some of the recent improvement in the care of the lying-in woman has been due to the benefit, though the expenditure incurred by a confinement is not covered by 30s. Much more serious matters have arisen in connexion with the administration of the Act regarding maternity benefit. It is uncertain in its application to various classes of women; and the approved societies have varying standards, rules and methods, administered by male officials. There is also the intermittency of women's employment and consequent insurance, and the 'misconduct' rule of certain societies in regard to the pregnant single woman. On these and other grounds there is a good deal of dissatisfaction, which must be removed before full advantage is obtained from the benefit.

Various modified forms of benefit or bonus for maternity are being advocated. Judge Neil of Chicago, who has recently been in this country, has explained how a scheme of State pensions for mothers is carried out in Illinois and some thirty other States. The applicant with children under fourteen years of age goes before the Juvenile Court and, proving her need of financial assistance for their maintenance, claims a State pension. Once a month she reports to the Court, and she is kept under supervision by inspection. She must devote herself wholly to the care of the children; and, if she abuses the trust, she loses both pension and children. It is reported that only some 2 per cent. prove incorrigible.

Another method is for the State to make a grant of 5*l.* to every mother at child-birth, as in Australia, deducting from it necessary payments for midwifery and medical and nursing attendance. There lies before us, as we write, a proposal of this kind by a responsible English consultant gynecologist. He recommends that the State should offer 5*l.* to every expectant mother on the following terms: that she registers her condition, engages a qualified midwife or doctor at an early date of pregnancy, and submits to periodical examination before confinement. At the birth of the child she pays 20*s.* or 25*s.* to

the midwife, and the necessary fee for medical aid when required. During the puerperium and until the baby is one year old the mother is required to attend an infant or maternity clinic and follow the advice given, for which she pays another 20s. Provided she fulfils the terms required by the State, she should retain the balance of the 5*l.* (normally 3*l.*). This scheme possesses certain advantages, but it is open to obvious criticism. However the details be settled, a wide-spread demand is now being made for financial assistance to meet expenditure incurred at child-birth or for relief from wage-earning immediately before and after. The recent Trade Union Congress resolved to

‘support the principle underlying the scheme for mothers’ pensions now in operation in thirty of the States of North America, which recognises the valued services rendered to the community by mothers who tend and cherish their children in the home; it urges that a scheme on similar lines be established in this country, so that no mother who worthily discharges this great service should be brought under the operation of the Poor Law, or prevented by economic stress from discharging it adequately and well.’

### *Conclusion.*

We have now stated in its simplest form the problem, social and medical, of maternity. We have similarly presented, in brevity, the main lines of its solution. The issue is the encouragement rather than discouragement of child-birth, which at present entails a vast amount of avoidable social misery and preventible suffering coupled with a gratuitous and excessive loss of life. The solution is to be found in healthy and well-informed mothers, whose maternal function—pre-natal, natal and post-natal—shall be protected, and whose lives shall be safeguarded. These great ends may be secured for millions of mothers, to the inestimable advantage of the nation, by providing for the health and education of the growing girl, and the proper attention to the mother at child-birth by means of improved facilities in regard to midwifery, medical attendance and maternity benefit.

There are, however, two lions in the path. The first is the lion of lethargy—uninformed public opinion and lack of what Lord Salisbury used to call 'public impulse.' The second is the many-headed lion of competing authorities and chaotic administration. The enlightenment of the public mind is steadily going forward. The admirable services of voluntary agencies supported by such men as Mr Broadbent of Huddersfield and Mr Arthur Acland, assisted by a splendid regiment of women, the public press, the advocacy of Mr Samuel, Mr Long and Lord Rhondda at the Local Government Board, and Mr Pease (now Lord Gainford) and Mr Fisher at the Board of Education, the permeating influence of the National Insurance Scheme which has made its way into millions of homes, the 'national baby week' movement, and above all the emphasis given to these matters by the devastation of the war—all these influences enlighten the public and create an impulse and in the highest form an inspiration.

The need for unification or, at least, coordination of the various central and local authorities is even more pressing. In the previous pages we have been introduced to the confusion and overlapping which exist. A child is usually born apparently under the ægis of His Majesty's Privy Council and the National Insurance Commission; its infancy comes under the Local Government Board; its days of babyhood are neglected by the State as non-existent; its school days fall beneath the wing of the President of the Board of Education; at puberty it is again forgotten by a State which never professed a knowledge of physiology; the health, housing, food supply, and employment of the adolescent come within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commission, the Local Government Board, the Board of Education, the Board of Agriculture, and the Home Office; and in adult life the whole gamut of central departments may have a finger in the pie. Nor is the chaos less remarkable if we restrict ourselves to maternity only. There, too, the Privy Council, the Board of Education, the Local Government Board, the Home Office, and the Insurance Commission have their say; and, all through and all the time, public-spirited men and women, as individuals or in voluntary societies, fill up the amazing gaps in babyhood

and puberty, and render invaluable service to the child-bearing mother.

The fact is, there is no escape from the existing chaos but the establishment of a Ministry of Health, co-ordinating not only Maternity Service but all health work, and providing guidance and inspiration for local authorities. For the overlapping is not confined to Whitehall; it occurs likewise in every local area in the country from John o' Groats to Land's End. Maternity and infant welfare are the business of the local sanitary authority, the local education authority, the local insurance committee, the local poor law union, and a series of local bodies and associations for midwifery, health visitation, and so forth. This anomalous, complex and duplicated system, or lack of system, leads to untold waste, confusion and inefficiency. If, as Sir Edwin Chadwick said, 'a people's health, as a source of a people's strength, is a proper subject of regard by a constitutional government,' it seems high time that these undesirable and ineffective conditions should end. Nor can it be wisely postponed until after the war. For the war itself has not only accentuated the pre-war complications, but has added to them. Now we have to think of new questions, of housing and food supply, of the prevention of epidemics following on demobilisation, of tuberculosis and syphilis in the army, of disabled soldiers, and of the coming shortage of doctors—problems affecting not only these Islands, but those great Dependencies and Dominions of Britain over the sea, which look to her for guidance, cooperation and inspiration. And always and everywhere the burden of neglected maternity lies in the background, with its costly and daily sacrifice of women and its yearly toll of dead children. We trust that the convincing appeal of Mr Waldorf Astor, in 'The Health of the People: A New National Policy,' and the insistent speeches of Lord Rhondda in behalf of unification of the public services of health and maternity will reach the ear of the Prime Minister, on whom, in this respect as in others, 'the ends of the earth have come.'

## Art. 12.—THE BAGDAD RAILWAY NEGOTIATIONS.

In an article in the 'Quarterly Review' of January 1917 the two main trends of thought running through German war literature on the Near and Middle East are clearly set forth; 'the first is occupied with the subject of a Central European agglomerate stretching from the Baltic and the North Sea to Constantinople, and thence dominating Asia to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf; the second dwells on the use of this agglomerate as a wedge to split the British Empire.' In the numerous extracts quoted from recent German publications it is shown how commercial penetration in Turkey, where German trade increased tenfold between 1889 and 1912, is in future to be solicitously fostered as a means to political ascendancy; how the road from Berlin to the Persian Gulf is considered the vital nerve in German economic life and German policy; how the phrase 'Ostend-Bagdad' implies the undermining of Britain's command of the seas by means of a land route; how the way is to be opened to Egypt and Persia, and through the Persian Gulf—where England's supremacy and the *Pax Britannica* must be broken—to the Indian Ocean and the lands around it.

An old saying points the unwisdom of spreading the net in sight of the bird; if these professions of policy should appear in the German interest premature, they have certainly served to emphasise the paramount British interest of opposing to the uttermost the *Drang nach Osten*. It is indeed well put that, should the Prussian system secure its hold across the great land mass of the globe, from Denmark to Arabia, there would soon be no vital issue, whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa, that would not be decided from Berlin. After all that has been said and written in Germany on war aims—Turkey to be the pivotal point of Prussian world-power and future dominion; Antwerp to be surrendered as the gateway of German expansion; a reconstituted Poland under German authority; the Chancellor's own avowal, on the eve of war, of the intended annexation of the French colonies—clearly the possibility of satisfying the ambitions of Imperial Germany can no longer enter into our calculations. No reasonable give-and-take settlement can be lasting or expedient with a great Military Power.

if it be set upon using every point of vantage gained as a means of threatening or undermining its neighbours.

We are not concerned in the present article with such larger aspects of foreign policy ; nor are we inclined to discuss here whether in the years before the war it would have been wiser, or indeed possible, to abstain from further efforts to reach a general settlement with Germany by friendly negotiation. Our immediate object is a narrower one ; it is confined to tracing the development of railway interests in Turkey and, in the light of that development and of available information, seeking to restore the perspective and focus the situation in which the later negotiations concerning the Bagdad Railway and cognate questions took place, and ultimately resulted in a draft agreement.

Historically the development of railway enterprise in the Ottoman Empire may be dealt with in three periods, the first terminating in 1888 ; the second in 1903 ; and the last in June 1914.

In European Turkey, railway enterprise was at first promoted, though by no means on the most approved conditions, by the late Baron Hirsch, who obtained a concession from the Sultan in 1867, and constituted the Oriental Railway Company. The principal sections of this Company's system were those establishing communication between Constantinople and the Bulgarian frontier and between Salonica and Mitrovitza. For some years the Company was under French influence ; but the participation of Austrian capital and the close relations of Baron Hirsch with the Vienna Cabinet subsequently gave the undertaking an increasingly Austrian character until, at a much later period, the Deutsche Bank, acting through a Swiss institution, acquired the greater portion of Baron Hirsch's holdings in the concern.

In Asiatic Turkey, such railway enterprises as existed were at the outset entirely in British hands. The Smyrna-Aidin, the Smyrna-Cassaba, and the Mersina-Adana lines were all built by British capital and with British material, and remained at first under British management, while the line from Haidar Pasha to Ismidt, after an attempt at direct administration by the Ottoman Government had broken down, was leased for some years to a syndicate



presided over by a British subject. The railways in Asia Minor originally undertaken by Englishmen were built in the hope and belief that early and remunerative traffic would be secured; and though, as in the case of the Smyrna-Aidin Company—the oldest line in Turkey and one which, ever since its inauguration by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in 1858, has remained under British management—bold plans were formed for the future, the general idea was rather to push forward gradually, and only as the necessity and profit of extension became clearly apparent. Some direct financial assistance was indeed sought from the Sublime Porte, but hopes of profit depended for the most part upon the successful development of traffic in fertile districts.

As regards more ambitious schemes, during several decades prior to the inception of the German scheme for building the Bagdad Railway, proposals to construct by British capital and enterprise a railway through the Euphrates Valley, connecting the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, were discussed in the British press, in Parliament, and at public meetings. So early as 1856 the 'Euphrates Valley Railway Company' was formed for the purpose; and among the benefits expected from the project were the more rapid transmission of passengers, troops, and mails, and, together with much benefit to the regions traversed, great commercial advantages to Great Britain and India on the route opened up. General Chesney, who, at the instance of the British Government, had commanded the Euphrates Survey Expedition of 1835, was appointed consulting engineer and representative of the company at Constantinople, and succeeded in 1857, through the invigorating impulse of Lord Stratford's strenuous and compelling personality, in obtaining a general concession for the construction of a railway between Suedia, opposite Cyprus, and Basra, on the Shatt-el-Arab. The Ottoman Government undertook to guarantee 6 per cent. on the capital necessary for the first section as far as the Euphrates, and to grant other privileges; but these terms were not then sufficiently attractive to induce capitalists to invest in a distant undertaking, and the support of the British Government was sought in the form of a counter-guarantee for a period of twenty-five years.

This financial assistance the Government did not feel justified in giving. The scheme received a further check from the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869; but it was nevertheless kept alive by those interested, and in 1871-72 a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed 'to examine and report upon the whole subject of railway communication between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf.' The report was to the effect that no insuperable obstacle existed in the way of the construction of a railway from some suitable port on the Mediterranean to some other suitable port near the head of the Persian Gulf, but that there seemed no probability of the line being constructed by private enterprise, without a British Government guarantee, for it was plain from the evidence given that the railway could not at first pay its way as a commercial undertaking. Neither the Imperial nor the Indian Government proved willing to give a guarantee, and no action was taken upon the Committee's report. There is, nevertheless, foundation for the belief that Lord Beaconsfield clearly recognised the dominating importance of this ancient trade route; indeed the occupation of Cyprus was not wholly unassociated, in his constructive mind, with the project of a railway from the Gulf of Alexandria to the port of Basra; and, at the time of the Congress of Berlin, he actually instructed Major (afterwards Sir John) Ardagh to trace on a map the alignment of this railway. Possibly if Lord Beaconsfield's Administration had remained in power some of the profits on the Suez Canal shares might have been applied as financial guarantees for this enterprise.

Parenthetically it may here be remarked that although in 1857 the Ottoman Government had been willing to support a line from Suedia to Basra, it is doubtful, owing to strategical and political reasons, whether at later periods they would have welcomed any railway from the Mediterranean to Bagdad until direct communication between Constantinople and Aleppo had first been established. In 1892, however, Mr. G. N. (now Lord) Curzon observed in a published work :

' . . . I do not see how such a line, running through such a region, could possibly be expected to pay; and I should

indeed be loth to incur the responsibility of advising any Government to saddle itself with even a limited guarantee. . . . In the very fact that neither the attention which it then excited nor the voluminous literature to which it gave birth has saved it from an almost complete extinction, might be discovered an inferential argument against this scheme. Its superficial attractions, judiciously dressed up in the garb of patriotism, were such as to allure many minds; and I confess to having felt, without having ever succumbed to, the fascination.'

While the British project was thus being consigned by a prominent authority to 'an almost complete extinction,' other schemes, as will presently be observed, had already entered upon a fascinating development.

'German imagination,' so it has been said, 'never ceased to dream of the *Morgenland* since the epic of Barbarossa's crusade, and the legendary disappearance of that great figure of Teutonic battle and romance in the Cilician stream.'\* Be this as it may, so early as 1841 the future Field-Marshal von Moltke, while on an official mission in Turkey, drew attention to the importance of the country from the point of view of German interests and advocated the establishment of a German principality in Palestine†; in 1848 the economist Roscher indicated Asia Minor as the eventual portion of Germany in the spoils of Turkey; while another writer of the same period, Rodbertus, looked forward to the time when German soldiers would be on the shores of the Bosphorus, and Turkey would be under German dominance. Nevertheless it was some years before these aspirations began to develop in any material form, and public interest in Germany on a practical basis was only gradually attracted. But from 1885 onward German writers dwelt with increasing attention upon the advantages offered by Turkey, especially Syria, Assyria, and Asia Minor, as a promising field of colonisation. 'This is the only country in the world which has not yet been seized upon by a Great Power,' wrote Dr Sprenger in 1886; 'if Germany does not miss her opportunity and takes it before the Cossacks

\* 'The Focus of Asiatic Policy' by X. 'National Review,' June 1901.

† Helmuth von Moltke: 'Deutschland und Palästina,' Schriften, vol. II, pp. 279-288. Berlin: Mittler, 1892.

extend their grasp, then she will have secured, in the division of the world, the best share. Here are no virgin forests to fell, no natural difficulties to surmount; simply scratch the soil, scatter the seed, and reap the harvest.'

It was in the autumn of 1888, when the completion in Europe of the Oriental Railway system had placed Germany in direct railway communication with the Bosphorus, that Turkish securities began to find a ready market at Berlin, and this was ascribed to the interest awakened in certain financial operations at Constantinople. Here a M. Kaulla, acting on behalf of the Württembergische Vereinsbank and the Deutsche Bank, and in association with a London group of financiers, obtained at this time certain valuable railway concessions. They consisted in the right to administer the existing line of 57 miles from Haidar-Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Ismidt; to extend that line for 300 miles to Angora; and to retain the whole undertaking, with substantial financial guarantees from the Ottoman Government, for a period of ninety-nine years. Preferential rights for eventual extensions beyond Angora were conceded to M. Kaulla at the same time. This concession, though intrinsically not a very extensive one, was to prove a turning point in the whole situation; for all practical purposes it was the initial step in the Bagdad Railway scheme, as it also was in the gradual permeation of most existing Turkish railway undertakings by German influence. Such being the case, what were the complicated conditions, the congeries of elements, which resulted in 1888 in the success of the Kaulla syndicate?

In 1888 Sir William White, one of the most energetic Ambassadors this country has ever had and certainly one who enjoyed exceptional sources of political information, represented Great Britain at Constantinople. About 1887 he had observed that more than thirty years had then elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, and eight British Ambassadors had been in Turkey since that event; that the importance of the railway question had been felt all along without obtaining any practical result; that British railway enterprise in Turkey had hitherto been *planlos* in its lines of development; and that future historians, no doubt, would wonder how so few important results were accomplished after the

conclusion of the Crimean War, when British interest in the East was still fresh, and our influence paramount and shared only with France. There were no doubt a number of causes which contributed to the failure of British enterprise to embark upon any large scheme of railway development in Turkey in the period referred to; some of them remained operative at a much later period and afforded opportunities adapted to German methods.

Firstly, there was the increasingly parlous state of Turkey's finances. From 1860 to 1874 she raised almost annually a fresh loan to meet the interest on preceding ones; in 1875 she defaulted, and it was only in 1881 that she was induced to compound with her creditors. Numerous bondholders in the United Kingdom were hit, confidence was undermined, and, with a wide field of enterprise elsewhere, as in South America and Canada where in the eighties the wheat requirements of the world gave great impetus to railway construction, British capital found ample and more inviting outlets.

Secondly, political conditions, though favourable to British enterprise in Turkey during the sixties and early seventies, for various reasons arising from events in the Near East and in Egypt, underwent a growing change for the worse in later years. It was then that the British press was full of denunciations of Ottoman misrule; thus Turkish sympathies were increasingly alienated, while the tendency of the British investor to go elsewhere was also stimulated.

Thirdly, the disinclination of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, notwithstanding his alleged propitious disposition, to grant railway concessions was a formidable obstacle during the first part of his reign. At any rate it was found expedient to overcome His Majesty's hesitation by a novel mode of procedure; and, in pressing such projects upon his attention, it became habitual if not essential to accompany them with an offer of a sum of ready money to be advanced to the Imperial Treasury as an equivalent for real or ideal advantages to be secured by the desired concession. The principal cause of the success of M. Kaulla in securing his railway concessions in 1888 was thus held to consist in the fact that, during an unusually acute and painful financial crisis, the German syndicate offered to Turkey on relatively favourable

terms a well-secured loan of T.1,500,000*l*. It seemed doubtful to competent observers at the time, whether any purely English railway syndicate would have been prepared to enter into loan transactions of the kind.

Fourthly, there was undoubtedly some lack of foresight and, above all, inadequate organisation and co-ordination of British interests on this occasion. A British subject, Colonel Alt, one of the lessees of the existing Haidar-Pasha-Ismidt line, was indeed desirous of securing the concession for an extension to Angora; but he had not impressed the Sublime Porte by the manner in which he had administered the Ismidt line, nor did he produce convincing evidence to the Turks of the financial resources which he represented; he also failed to advance opportunely the operative inducement of a large loan. On the other hand, M. Kaulla was associated with other British interests, and the prospects of this consortium appeared from the first more promising. It had moreover been agreed by M. Kaulla and his London friends that British and German participation in the concessions, if secured, should be equal. At that period cooperation with Germany was not deemed undesirable on political grounds, though in this instance it was not, for reasons of local expediency, openly avowed at Constantinople before the concessions were obtained. Sir W. White laid stress throughout upon the importance of continued British participation: but apparently some hitch eventually arose between M. Kaulla and his British associates; no adequate precautions had been adopted by the parties interested to secure or to render permanent the British participation, and the whole capital was ultimately subscribed in Germany.

Lastly, there never was in the United Kingdom anything approaching the fusion of the banking and industrial interests which gradually came about in Germany, where any promising scheme abroad or at home could be examined by an institution combining the financial power, the machinery of investigation and research, and the industrial connexions amply sufficient to carry out any contract, however large. This tendency of German banking began to manifest itself from 1871, though the concentrated banking organisation of to-day may perhaps be said to date from somewhat later, when the unit



began gradually to disappear and there sprang up in its place a system of groups of banks strongly controlled by some five or six institutions, working on the whole in harmony with each other and always in unison with the policy of the German Government. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of such an organisation on wider grounds, it undoubtedly afforded a most powerful means for the promotion and retention of German concessions in Turkey, where certain important German banks have made a feature not only of promoting, but of themselves participating and remaining permanent shareholders in, industrial concerns.

It appears to us indeed that, apart both from political considerations in Turkey and other factors already indicated, which had an important influence, the initial success of the Germans in 1888 and its subsequent development are to be ascribed very largely to their banking and industrial organisation, to the application of that organisation to the peculiar conditions of Turkish finance, to the German practice of subordinating individual to collective effort in every department, and to the consequent facility with which powerful Government support could be afforded to any given enterprise without the risk of collision with competing German enterprises in the same field. There has been the closest cooperation between the German banks and the German Government; but it should not be overlooked that such cooperation is politically only possible if the banks are prepared to surrender some of their freedom of action.

The second period—1888 to 1903—was the crucial one in the history of the Bagdad Railway question. It was then that Germany secured the concessions for the whole undertaking and concluded the decisive agreements with the Ottoman Government. The basis of the German enterprise, the right to build to Bagdad, was foreshadowed in the agreement of 1893 and secured by that of 1899, which also provided for an extension to Basra; and the convention of 1902 and the definitive one of March 1903, included important additional privileges. The Germans were thenceforth *beati possidentes*. Being so, in all subsequent negotiations they held the trump card; and, failing the impediment of some insuperable

financial difficulty, it was wholly unlikely that they could be induced by negotiation to admit British or any other non-German participation on terms involving the abandonment of German control. Stress is laid upon this governing factor of possession, for due appreciation of it is essential to any unbiassed judgment regarding the Bagdad Railway question in the final period.

The British attitude towards the development of this question was necessarily influenced by our general political relations with the Great Powers; and it is not possible to form an accurate idea of the problems and difficulties which confronted British diplomacy in regard to German railway aspirations in Turkey all through the critical second period without taking into account the many points of friction which then existed with other Powers in different parts of the world. The German concession of 1893, which was secured in spite of important existing British railway interests in Asia Minor, was obtained at a moment when German diplomatic support was literally indispensable to us for administrative progress in Egypt; the crowning concession of 1899 was granted when attention was riveted upon Nicholson's Nek and the siege of Ladysmith, and the danger of European complications formed a constant preoccupation. The political constellation at the beginning of the period under review was indeed far different from that which existed in the years preceding the outbreak of the present war. In January 1889 Prince Bismarck said in the Reichstag:

'I regard England as our old and traditional ally, with whom we have no conflicts of interest. When I say "ally," I use the word in its diplomatic sense; we have no treaty with England; but I wish to preserve, even in colonial questions, the contact with England which we have had now for at least 150 years. And, if I were persuaded that we might lose it, I should be wary, and try to prevent that happening.'\*

In point of fact, between 1884 and 1887—the time of *Flaggenhissen und Vertragschliessen* in Africa, as Bismarck termed it—the British Government had already

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\* 'Reichsanzeiger,' Jan. 28, 1889 (Erste Beilage). Also 'Stenographische Berichte,' 1888-89, vol. i, p. 619.

had a preliminary experience of German hostility disguised as injured innocence; but relations were not then durably disturbed, and, when Heligoland was ceded by Lord Salisbury's Government in 1890, the German Government gave, it is believed, an assurance of general support of British policy. By the middle of the period under review, however, our relations with the German Government were assuredly no longer so close as Prince Bismarck professedly believed them to be in 1889, while relations with other Powers showed as yet no marked improvement. We were indeed passing through the era of 'splendid isolation,' and a competent authority thus summarised the situation in October 1896:

'With the exception of Italy—whose position has been seriously weakened by her losses in men, money and prestige in Abyssinia—we have no avowed friend in the councils of Europe. France and Russia are allied and unfriendly to us. An anti-English feeling has developed in Germany, and has to some extent been echoed in Austria. The South African Republic is arming and legislating against us, and, at least unofficially, repudiates our suzerainty. The Congo State and France are hurrying towards the Upper Nile; French and Russian influence is predominant in Abyssinia; and the connexion between Egypt and Uganda may at any moment be menaced.'

Germany did not fail to take advantage of England's embarrassments. Bismarck was indeed unwilling to embark upon a policy of political adventure in the Near East; but, with British influence at Constantinople on the wane, he was ready and able to secure the goodwill of the Sublime Porte for the purpose of promoting German commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire. When the present Emperor came to the throne, German policy at once became more active; and His Majesty paid his first visit to Constantinople in 1889. So successful were the personal relations thus formed that a few years later, in 1893, the Sultan was induced to make a direct appeal to the Emperor to use his influence to promote the establishment by German agency of railway communication between Angora and Bagdad; and in 1898, two years after the Armenian massacres, William II, as the friend of the Padishah, again visited Constantinople

and, going on to the Holy Land, proclaimed himself the protector of Turkey and the Moslem world.

Looking back at authoritative British opinion about the year 1888, it was held to be an essentially British interest that railway communication should be established throughout Asia Minor; that such communication should so far as possible be promoted by British enterprise; that any railway undertaking to be encouraged should be sound financially and not require any material support whatever from the British Government; and that, generally speaking, reliance should rather be placed upon the prospect of normal and gradual development of traffic than upon precarious financial assistance from the Ottoman Government. As to railway connexion with the Persian Gulf, there was a division of expert opinion. It appears to have been generally held that sooner or later it would be established; but one section of opinion, including Sir W. White, held that our main interest lay in a railway built under British auspices, joining the port of Alexandretta with some port on the Persian Gulf and taking in the intervening points of most importance; while another influential section of opinion deprecated the construction of any such line, on the threefold ground that it would tend to create rival interests in Mesopotamia; that there appeared to be no early likelihood of alien concessionnaires constructing the line—a view which was indeed clung to by many authorities till a very much later period; and that British interests in those regions would in any case be adequately protected by a firm policy on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

Early in 1889 M. Kaulla constituted the Anatolian Railway Company to carry out the concessions in Asia Minor which he had obtained in the preceding year, and the work of construction to Angora was completed in 1892. The thoroughness and rapidity of construction soon led, but not without the added inducement of another much-needed loan, to a further German success: in February 1893 M. Kaulla received concessions for a twofold extension, the first from the railhead at Angora to the town of Cæsarea, the second from Eski-Shehr—a point about midway on the existing line connecting Haidar-Pasha with Angora—to Konia, the ancient

Iconium. The concession for a line to Cæsarea carried with it an obligation on the part of the recipient to prolong the line eventually from that point to Bagdad, but some years later the proposed line to Cæsarea and the idea of an extension thence to Bagdad were abandoned.

The projected extension to Konia threatened to cut off two existing lines, the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, from their back-country. Both these undertakings had originally been British, but impartial though competent observers had not failed to foresee and to indicate the dangers which threatened their position and prospects as such, and to urge that all differences between them should be sunk and an amalgamation of the two lines effected. This advice, which was based upon a belief that united they would be better able to resist external pressure, did not commend itself to their respective administrators. Early in 1893 the Ottoman Government exercised their right of repurchasing the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway; and the concession was granted to a Franco-Belgian Syndicate in 1894, together with the right of making an extension up to the Anatolian Railway's line at Afum-Karahissar. Finally, in 1899, the Germans acquired a controlling interest in the Smyrna-Cassaba Company. The Smyrna-Aidin Railway, on the other hand, remained, as already indicated, British in administration down to the outbreak of the present war; and it generally had the reputation of being as well-built and well-conducted a line as any outside the United Kingdom. Moreover—and this was a unique phenomenon in Turkish railway enterprise—it received little financial assistance from the Ottoman Government at any time, and none at all after the first few years. By 1893 the line had already been extended to Dinair; and hopes of ultimately reaching Konia, to say nothing of bolder plans in a more distant future, were entertained.

When, in 1893, the project of an extension of the Anatolian Railway to Konia was in contemplation, the British Ambassador, having regard to the interests of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway—which after all was an existing enterprise whose larger prospects of development were threatened with ruin by the proposed German extension—very properly urged that there should be

sufficient delay, before the grant of a definite concession by the Ottoman Government, for the several interests involved to be duly examined and, if possible, reconciled. The conduct of the German Government hereupon was impressive. Count Leyden, the German Consul-General at Cairo, intimated to Lord Cromer that his Government had been prepared to agree to certain essential administrative changes in Egypt, but that he was now instructed to withhold their consent, and to add that this decision was due to the attitude of the British Government towards German railway schemes in Asia Minor and that, in these circumstances, the British authorities were no longer to count upon German aid towards carrying out their plans in Egypt. The full significance of this threat may be gauged in the light of the following passage quoted from Lord Milner's work, 'England in Egypt,' published in 1892:

'Almost all European nations have interests in the Nile Valley, and these interests are entrenched in a manner which has no parallel elsewhere. We have seen that many acts of government cannot be performed in Egypt without the concurrence of the European Powers. It is not too much to say that the work of England in that country, however excellent, could not go on if the Powers in general were opposed to it.'

The *mise en demeure* of the German Government at Cairo was the more abrupt in that it was taken without any prior attempt to ascertain from official British sources in Constantinople or in London precisely what action the British Ambassador had taken. No doubt the British Government were keenly moved by the German *démarche*, and, it was understood at the time, did not fail to impress their sense of resentment at Berlin; whereupon the German Government modified their Egyptian attitude. But the German extension to Konia was granted; and the efforts of the British Ambassador on behalf of the Smyrna-Aidin Company, which possessed no definite contractual rights to extend to Konia, were, indeed, foredoomed to almost certain failure even without the German threat at Cairo. It is true that Smyrna, in view of its harbour facilities and geographical position, was, as against Constantinople, the natural outlet for



produce from Konia; but there were at the Sublime Porte important political and strategical considerations which militated against the extension of the Smyrna lines to Konia and beyond. The Sultan's object was not to favour railway communication between that region and Smyrna, but, on the contrary, to see the Asia Minor trunk-lines converging on Constantinople, and to have such lines built for strategical purposes and also for attracting to the Bosphorus the agricultural and other produce of that part of the Imperial dominions.

The German concessions of 1893 were based upon the security of heavy kilometric guarantees, computed at an annual value of several hundred thousands of pounds. As the Imperial budget already showed a deficit of over 500,000*l.* for the current year, misgivings were felt by expert authorities as to the ability of the Turkish Treasury to support the weight of the obligations thus assumed. While the development of the resources of the Empire and the promotion of its prosperity by the establishment of railways on sound principles would admittedly have been to the advantage of the bondholders, the kilometric guarantees were so graded that they seemed to create a premium on bad working of the lines, and afforded no apparent inducement for the development of traffic beyond a fixed limit. At that time German financial interests, other than those in railways, scarcely existed in Turkey; and the great mass of Turkish bondholders were English and French. The British delegate on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration did not fail to utter a note of warning as to the serious danger to the Turkish Treasury, and therefore to the security of the bondholders whom he represented, involved in these railway-promoting operations, with the result that an inspired article appeared in the 'Cologne Gazette' attacking him on account of the hesitation he justifiably entertained, and even threatening measures of retaliation against British interests elsewhere.

A series of bad harvests marked the years succeeding the granting of the German concessions in 1893, and combined with the general fall in the price of agricultural produce to increase the burden on the Turkish Treasury, which in 1895 had to find a quarter of a million sterling to meet guarantees on behalf of the Anatolian Railway

alone. The German banks still held a large number of unissued bonds, which had not yet found a market; and the miserable traffic earnings shown by the published accounts of the Anatolian Railway were such as to discourage investment in the concern. These conditions undoubtedly led many recognised financial authorities to anticipate that the existing Turkish liabilities might become too great and involve repudiation, and to believe that, at any rate, there would be no important early extension of the railway system in Asiatic Turkey beyond Konia, which was reached in 1896.

Thus the mistaken impression was encouraged that a railway extension to Bagdad and beyond was not a serious financial proposition for a long period of time; and, although the revenue of both the Konia and Angora lines showed remarkable expansion after 1896, while the burden on the Ottoman Government was correspondingly reduced, and the country was materially benefited by the increased prosperity of the provinces opened up, still it was generally argued that these lines tapped some of the richest parts of Asia Minor and that similar results could not be derived from a line crossing the arid wastes of the upper Euphrates and Tigris basin. Not a few writers accordingly found comfort in the persuasion that, without an increase in the Turkish customs duties, for which British assent would admittedly be necessary, it would not be practicable for the Turkish Treasury, in its chronic state of penury, to provide the substantial revenue which would be required as a guarantee for the Bagdad Railway to be built and worked; and, so late as April 1903, some over-confident British publicists exalted this view to an article of faith.

All through the Armenian horrors of 1896 and 1897 Germany had remained studiously indifferent to any international obligations to promote reforms in Asia Minor; she had favoured Turkey in the settlement after the Greek war of 1897; she had laid down her flute in Crete. Finally, while Abdul Hamid was still boycotted by the civilised world, in the autumn of 1898 William II made an Imperial progress to Constantinople and Syria. On the other hand, Lord Salisbury never wavered in his opposition to the Sultan's system of rule in Asiatic Turkey; and he succeeded in the autumn of 1896 in

obtaining the consent of the Emperor of Russia to the employment of coercion for the introduction of administrative reforms, although, for reasons outside the scope of the present article, force was not ultimately resorted to. All this was sufficiently known to the Sultan, who of course was likewise aware of Lord Salisbury's successful resistance to the representations of the German Government that the Turkish occupation of Thessaly should be permitted to continue until the Greek war indemnity had been paid.\*

During the German Emperor's visit to Constantinople in 1898 the proposal to construct a line to Bagdad again came into notice; and throughout 1899 attempts were made by German interests to obtain the concession for a line to the Persian Gulf. The Ottoman Government were divided in opinion, and strong opposition was manifested at first to placing the line in German hands. But the German banks had been engaged for many years in cementing close relations with the Turkish Exchequer by doling out those advances of which the impecunious Turk stood in continual need; and eventually, by special favour of the Sultan and a lavish expenditure of money at the Palace, the desired Iradé was secured and a convention signed in December 1899. For strategical reasons the Sultan had at first favoured approach to Bagdad along what was called the 'northern variant,' from Angora viâ Sivas to Mosul; but formidable engineering difficulties afforded the Germans an ostensible motive for rejecting this route and extending along the 'southern variant' from Konia. The real reason for this preference was political, for at that period Germany could not risk estrangement from Russia; and Russian suspicion of German designs in Asiatic Turkey was never absent. It may be concluded that the German Government had a very clear indication of the objections entertained by Russia to the northern variant before the Turco-German railway agreement of December 1899 was reached. Four months later the Russo-Turkish 'Black Sea Basin agreement' was concluded, definitely securing to Russian enterprise all railway construction in Northern Asia Minor. So much for the attitude of Russia. As to that

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\* See 'Turkey, No. 2 (1898)' [Cd. 8851], pp. 230, 231.

of France, while some French financiers did not abstain from participation, the Government consistently refused, pending an agreement equitable to the interests of all the Powers, to allow a quotation on the Paris Bourse of any issue relating to the Bagdad Railway.

The attitude of the British Government, in presence of the German concession of 1899, was to resist any encroachment by Turkey or any other foreign Power tending to disturb the political *status quo* on the shores of the Persian Gulf. In pursuance of this policy various measures were adopted, and attempts on the part of Turkey to curtail the authority of the Sheikh of Koweit were frustrated not only by local action but by representations at Constantinople; moreover, the German Government were given very clearly to understand that, in so far as the increase of the Turkish customs and the eastern terminus of the line were concerned, the British Government must determine their future attitude towards the German enterprise in the light of any proposals which might be made as to British interests.

We propose to pass over the actual texts of the Turco-German agreements of December 1899 and January 1902. The first of these conceded in principle what the Germans sought, but left all details to be settled at some future date; and the concession of 1902 was eventually replaced by the definitive Bagdad Railway Convention of March 1903. After touching upon some of the leading provisions of this last instrument, we shall bring our narrative of the second period to a close with a short reference to the negotiations, which culminated in failure in April 1903, regarding British participation in the projected railway enterprise.

Under the definitive Bagdad Railway Convention (1903) the Ottoman Government granted a concession for 99 years to the Anatolian Railway Company for an extension from the Konia line to Bagdad and Basra, via Adana, Tell-Habesh, Mosul and Sadijeh. The concession included branch lines to Aleppo, to Urfa, to Khanikin on the Persian frontier, and to a point on the Persian Gulf to be settled subsequently; preferential rights were also given for branches towards Marash, Aintab, Birijik, Mardin, Erbil, Tuz Kurmati, and Hit, and for any lines connecting the main-line with the Mediterranean at

points situated between Mersina and Tripoli in Syria. Provision was also made for a branch from the main-line to Diarbekr and Kharpout, viâ the coveted copper mine of Arghana; and conditional permission was granted to work all minerals found within 20 kilometres on each side of the railway, which was to traverse important oil-bearing regions in Mesopotamia. Moreover the Company was to be allowed to establish ports on the Tigris at Bagdad, on the Shatt-el-Arab at Basra, and at the terminal point on the Persian Gulf, and to navigate the inland waterways in the service of the railway. Finally, if only the requisite specific revenues could be allocated as security, the financial provisions were most favourable to the Company and very onerous indeed upon the Ottoman Government, *alias* the taxpayer.

It will thus be seen that the Germans had the prospect of dominating railway enterprise in Asiatic Turkey, for their control would now extend altogether to nearly 3000 miles of track, to say nothing of the influence, more or less veiled, which they might ultimately expect to exercise over the Hedjaz line. As the new concession embraced mining options, terminal harbour facilities, and privileges of inland navigation, the Germans were seemingly in a fair way to acquire complete control of the traffic by water as well as by land. Moreover, the Bagdad Railway was to traverse one region of enormous potential development, where the supremacy of British-Indian trade had long been undisputed; it was to pass Kerbela and Nejef, Shiah shrines visited annually by thousands of British-Indian subjects; and it must, in the original form of the concession of 1903, have profoundly influenced the political situation on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

In 1888, and again in 1893, there may have been a lack of imagination, grasp, and constructive policy on the part of the British Government. But in 1903, when the question of British participation in the Bagdad Railway was under consideration, the Prime Minister (Mr Balfour) showed that he had the clearest perception of the German prospects of success.

'I have no doubt whatever,' he stated in the House of Commons on April 8, 1903, 'that, whatever course English financiers may take, and whatever course the English Government may pursue, sooner or later this great undertaking will

be carried out. There is no difficulty in point of money. Whether the English Government assist or do not assist, it is undoubtedly in the power of the British Government to hamper and impede and inconvenience any project of the kind; but that the project will ultimately be carried out, with or without our having a share in it, there is no question whatever. Therefore the point on which His Majesty's Government will ultimately have to decide, and which the House may safely and wisely take into consideration, is whether it is or is not desirable that, if this railway connecting the base of the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf is to be constructed, British capital and British interests should be as largely represented in it as the capital and interest of any foreign Power. That is exactly the question which will have to be considered and determined.\*

On the same occasion the Prime Minister, while recognising that the question was not without difficulty and observing that the Government intended to give the whole subject their most careful consideration, indicated three points which ought not to be lost sight of:

'Was it desirable or not that what would be the shortest route to India should be entirely in the hands of foreign, to the exclusion of British, capitalists?

'Was it desirable or not that, if there was to be a trade opening to the Persian Gulf, it should be within the territories of a Sheikh whom we had under our special protection, and with whom we had special treaties?

'The railway was to go through a very rich country; and the information of the British Government was that it was not likely to be of the financially disastrous character prophesied by one honourable member, but was rather likely after a certain period of development to add greatly to the riches of Turkey and indirectly, it might be supposed, greatly to the riches of any other country ready to take advantage of it. Was the British producer more likely to be able to take advantage of it, if English capital was largely interested, than if it was confined to foreign capital?'

The Prime Minister had already stated on the preceding day that, while no final arrangements had been arrived at, the suggestions which, it was understood, were to be made, and would be carefully considered, were

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\* 'Parliamentary Debates,' vol. cxx, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374.



'(1) that British capital and British control were to be on an absolute equality with the capital and control of any other Power; (2) that, in respect of the negotiations then going on with the Turkish Government for a new commercial treaty (and which, quite apart from the Bagdad Railway, raised the question of increasing the Turkish customs), His Majesty's Government should not object to a reasonable increase in the customs duties, although a part of the increase might be used in guaranteeing a railway so important for the commercial interests of Turkey; (3) that, if the railway should prove to be a substantially better route for conveying the mails to India, it might be so used, on terms to be agreed upon subsequently; (4) that His Majesty's Government should assist, not by money or the promise of money, but by their good offices in providing a proper terminus at or near Koweit.'\*

A fortnight later the Prime Minister announced that

'the arrangements which have lately been under the consideration of His Majesty's Government were designed to place the [Bagdad] railway, including the existing Anatolian Railway, throughout its whole length from sea to sea, under international control, and to prevent the possibility of preferential treatment for the goods or subjects of any one country. In these arrangements it was suggested, *inter alia*, that equal powers of control, construction, and management should be given to German, French, and English interests. After careful consideration of these proposals, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that they do not give to this country sufficient security for the application of the principles above referred to; and they have therefore intimated that they are unable to give the suggested assurances with regard to the policy which they might hereafter adopt as to the conveyance of the Indian mails by the projected route, as to facilities at Koweit, or as to the appropriation of a part of the Turkish customs revenue in aid of the contemplated guarantee.'†

It is certain that the final German proposals in April 1903 would not have secured for British capital and British control, over the line from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, that 'absolute equality' with the Germans which was

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\* 'Parliamentary Debates,' vol. cxx, 1247, 1248.

† Ibid., vol. cxxi, 222.

to be one indispensable condition of a compliant attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government. It is, according to all available records, unlikely that further negotiations in 1903 would have resulted in German acquiescence in any such equality; in any case it is incontestable that what the Germans would not concede in 1903, when the enterprise was *in limine*, they would have been still less willing to concede in later years when, without British cooperation, it was approaching a triumphant completion.

In 1903 numerous politicians and not a few influential writers in this country were, as we have indicated, convinced that the undertaking could not be financed without British assent to an increase of the Turkish customs duties and their appropriation as security for the railway guarantees; they were also confident that Koweit was the only practicable eastern terminus where an adequate harbour for ocean-going vessels of large draught could be established. To judge by Mr Balfour's statements in Parliament, neither of these consoling theories appears to have been entertained by the British Government. Koweit was, of course, known to possess certain advantages, but it was known to be equally lacking in others. The popular view that it was unique was apparently due to the conclusions of a technical mission which the Germans had sent to the Persian Gulf to investigate a few years before; and public opinion, fortified with the persistent reiteration of these false and soothing premises and suspicious of the extreme anxiety of the Germans to secure British cooperation, was unmistakably opposed in 1903 to the desired assurances of British compliance, in respect of Koweit and the customs increase, being given. Moreover, the avowed hostility of the German public and press, and the scarcely less hostile, though more guarded, language of German statesmen during the South African War, had exercised a profound influence in England, and, together with the recent humiliations we had experienced by cooperating with Germany in China and in Venezuela, combined to render uninviting further joint ventures with Berlin.

We have considered attentively the copious comments to which the negotiations of 1903 gave rise, with a view to ascertain whether any constructive policy was advocated as a practical alternative. The most definite, in

fact the only suggestion of this kind which we have been able to trace is that which was adumbrated in the autumn of that year by a writer of recognised authority, Sir Valentine Chirol. He appeared, indeed, confident that the Germans, while their cue was to proceed with the first part of the railway without displaying any concern about the future, would sooner or later have to face the difficulties to overcome which they had already wanted, and would still want, our help. 'When that day comes,' he proceeded, 'must our reply be an unconditional *non possumus*? By no means, if our interests are properly safeguarded—not merely our interests in the railway itself as a business undertaking, but our Imperial interests in the region which it specially affects.' His proposal, in substance, was that England should build, control, and manage the Khanikin branch and the sections of the railway in the Mesopotamian delta, where our interests centred; and that Germany and France should have the same rights on similar terms with regard to the line from Constantinople downwards, the whole line being worked on a joint traffic agreement.\*

Was this, in fact, a practical suggestion? Even if every allowance were made for Britain's established position and secular interests in Mesopotamia, we do not think the Germans, short of being driven to the last extreme of financial impotence or political embarrassment, could have accepted this solution. They had built the Anatolian line as far as Konia single-handed; it was they who had secured the whole concession from Konia to the Persian Gulf; and now it was in effect suggested that they should master the formidable barrier of the Taurus and the Amanus, and then be invited to abandon to others the completion of the enterprise, including the development of Mesopotamia with all its mineral wealth and agricultural prospects. We do not believe that any terms Great Britain could have offered in 1903 would have induced Germany to accept such a settlement as this; and, as the railway progressed, and, moreover, Germany's political and military power increased with the partial eclipse of Russia after the war with Japan, the chances of British cooperation being sought or

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\* Chirol: 'The Middle Eastern Question,' pp. 228, 229. (Murray, 1903.)

agreed to on any such terms became even more slender. Nevertheless, we recognise that this suggestion offered perhaps the basis of an alternative arrangement; and, if public opinion had been favourable to further negotiation, the British Government might possibly have secured in 1903, while the Germans were still faced with many uncertain factors, British predominance on some international basis in the construction and management of the sections indicated.

If peace had not been disturbed, our failure to reach agreement in 1903 might have been ultimately viewed as a misfortune. As it is, however, the failure of 1903 has become a source of gratification; it resulted in the Bagdad Railway not being completely carried out before the outbreak of the present war.

The character and form of the *entente* with France and the *entente* with Russia, our policy in Morocco and in Persia, and the negotiations with Germany with a view to some understanding—these have been classed as the main points upon which turns the diplomatic history of the period we are now to discuss. They are the circumstances which mark the break in the first fourteen years of the 20th century with the traditions of British policy; all are correlative; and all are necessarily the subject of acute controversy to-day. It is here that we are strongly impelled to transgress the prescribed limits of our study, and to engage upon a more comprehensive survey; but to yield to such a fascination on this occasion would be to sacrifice to diffuse and superficial review our main object and present pursuit—a scrupulously fair and impartial statement, so far as available information permits, of the Bagdad Railway negotiations which took place in London in the years preceding the war.

We have already brought our narrative down to the collapse of negotiations in April 1903; it is, unfortunately, necessary to restrict to a bare chronicle that of the eventful years between 1903 and 1911. On Oct. 25, 1904, the Konia-Eregli section of the Bagdad Railway was inaugurated with much pomp and ceremony. It was completed as far as Bulgurlu, but at that point work was discontinued, and in 1908 the terminus was still Bulgurlu. The arrest of progress was apparently due to

the state of the money market in Berlin and the absence of funds in Turkey available as security for further construction loans. In 1907 the Powers agreed to a 3 per cent. surcharge on the Turkish customs duties for a period of seven years, but on terms which involved its application to the cause of Macedonian reforms, and in effect prevented any part of the proceeds from being used to finance the Bagdad Railway or to release other funds for that purpose. The considerable delay in construction seemed almost to justify the anticipations of those who had contended that the project was incapable of fulfilment without British financial assistance. But in June 1908 another stride was made, financial arrangements being concluded by the Bagdad Railway Company and the Turkish Government, in pursuance of the provisions of the Convention of 1903, for the construction of further sections, 840 kilometres in all, which would bring the line to Aleppo and El Helif.

Then came the constitutional revolution in July 1908, and the advent to power of the Young Turkish party with its League of Union and Progress. The atmosphere of unfriendliness to Great Britain, which had been excited by Abdul Hamid and his corrupt entourage during his personal reign disappeared; the obvious sincerity of British congratulations and the position of Great Britain as a great exponent of constitutional government led the new Government of Turkey to look to Great Britain to guide her through the difficulties created by a complete reversal of the whole system of government; and simultaneously German influence, which had rested to a large extent upon the German Emperor's support of the Sultan, received a severe check, though the Bagdad Railway concession, which now came in for severe criticism, could not be disavowed, since it was held by virtue of a signed convention, that of 1903. But gradually, despite the effective support of Great Britain to Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian crisis, a reaction appears to have taken place in 1909 and 1910; and the German Government regained much of their influence in Constantinople.

The change seems to have been due to a variety of causes. On the one hand the Young Turks realised that their obvious determination to maintain the predominance of the Moslem element throughout the Empire, the

imposition of restrictions on political and personal liberty, the Adana massacres, and the prolonged retention of martial law in the capital, had led to disappointment and criticism in England; they were aggrieved by our attitude on the Cretan question; our occupation of Egypt was in conflict with the growing Nationalist policy of the Turkish Government; our refusal to grant, unconditionally, the request for the increase of 4 per cent. in the customs duties led to considerable disappointment. But perhaps the principal cause of the change of attitude was the development of a chauvinist and aggressive policy on the part of the Turkish Government, which brought them into conflict with us as regards the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf, where, for example, a palace of our *protégé* the Sheikh of Mohammerah was bombarded by them, and British commercial interests in Mesopotamia were actively obstructed. On the other hand, the steady penetration of Turkish commerce by Germany; the calculated abstention in German publications and speeches from any comment or criticism on the unconstitutional methods employed by the Turkish Government; the idea, which undoubtedly obtained, that Germany was not 'suspect' as regards Turkish territory, and that their projects in Asia Minor were commercial and not territorial; and the sale of cruisers to Turkey at a time of crisis—all these circumstances contributed powerfully, it would appear, to cause the Turks to lean towards Germany. In the result, the Bagdad Railway Co. found that no difficulties were placed in the way of carrying out their valuable concessions; work was resumed; and, by the end of 1910, extensions were proceeding rapidly both from the railhead at Bulgurlu towards Adana, and from Adana itself, and the section to the foot of the Taurus on the Bulgurlu side was nearing completion. In March 1911 the Germans concluded a further arrangement with the Turks, securing the appropriation of the available surplus of revenues, which had already been allocated for other sections of their railways, as security for the continuation of the line from El Helif to Bagdad in accordance with the Convention of 1903, and agreeing to surrender to a new Company the sections of the Bagdad Railway between Bagdad and the Gulf, but only on condition that the Bagdad Company



should participate in the new Company to an extent not less than any foreign (i.e. non-Turkish) element. This reservation, if maintained, was an absolute bar to any scheme of British predominance in the Gulf sections.

Russia now somewhat precipitately squared accounts with Germany regarding the Bagdad Railway; and this assuredly weakened the position of the French and British Governments, who, nevertheless, clearly continued to maintain a policy of cooperation in this question and to abstain from any arrangement with Germany until all three Powers could agree, as apparently was the case in June 1914. The Potsdam Agreement of 1911, which was negotiated in the autumn of 1910, bound Russia *inter alia* 'not to oppose the Bagdad Railway'—an ambiguous expression, which, not being defined in terms, was afterwards construed by Petrograd, on the strength of what had passed orally, merely as implying Russian assent to construction as far as Bagdad, and by Berlin as acquiescence in the whole Bagdad Railway Convention of March 1903.

In August 1911 Sir E. Grey announced in the House of Commons that negotiations had been in progress for some time respecting the terms upon which His Majesty's Government would agree to an increase of the Turkish customs duties; and that, incidentally, these negotiations bore on the Bagdad Railway question. He added that the British Government had recently made proposals to the Turkish Government to secure economic equality on the railway, and a definite settlement as regards the region of the Persian Gulf.\*

We think that this may be taken as a convenient starting-point from which to date the final negotiations with the Ottoman Government, although in March 1911 Sir E. Grey had already made an important speech drawing attention to certain outstanding factors, and the following extracts are essential to a due appreciation of the position:

'The time to oppose the Bagdad Railway, if it was to be opposed in British interests, was before the concession was granted. . . . The concession has not been extended, and it

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\* 'Parliamentary Debates,' vol. xxix, 939, 2081.

is within the rights of the German concessionaires and of the Turkish Government to carry out the terms of that concession as they please in Turkish territory. . . .

'We are not quite so helpless in the matter as might be gathered. . . . These railways in Turkish territory are going to cost money. The Turkish Government some years ago received consent for a limited period for a 3 per cent. increase of the customs duty. The Turkish Government have since applied for a 4 per cent. increase of the customs duty. That cannot be levied without our consent. I wish to see the new régime in Turkey strengthened. I wish to see them supplied with resources which will enable them to establish strong and just government in all parts of the Turkish Empire. I am aware money is needed for those purposes, and I would willingly ask British trade to make a sacrifice, so far as it is a sacrifice to British trade, for those purposes, but, if the money is to be used to promote railways which may be a source of doubtful advantage to British trade, and still more if the money is to be used to make railways which will take the place of means of communication which have been in the hands so far of British concessionaires, then I say it will be impossible for us to agree to that 4 per cent. increase of the customs duty until we are satisfied that British trade interests will be satisfactorily guarded. . . .

'I have been careful to emphasise that the Bagdad Railway is a German concession in Turkish territory; but, if the Bagdad Railway is to proceed further than Turkish territory, then of course our diplomatic position in the matter becomes very different from what it is so long as it remains purely in Turkish territory. We are not anxious to disturb the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf. To a great extent that *status quo* has been built up by us in previous generations. We have practically opened the Persian Gulf to trade and kept it open. That has been a matter of historical knowledge for years past. We are not anxious to have a forward policy in the Persian Gulf, to acquire new territory, or to disturb the *status quo*; but, if the *status quo* is going to be disturbed by others, then we must undoubtedly use our resources to maintain the position we have in the Persian Gulf. Part of the *status quo* is that we have entered into treaty obligations with the Sheikh of Koweit; and, in any negotiations which there may be or in any changes which may take place, it is an obligation upon us to see that our treaty obligations towards the Sheikh of Koweit in maintaining his position are fulfilled.\*

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\* 'Parliamentary Debates,' vol. xxix, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285.

We understand that the British proposals of 1911 included some arrangement for securing a measure of British control over the sections of the Bagdad Railway between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. There is evidence that, before this, the British Government had contemplated an alternative railway, under British control, along the Tigris Valley from Bagdad to the Gulf; but manifestly this proposal would have been unattractive to the Turks, since it would have diverted traffic from the projected German railway, and, *pro tanto*, have increased the burdens on the Turkish Exchequer, which had of course to make good any deficit in the gross earnings of that railway. Be this as it may, in the summer of 1912 two Turkish delegates (Djevad Bey and Reshid Bey) visited London and carried on with the British authorities tentative discussions, which were wholly fruitless, both in regard to the railway question and to the definition of the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf. Turkish encroachments were meanwhile causing increasing concern; and Turkish officials at Basra, for example, started to remove buoys which had been placed many years before by the British authorities off the entrance to the Shatt-el-Arab, and thus to interfere with navigation. Serious complications had also arisen owing to the forward policy of the Turks at various points on the Persian frontier; and the rights of the British holders of oil concessions in the region of Zohab appeared to be jeopardised. It was apparently in the late summer of 1912 that the British Government made fresh proposals, which formed the basis of the settlement reached before the outbreak of the present war.

During the last three years a number of incoherent and manifestly incorrect statements have appeared in Germany regarding the Bagdad Railway negotiations with England; Reventlow, Rohrbach, and other writers have regaled the German public with partial references to the draft settlement and misleading inferences as to its outstanding features. Various circumstantial disclosures, which clearly emanate from enemy sources, have also been made in other countries. Thus among American papers we may instance the Philadelphia 'Public Ledger,' of Oct. 22, 1916, which purported to reveal the substance of a number of articles of agreement

*seriatim*; and several carefully inspired articles have likewise been issued from time to time in the Dutch, Scandinavian, and Swiss papers. In Constantinople, where the German Embassy leased a prominent shop-window at the beginning of the war for purposes of proselytising and propaganda, a whole series of misleading and delusive pictorial displays was exhibited. In England, moreover, not a few recent utterances in the press have tended, rather by lack of precision than by positive indication, to obscure the fundamental fact that the Germans had obtained the concession, in principle, for the Bagdad Railway in 1899, and the definitive concession in 1903, and therefore to misconceive the whole character of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1913-14. Thus Sir Harry Johnston, in an article in the 'Daily Chronicle' of Sept. 6, 1917, suggests that 'our Foreign Office was prepared to conclude agreements with Germany enormously widening the sphere of her colonial action in the Turkish dominions'—an assumption for which there is no evidence.

We have been at some pains to collate the authoritative statements which were made both in Germany and in this country, as well as in Paris and Petrograd, on the subject of these complicated negotiations *before* the outbreak of war. The comparison with more recent versions of what actually took place is instructive. We believe that we have succeeded in compiling—from Parliamentary Debates in both Houses in 1911-14, from the 'North German Gazette,' from various issues of the 'Times,' including those of May 14 and 17, 1913, from articles written in the summer of 1914 by Dr Hans Plehn and other German writers whose compositions bear traces of the heavy hand of semi-official revision, and from a number of pre-war announcements in France, Russia, and Constantinople—a pretty accurate summary of events during the period of negotiation. We are also able to reproduce a map showing approximately not only railway but also navigation concessions in Asiatic Turkey, as they appeared in July 1914. Parenthetically we have been much impressed by the virtual unanimity which apparently existed in this country during 1913 and the first half of 1914 in regard to the expediency of the Bagdad Railway settlement, the essential provisions of

which were generally known; indeed, some of those organs of opinion which had been most uncompromising in their condemnation of the negotiations of 1903 now expressed a distinct measure of satisfaction.\*

When it became clear that the Germans were satisfied that the customs increase was not an indispensable condition of the ultimate completion of the line, and that they were therefore not prepared to go beyond the arrangement they had reached with Turkey in 1911 in regard to the sections from Bagdad to the Gulf, two courses were open to the British Government. They could either have adopted a *non possumus*, but in the end ineffectual, attitude of withholding indefinitely British assent to the customs increase; or they could have sought some other basis of negotiation. It was the second of these alternatives that they adopted. In the late summer of 1912 they appear to have withdrawn their request for British participation in the Gulf sections of the Bagdad Railway, and intimated their readiness to assent to the customs increase on condition that British interests should be safeguarded by a satisfactory agreement on the following points: (1) A complete adjustment was to be reached defining the respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. (2) Turkey was to recognise the right of Great Britain to undertake, in the future as in the past, the duty of lighting, buoys, and policing the Persian Gulf. (3) The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be at Basra, and no railway was to be continued beyond Basra in the direction of the Persian Gulf without the consent of the British Government. (4) There was to be a settlement of the long-standing difficulties concerning the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and the future control of the port of Basra. (5) A final settlement was to be concluded in regard to the Turco-Persian frontier. (6) The time-honoured British rights of navigation on the rivers of Mesopotamia were to be confirmed and extended. (7) Differential treatment on all railways in Asiatic Turkey was to be precluded by express treaty stipulation. (8) Two British

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\* See, *inter alia*, 'The Times' of May 17, 1913, and the 'National Review' of August 1913.

representatives, agreeable to the British Government, were to be admitted to the Board of the Bagdad Railway Company.

Hakki Pasha arrived in London to negotiate on this basis early in 1913. Rapid progress was made in the ensuing months; and, when the negotiations had reached an advanced stage, Turkey intimated that she wished to obtain our assent to the creation of further sources of revenue, in the shape of consumption taxes and municipal *octroi* dues. The British Government agreed to extend the basis of negotiation as desired, provided that various outstanding questions, in which our interests were closely involved, were simultaneously settled. These included the ratification of the Aden boundary agreement of 1905; the regularisation of the legal position of British institutions (religious, educational, and medical) in Turkey; the acceptance of the general principle that all irrigation works in Mesopotamia, other than the very considerable sections for which British firms alone had already tendered, should be put up to open tender; the reduction of the Turkish light dues levied upon shipping; a settlement in regard to the oil concessions of the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad, in certain fields in the caza of Ajloun (south of Lake Tiberias) and in the Farsan Archipelago; the settlement, by arbitration, of a large number of British pecuniary claims; the removal of the Turkish veto on the borrowing powers of Egypt; and, finally, the prolongation from 1950 till 1999 of the concession of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, together with the grant of extensions of the line (amounting in all to 200 miles) and of rights of navigation on Lakes Eghirdir and Beyshehir.

What were the reasons which led to the inclusion of the first four points we have enumerated as British conditions for assenting to the customs increase (p. 517)? They are to be sought in the historical position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, which is thus eloquently described in a paper, too little known, by Mr T. J. Bennett, entitled 'The Past and Present Connection of England with the Persian Gulf':\*

'If England has become, in any sense, the arbiter and

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\* 'Journal of the Society of Arts,' June 13, 1902.



guardian of the Gulf, it has not been through a restless ambition urging her on to the control of the waste places of the earth, but in obedience to the calls that have been made upon her in the past to enforce peace between warring tribes, to give a free course to trade, to hold back the arm of the marauder and the oppressor, to stand between the slave-dealer and his victim. . . .

'In the case of England and the Persian Gulf the position is unique; for, although England has at no time enjoyed or even asked for territorial acquisitions in those regions, she has for generations borne burdens there which no other nation has ever undertaken anywhere, except in the capacity of Sovereign; she has had duty thrust upon her without dominion; she has kept the peace amongst people who are not her subjects; has patrolled, at intervals, waters over which she has enjoyed no formal lordship; has kept, in strange ports, an open door through which the traders of every nation might have as free access to distant markets as her own.'

Turkey, on the other hand, never exercised an effective influence on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and on the waters of that sea relied in the past exclusively on British armed assistance. Thus, throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century the East India Company's ships assisted the Pasha of Bagdad in his operations against the Arabs above and below Basra; in 1774 British-built vessels were supplied for the Pasha, who, finding himself unable to man them, called upon the British Resident to employ them as he might think best for Turkish interests; in 1778 the British aided by naval action in regaining for Turkey the town of Basra from the Persians; and in 1798, when the Sultan of Oman had prepared to prosecute by force a pecuniary claim against the Pasha of Bagdad, the Ottoman authorities besought the good offices of the British Resident, and in the end the matter was amicably adjusted at Bushire. It is the simple truth that the commercial prosperity of Bagdad and Basra during the past three centuries, and their whole maritime trade, were built up and maintained through British enterprise and sacrifice.

The attitude of successive British Governments for over forty years before the outbreak of the present war was based upon the contention that, prior to Midhat

Pasha's expedition to Nejd in 1871, which resulted in the establishment of one or two isolated military posts in the coast regions of El Hasa and El Katr, there were on the Arabian coast no symbols of Turkish authority, no Turkish jurisdiction, effective or ineffective, south or east of Ojeir; and the influence which existed between Ojeir and Koweit was ineffective and frequently interrupted. 'At Koweit,' wrote Sir Lewis Pelly in 1863, 'the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte is merely nominal; the Arabs acknowledge the Turks as we do the 39 Articles, which all accept and none remember.' Yet Turkey laid claim to Muscat in 1870 and 1879, to Bahrein on repeated occasions, and to the whole of Arabia in 1874, 1883, and 1902—pretensions which the British Government always contested. Nevertheless, the region of El Katr henceforth became a favourite resort of the Arab pirates, and British naval forces were repeatedly thwarted in their efforts to capture them owing to the connivance of Turkish officials. At the end of 1910, moreover, Turkish encroachments against the British *de facto* position at the head of the Gulf had become so serious that peremptory remonstrances had to be addressed to the Ottoman authorities, and it became essential to get our position recognised *de jure*.

It was in such circumstances that the recognition of our position *de jure* was made a principal object of our negotiations with Hakki Pasha. The British definition of the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf was accepted in all essential details; and Turkey agreed in substance to all the other points laid down by the British Government in 1912 as enumerated above. She abandoned her pretensions to suzerainty over the peninsula of El Katr and adjacent regions. Great Britain recognised the nominal suzerainty of the Porte over Koweit, which, with the adjacent territory and islands claimed by the Sheikh, was to be an autonomous kaza of the Ottoman Empire; and Turkey undertook not to interfere with the internal affairs of the Sheikh and his subjects, and to recognise the validity of the conventions concluded by the Sheikh with the British Government, giving us, *inter alia*, control of his foreign relations, and preventing him from alienating any portion of his territory without our consent. A writer of recognised authority, in the

'National Review' of August 1913, expressed the opinion that the compromise reached left us in a solid position at Koweit, and that there were other undertakings which gave us all we required. It appears, however,—and this, having regard to the innate propensity of Turkish officials to intrigue, was indeed an unfortunate concession on our part—that we agreed to a Turkish agent residing at Koweit. Although the agent was expressly debarred from any intervention other than the protection of the interests of Ottoman subjects from other parts of the Empire, the arrangement was, we apprehend, but too likely to give rise to local friction. On the other hand, provision was made to secure both the Sheikh of Koweit and his friend, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, in the undisturbed enjoyment of their valuable date properties on the Turkish bank of the Shatt-el-Arab. Generally speaking, the Koweit settlement appears to have been satisfactory.

The future of the Shatt-el-Arab presented a formidable problem. This was due to its importance as the approach to Basra; to its peculiar status, which is *sui generis* amongst inter-state rivers inasmuch as the whole waterway is admittedly *de jure* within Turkish limits, while the Sheikh of Mohammerah has always exercised a *de facto* jurisdiction on its waters; to the complicated tribal conditions on its banks; and to its complex and ever-changing physical conditions, both above and below its junction with the Persian River Karun. To deal with this involved situation, and with the anticipated development of traffic on the river with the advent of the Bagdad Railway, Turkey agreed to the institution of a Riverain Commission with a Turkish façade and British control. The Commission was to be empowered to levy dues on all vessels entering the river; but this, in view of the Capitulations, could only be done by agreement with the Powers concerned, and it was one of the points necessarily dealt with in direct negotiation between England and Germany.

We cannot trace, even in bare outline, the satisfactory settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier (extending over 700 miles from Mount Ararat to the Gulf) which had been in dispute since Sultan Murad concluded his first treaty with Shah Sefi in 1639—an instrument which

certainly failed to justify its designation in the preamble as 'happy leaves, a nosegay plucked from the thornless garden of concord and tied by the hands of the plenipotentiaries of the two great States into articles of amity and friendship.' Nor can we deal at length with the question of navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates. Great Britain had possessed, ever since the reign of Charles I, special privileges on these rivers; but, from 1845, the Ottoman authorities had persistently adopted an obstructive attitude in regard to our interests. By the settlement the whole control of navigation, including the requisite measures of river conservancy which were specially desirable in view of the wasteful irrigation methods of the Arabs, was to be placed in British hands. The existing British navigation company was to be confirmed in the privileges which it had enjoyed, including the right to fly the British flag. A new Turkish company was to be formed, under the chairmanship of Lord Inchcape, to take over the existing Turkish navigation company, with power to add indefinitely to its fleet of vessels. Fifty per cent. of the share capital in the new Turkish company, with a casting vote, was to be British. The remainder of the capital was to be subscribed by the Turkish Government without power of alienation, except as regards 20 per cent., which was to be transferred to the Germans, in consideration of the immediate surrender by the latter of their navigation rights under the Bagdad Railway Convention of 1903 and of their agreement to British participation in the construction of the ports of Bagdad and Basra (as will presently appear).

So much for the arrangements with Turkey. They were, of necessity, followed by negotiations between London and Berlin. These negotiations, which began in May 1913, reached a conclusion in June 1914. The substance of the arrangements arrived at was as follows. Great Britain undertook not to oppose the Bagdad Railway system, which was carefully defined. Germany undertook not to oppose British control of the navigation of Mesopotamian rivers. Germany and Great Britain both undertook to use their best endeavours to secure the due execution of an arrangement between the Bagdad Railway Company and the Porte providing that the terminus of the line should be at Basra, that there should

be two British directors on the Bagdad Railway, and that the construction and exploitation of ports at Bagdad and Basra should be carried out by a separate company. British interests were to have a 40 per cent. participation in this company. Both Governments undertook to prevent any discrimination in treatment on the railways or waterways of Asiatic Turkey. The German Government bound themselves in no circumstances, except by agreement with Great Britain, to support the establishment of any port or railway terminus on the Persian Gulf. They also recognised, by agreeing to the levy, by the proposed Riverain Commission, of dues on German ships, the special position of Great Britain on the Shatt-el-Arab. The British Government bound themselves not to support the establishment of any railway in direct competition with the Bagdad Railway. A line from Egypt to the Gulf, and lines as feeders for the river navigation, were expressly stated not to be in direct competition.

Simultaneously negotiations were carried on by Germany and France (who had obtained from Russia the reversion of some of the railway rights secured exclusively to Russian subjects by the 'Black Sea Basin' agreement of 1900) in regard to their respective railway interests, and a complete agreement seems to have been virtually reached. On June 18, 1914, Sir E. Grey stated in the House of Commons that the arrangements of Great Britain both with Turkey and Germany were complete, but they were dependent upon the conclusion of negotiations then proceeding between Turkey and Germany; and these latter were not concluded when the European war broke out.

The Bagdad Railway was a *damnosa hæreditas*, which was due as much to a lack of imagination and effective organisation on the part of our business community in the eighties and nineties of the last century, as it undoubtedly was to mistaken policy in those critical years on the part of the British Government. Whatever judgment may eventually be passed on Sir E. Grey's administration of our general foreign policy, our narrative has, we trust, made it clear that in the Bagdad Railway settlement his action was necessarily limited to saving the wreckage. He was hampered by the existence of

the Convention of 1903; and he was constrained, in determining our attitude, to take into constant consideration the interests of France and Russia as well as our own. He succeeded in securing recognition of our time-honoured position at the head of the Persian Gulf and on the Arabian coast in a manner which made it no longer possible for Turkey—whether *proprio motu* or at the bidding of another—to fasten a quarrel upon us at a moment of her own choosing.

Apart from the varied political objects which were locally secured—objects which had been a first aim of our policy in those regions for a long period of years—the settlement would have resulted in substantial advantages to British industry and trade. As regards railway development, our freedom of action in negotiation was indeed seriously handicapped by existing conventions and established rights, but, notwithstanding this, the mileage of the only existing British railway was to be increased by over 50 per cent., its concession was to be prolonged till 1999, and other points of importance were to be finally arranged. An opening was also foreshadowed for British railway enterprise on a minor scale (as feeders for the river navigation) in the delta of the Euphrates and Tigris; here, in the great scheme of irrigation, a fair field was assured to British contractors, who moreover were secured in prior rights to carry out works involving in cost many millions of pounds; in the navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia British enterprise would have taken a dominating part. In the construction of the ports of Bagdad and Basra British participation was provided for, notwithstanding the practical German monopoly of 1903; in the development of the extensive oil fields of Bagdad and Mosul, and in the smaller fields of Ajloun and the Farsan islands, British interests would have had the principal share; a large number of British pecuniary claims were to be submitted to arbitration; and discrimination against British or Indian merchandise was to be permanently excluded on all railways in Asiatic Turkey.

The subject of this article, covering as it does a period of over half a century, is so vast that we cannot here enter even into the essential details of Ottoman finance with which the progress of the Bagdad Railway is



closely related; but we have, in the course of our enquiry, made it a principal aim to examine all the relevant statistics, the annual reports on the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, and the financial rearrangements which resulted from the loss of territory and revenue sustained by Turkey in 1913 owing to the first Balkan War. We will confine ourselves to stating that in 1899 the kilometric guarantees had involved an annual charge of T900,000*l.*, while in 1913 that charge had fallen to T238,000*l.*, in spite of an increase in the interval of 600 miles in the railways under kilometric guarantees. Our deduction, in which we have obtained expert concurrence, is that for several years before the outbreak of the present war it was always practically certain, so far as finance was concerned, that the railway would be completed as far as Bagdad by the autumn of 1915 at the latest, even without Turkey's available revenues being augmented by raising the customs duties. The engineering obstacles between Konia and Aleppo would in due course have been overcome; the long stretch of desert between Aleppo and Mosul would have been crossed; and all would then be ready for starting upon the remunerative branch to Khanikin and the sections between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Withdrawal of British opposition could at the most only have advanced the completion of the undertaking so far as Bagdad by a few months.

The conclusion is that, in all the circumstances, a negative attitude, at any rate after 1910, in regard to negotiation with Turkey and Germany concerning the Bagdad Railway and cognate questions, would have been justified upon one hypothesis, and one only—that the balance of probability was so great as to amount to certainty that Germany was determined to carry out her great attack on her European neighbours even before she could complete the Bagdad Railway. There is evidence now that she was all the time planning this, but what is now almost certain was then problematical; and the immediate problem was to render the Bagdad Railway, not indeed free of menace to British interests—for this immunity could not have been secured at that late stage by negotiators however capable—but as innocuous as possible before the enterprise had been brought single-handed to a practical completion, when the German

attitude would undoubtedly have hardened, and less favourable terms could have been obtained. Negotiation with Turkey and complete abstention from negotiation with Germany would manifestly have been an unpractical course, since matters were involved in which it was essential to British interests that the British Government should secure, *valeant quantum*, certain assurances of acquiescence and of renunciation directly from the German Government and not through third parties.

No doubt a powerful incentive to negotiate with Germany was the ardent desire of the British Government either to reach a settlement of all outstanding difficulties, provided it in no way conflicted with our policy of continued friendship to France and Russia, or, failing a complete settlement, to remove particular causes of trouble and, to that extent, to diminish the danger of a rupture. But this motive, however cogent, appears to us to have been merely contributory, and not the really operative and governing consideration, which undoubtedly was the conviction that a settlement of the Bagdad Railway and cognate questions could no longer be delayed without irreparable prejudice to our position in the Persian Gulf and to our long-standing commercial interests in S.W. Persia and Mesopotamia. Our object was thus apparently a twofold one, to treat Germany fairly, but above all to safeguard British interests so far as circumstances still permitted.

While it seems certain that to neglect or abstain longer from negotiations such as took place from 1911 to 1914 would have been to imperil still further the British position at a threatened and vulnerable point; that the only alternative course—though surely one open to grave if not insuperable objections—to secure that position was to maintain that the construction of the Bagdad Railway would be a hostile act; and that, in the main, and having regard to the element of actual possession which the Germans were engaged upon turning rapidly to account, the negotiations were conducted with some technical skill,\* not without continual reference to the expert

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\* 'It is just to admit that on our side these negotiations were conducted with extraordinary patience, with very great zeal and sincerity, and with an almost unrivalled familiarity with the details of the difficult

knowledge of our officers in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and with a measure of apparent success in the British interest—still we must be held to reserve all expression of opinion upon the omission, while negotiations which we admit to have been necessary were in progress, to provide adequately by land as well as by sea against the cataclysm which eventually supervened in Europe. Our principal object, however, is not to criticise or defend the policy adopted by successive Governments in this country towards the Bagdad Railway problem; rather it is to state the material facts fairly, and thus, while not hesitating to express our own conclusions where we felt justified in so doing, to leave the reader in a fair position to judge for himself and draw his own inferences.

The negotiations between England and Germany, according to all outward signs, were conducted with candour and friendliness on both sides, and appeared in the summer of 1914 to be making excellent progress. The question has since been mooted, how far the German negotiators in London were in the counsels of their Government and acted with 'permissible dishonesty,' according to the accepted German code. No final answer can be offered; but no evidence has been produced that either Prince Lichnowsky or Herr von Kühlmann, his Counsellor of Embassy, who, it is understood, took the leading part in the details of negotiation, sympathised either with the Bernhardi or with the Bülow school, even on motives of expediency.

We have been furnished by a trustworthy informant with the account of a conversation with a very prominent German, which took place in this country in the spring of 1914, and was recorded at the time. The subject of discussion had drifted to the apparent improvement in Anglo-German relations in recent years; to the disquieting press polemics between Berlin and St Petersburg; and to the tragic possibility of all the elaborate negotiations—the Potsdam agreement, the suggested Anglo-German settlement, and the impending adjustments between France and Germany in regard to the Turkish

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questions involved. If the Foreign Office erred, it was not through lack of laborious work, for I doubt whether any highly technical and often obscure issues were ever handled with greater knowledge or attention to detail.—*Vide* 'Asiaticus,' in the 'National Review,' March 1915.

railway question—ending in smoke through the outbreak of a European war. ‘War,’ said the German, ‘is possible, for it cannot be denied that there are influences which make for war. But we have no need for war. Bismarck always looked on war not as an end but as a means of policy, and we have no advantage to seek necessarily through war. For what is the situation? Russia is too large, and cannot hold together; it may take twenty years, but she will “disrupt.” France is administratively rotten, and M. — will not long be out of power. As for you—well, I will be quite frank—you are commercially decadent, and we can secure all we want by commercial penetration. Your banking system is stable but not progressive—“fest aber stillstehend.” As for your electrical industry, you need merely ride on a ‘bus to the Mansion House, and you will see your dependence on the A.E.G. You go to Australia, and you will learn that metals are controlled by the “Big Five.” Where is your English dye industry? How is it that German locomotives are now being ordered for British railways, that German enterprise has supplanted British in Russia, in Italy, and elsewhere, and that essential industries are passing into German hands even in your own colonies and dependencies? It is that in England the young man with brains and no capital finds it harder to get on than in Germany. Mere brains are certainly at a discount in England. You have freedom here, but not organisation; modern commerce requires elaborate organisation *at home*, the best brains and sustained cooperation in every branch. No! —Bismarck would have been opposed to war.’

## Art. 13.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

AFTER the battle of Messines (June 7), there followed a period of comparative calm on the British front in the West, which was undisturbed by any important event until the end of July. It was a period of preparation on both sides for changing the scene of the principal operations, in which the capture of the Messines—Wyttschaete ridge was a preliminary step. British troops and guns, withdrawn from the St Quentin—Arras front, were brought up on General Plumer's left, prolonging the line from the Menin road to the neighbourhood of Boesinghe. A French corps, under the command of General Anthoine, occupied the space between the British left flank and the inundations which cover the Belgian front from the region of Noordschote to Nieuport; while the line between Nieuport and the sea was taken over by a British force. These dispositions did not escape the observation of the Germans, who responded by drafting large reinforcements into Flanders, with the result that, by the end of July, the Allied and German armies were concentrated in great strength in the region round Ypres.

In the mean time the enemy had snatched a local success in the sector adjoining the coast, where the positions held by our troops north-west of Nieuport formed a bridgehead on the further bank of the Yser, facilitating an advance along the causeway of the Dunes, between the inundations and the sea. The purpose of the German enterprise was to deprive us of this advantage, by throwing our advanced detachments back across the river. After an intense bombardment, which lasted twenty-four hours, the attack, embracing the front from Lombartzyde to the sea, was delivered at 7.45 a.m. on July 10. The defences on the Dunes, in front of the German right wing, had been completely levelled, and the bridges over the canal demolished, by the artillery fire. The defenders, consisting of two battalions, deprived of cover and cut off from support, fought with great gallantry; but they were ultimately overpowered. In front of Lombartzyde the German left wing, after gaining a momentary advantage, was driven back to its own lines by a counter-attack; and subsequent attempts in this locality, on July 14 and 19, met with no better success.

The partial success which attended the operation appears to have been due, in a great measure, to the weather—wind and mist having prevented our aircraft from performing their functions for the preceding three days. An undiscovered change in the disposition of the German artillery during this period would account for our counter-battery work being less effective than usual, while a strong on-shore wind appears to have prevented the monitors from taking part in the action. The position itself had certain obvious disadvantages. Entrenchments in the sand of the Dunes were especially ill-adapted to resist artillery; and, as the front trenches were only six hundred yards from the canal, the depth was insufficient either to accommodate the reserves on the north bank, or to cover the bridges. The Germans, on the other hand, had the advantage of attacking on a narrow front, with their flanks protected by the inundations and the sea, which enabled them to make the most of a comparatively small force.

For some days before the opening of the new Allied offensive the Germans were aware that an attack was impending. From July 24 onwards the Berlin reports referred daily to the artillery duel, which 'ragged day and night with an intensity never hitherto reached,' and to frequent reconnoitring thrusts by British troops in several sectors of the Flanders front. But, as at Messines, the varying intensity of the bombardment kept the enemy in doubt as to the time of the attack;\* and they appear to have been taken by surprise when our troops sprang to the assault shortly before 4 o'clock on the morning of July 31. The front of attack extended from La Basse Ville, on the Lys, to the neighbourhood of Steenstraate, on the Yser, a distance of some fifteen miles; while the French advanced on a front of two miles, including Steenstraate. In the centre and left centre British divisions penetrated the hostile positions to a depth of two miles, and secured the crossings of the River Steenbeek, their final objectives. Two powerful defensive systems were captured, comprising the villages of Verlorenhoek, Frezenberg, St Julien, and Pilkem, as

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\* On this subject see the 'Quarterly Review' for July, pp. 256, 257.



well as many strongly defended farms, woods, and organised localities. In the right centre, obstinate resistance was encountered in the difficult country adjoining the Menin road, with the result that progress was less satisfactory; but all the first objectives were gained, including Hooze village and Sanctuary Wood, and, before evening, our troops had fought their way into Westhoek. On the right, La Basse Ville and Hollebeke were captured before noon, and all the objectives south of the Zillebeke—Zandvoorde road were attained.

On the extreme left the French forced the passages of the Yser, captured Steenstraate, and, advancing rapidly, gained their appointed objectives early in the day. Not content with this achievement, they continued their advance, and, having captured Bixschoote and the positions to the south, east, and west, on a front of nearly three miles, established a strong defensive flank covering the left of the British line.\*

Except in the sector roughly defined by the roads to Menin and Roulers, the results of the day's fighting fulfilled, and in some parts surpassed, expectations. But the continuance of the offensive was precluded by the rain, which had begun to fall during the afternoon, and continued almost without intermission for many days. Streams overflowed their banks, shell-craters were quickly flooded, and the battlefield soon became a quagmire, in places waist-deep in mud. In these circumstances movement of any kind became well-nigh impracticable. On the other hand, the Germans, having been driven back beyond the crater-field, were on ground which was relatively little affected by the weather. Moreover, their infantry was closely supported by the artillery, whereas ours had left the guns far behind. The difficulty of entrenching, and of keeping our troops supplied with food and ammunition, enhanced the embarrassment of the situation, even from the defensive point of view.

The Germans did not fail to make use of their advantages. They directed their efforts chiefly to the defence of the front east and north-east of Ypres, where, from the first, their resistance had been most obstinate. The reason for their solicitude in this quarter may readily

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\* On July 31 the Allied army captured 6000 prisoners, and a few guns.

be discerned by a cursory glance at the topography of the region. It has been observed that the capture of the Messines ridge was a preliminary step to the new offensive. It gave us possession of a formidable artillery position, from which the enemy had commanded all the ground in the Ypres basin, and a footing on the southern portion of an elevated tract which extends, with slight fluctuations of level, through Veldhoek, Passchendaele, and Westroosebeke, affording positions from which guns can flank an advance towards Poelcappelle and the Forest of Houthulst, while, on the other side, it commands the lower country towards Menin and Roulers. The western slopes of the ridge are interspersed with woods, farms, and villages, which provide useful pivots for the defence of the region.

These considerations, together, no doubt, with the relative immunity of the rising ground from the effects of the persistent rainfall, caused the operations, after the first day, to become concentrated in the area east and north-east of Ypres; the British striving to follow up their initial success, and the Germans struggling to hold them back, and to recover the more important of their lost positions. During the first half of August, besides minor operations, the enemy delivered ten attacks in this district, only one of which met with any success. This was on the day after the battle, when our troops, not having had time to establish themselves, were forced to vacate St Julien, and to withdraw to the western outskirts of Westhoek. The former village was recovered two days later. On the other hand, our line was advanced appreciably on three occasions. On Aug. 10 Westhoek was recaptured, and a footing was gained in Glencorse Wood. A more important operation, embracing the front from the Menin road to the French left, resulted, on Aug. 16, in the capture of Langemarke, and the occupation by our Allies of the tongue of land between the Yser and the lower reach of the Steenbeek, including the Driegrachten bridge-head, at the confluence. The advance north of the Menin road was again strongly opposed; and the fighting, which continued till nightfall, made no material change in the situation. Better success attended the next attack in this locality, on Aug. 22, when, after a fierce and prolonged struggle, our front

was carried forward about five hundred yards on a front of one mile, and the western portion of Inverness Copse was occupied.

An improvement in the weather made it possible to resume operations on a large scale on Sept. 20. The preparatory bombardment followed the lines which are already familiar. The attack was launched at 5.40 a.m., on a front of about eight miles, extending from the Comines Canal to the Ypres—Staden railway. The ground had only dried superficially, and the advance was much impeded by bogs, and by the all-pervading shell-craters, flooded by the prolonged rainfall, between which narrow causeways afforded insecure foothold. Rain had fallen again throughout the night, but the sky cleared in the course of the morning, enabling the aircraft to fulfil their customary rôle. In the first stage of the battle progress was made against strong opposition in Shrewsbury and Herenthage woods; Inverness Copse, and Glencorse and Nonne woods were completely occupied; and, further north, Potsdam, Gallipoli, and the intermediate farms were captured. In the second stage the troops reached their final objectives for the day, comprising Tower Hamlets, Veldhoek, the western portion of Polygon Wood, the hamlet of Zevenkote, and Wurst, Quebec, and Rose farms.\* During the five days' interlude which ensued, the enemy made repeated and determined attempts to recover the high ground about Veldhoek, and the Tower Hamlets spur, which projects thence in the direction of Zandvoorde. When the battle was resumed, on Sept. 26, the most obstinate resistance was encountered on this portion of the front, the struggle being especially severe on the north of the Menin road. By the close of the day our troops were in possession of their appointed objectives, including the Tower Hamlets spur and strong works on the eastern slope, Polygon Wood, with the system of trenches on the east, Zonnebeke, and an area half a mile in depth between that village and the St Julien—Gravenstafel road. During the rest of September the Germans made repeated but fruitless attacks upon the commanding positions between

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\* Quebec and Rose farms are, respectively,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles E.S.E., and 1 mile E. of Langemarek.

the Menin road and the north-western corner of Polygon Wood.

Minor operations have taken place on other portions of the British front, of which the most important have been in the Lens sector, where the Germans have made strenuous efforts to stem our encircling advance. After the engagements of the latter part of June, which carried our troops into the southern and western outskirts of the town, and gave them a footing in Avion, there was a comparative lull until Aug. 15, when an attack south-east and east of Loos gained possession of the entire German first-line system on a front of two miles, and reached Cité St Laurent. On this occasion the famous Hill 70, which had proved untenable by either army since the battle of Loos (September 1915), fell into our hands. The enemy resisted vigorously, and for ten days the fighting was exceptionally severe; but our troops, while maintaining their positions, extended their new front by gaining ground to the south-west of St Laurent.

Intermittent fighting, which deserves passing notice, has also taken place before the Hindenburg line on the front Villeret—Lempire, where the objective is the high ground south-west of Le Catelet, which commands an extensive view over the surrounding country, especially in an easterly direction. The Malakoff and Cologne farms, lying respectively 2000 and 1200 yards due north of Villeret, are situated on the western slopes of the ridge, which attains its maximum elevation one mile east of Malakoff Farm, at a height of 500 feet above sea-level. A mile and a half north of Malakoff Farm, and somewhat nearer to Lempire, Gillemont Farm stands on the watershed.\*

Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops occupied Lempire on April 6, and Villeret ten days later; but no further move of importance took place until Aug. 19, when they captured the positions about Gillemont Farm, and established themselves on the crest of the ridge. Fighting continued with fluctuating success till the end of the

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\* Lempire is shown on the map published in the 'Quarterly Review' for April last. Villeret, which lies three miles south-by-east from Lempire, is indicated by a circle, but not named. The unnamed circle between Villeret and Ronsoy indicates the position of Hargicourt.

month, when the enemy, after repeated efforts, recovered an isolated knoll north of the farm. The Cologne and Malakoff positions were carried on Aug. 26; a success which was supplemented, a few days after, by the capture of a line of trenches extending southwards to the latitude of Villeret.

Throughout July, and the first half of August, the Germans continued their attacks on the Chemin des Dames ridge, varied by an occasional thrust on the Moronvillers heights, their object being, apparently, to wear down the resistance of the French, and to prevent them from embarking on operations in other quarters. On several occasions they gained slight advantages, which were generally reversed by our Allies' spirited counter-attacks; and when, ultimately, the Germans found it expedient to turn their attention to other regions, the situation which existed at the beginning of their offensive was practically unchanged. The attempt to exhaust or immobilise the French reserves was a complete failure. While General Anthoine was co-operating with our armies on the Yser, General Fayolle, on Aug. 20, opened a fresh offensive at Verdun, on a front of nearly twelve miles, lying athwart the Meuse from the Bois d'Avocourt to Bezonvaux. At the close of the operations his left wing, having captured the dominating heights known as Hill 304, the Mort Homme, and the Côte de l'Oie, lay not far south of the Forges Brook; and the right wing, continuing the line north of Samogneux, touched the southern outskirts of Beaumont, and passed within a short distance of Ornes. Verdun, and the railways in rear of it, were no longer exposed to bombardment by the German howitzers. More than 8000 prisoners were taken during the operations.

There is little that is new to be deduced from the operations in Flanders, so far as their details are publicly known. The Germans have developed their system of defence on the lines indicated in the last article—that of invisibility, rather than of material strength. Continuous lines of entrenchment, and, so far as is possible, objects and outlines which would provide an easy target for artillery, or a well-defined objective for infantry

attack, have been eliminated. As the first-line trenches quickly disappear under the bombardment which precedes an attack, the advanced troops now take cover in shell-craters, in the adaptation of which, for purposes of shelter and defence, they display ingenuity. The positions in rear, which extend to a great depth, comprise isolated and irregular lengths of trench, designed for mutual support; and woods, villages and farms are utilised as tactical pivots, the buildings being demolished—should the artillery not have already done that service—to diminish their value as targets, and to obtain better concealment among the ruins. The blockhouse or 'pill-box'\* is ubiquitous, being concealed in the débris of woods and villages, or distributed, suitably disguised, in the open, and arranged in groups designed for mutual defence. These structures, with their armament of machine-guns, proved to be the most formidable obstacle to an attack, on account of their great strength, which renders them proof against anything but the direct impact of large shells, and their small size, which makes them a difficult target at the normal range of big guns.

These are some of the expedients devised by the Germans to impede and disorganise the attacking troops, and thus to prepare the way for the counter-attack, which remains the principal weapon of the active defence.† They cannot be said to have been altogether ineffective; for the local attacks undertaken during the earlier part of the interval between the two battles produced considerable results, and were relatively costly. But the experience thus gained suggested means for countering them; and, when subjected to the test of a general attack, the new system of defence proved by no means impregnable.

Profiting by the lessons learnt in previous battles, the Germans, at the first symptom of an attack in force, withdrew their heavy artillery beyond the probable

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\* Referred to in the last number of the 'Quarterly Review,' in connexion with the operations on the Arras front. They are formed of concrete, reinforced by steel girders. Height of chamber about 8 feet; walls 5 feet thick. Sunk into the ground for half their height. Machine-guns fire from loopholes at the minimum height affording a good field of fire.

† The disposition of reserves for counter-attacks followed the lines described in the 'Quarterly Review' for July, p. 262.





Heights in Metres.

[To face p. 536.]



range of the advance, with the result that, while they lost fewer guns, their counter-battery work has been even less effective than before. They also, throughout the operations, adopted the plan of changing frequently the position of batteries, in order to secure some immunity from the effect of our superiority in artillery; and instances have been reported of batteries being advanced to closer range after dark, and withdrawn to safer positions before daylight.

While the mud of Flanders has done us a disservice by delaying the operations, it has afforded some compensation by providing a refutation of the theory, which had gained some support, that the rifle has been superseded by the bomb and the machine-gun. The state of the ground often made it impossible to bring machine-guns into action, and interrupted the supply of bombs to the fighting-line. Under these conditions the rifle resumed its status as the premier arm of the infantry, a position which it may be expected further to vindicate if the present war of positions should, hereafter, give place to mobile warfare.

On Aug. 18 the Italians resumed on the Julian front the offensive which had been brought to a close, early in June, by the Austrian counter-stroke on the southern Carso. The front of operations extended from Auzza to the sea, a distance of about twenty-two miles. The preparatory bombardment was of great intensity but brief duration, lasting only twenty-four hours. Early in the operations the 3rd Army carried a strong position south-east of Dosso Fatti, occupied Selo, and made progress in the Brestovizza sector towards the northern slopes of Hermada; but its rôle was subsidiary to that of the 2nd Army, and was probably designed chiefly to prevent the enemy from drafting troops from the Carso to the principal scene of action, which lay north of Gorizia. On the night of Aug. 18-19, fourteen bridges were thrown across the Isonzo north of Anhovo; and the Italians, crossing in force, quickly seized the first hostile positions, which had been made untenable by the bombardment, and gained the edge of the Bainsizza plateau. On the left a Bersaglieri division, crossing above Canale, carried the heights overlooking Loga and

Bodrez, and fought its way towards Vrh; while the Florence Brigade, advancing across the Rohot, drove the enemy from their positions east of the valley. The range of heights culminating in the Jelenik summit, which formed the nucleus of the system for the defence of the plateau, withstood for some time the frontal attack from Anhovo, but ultimately succumbed to the outflanking movements on the north and south. The Bersaglieri division carried the heights of Frata and Sommer, and advanced southwards through Vrh; while the positions on the south were broken through on a broad front from the Rohot valley. Having captured the ridge, the Italians, pivoting on their right in the neighbourhood of Vodice, swept eastwards and southwards across the plateau, opposed only by Austrian rear-guards equipped with numerous machine-guns, and supported by light artillery.

For the moment it seemed as though the enemy's resistance had been broken. Monte Santo, being outflanked, fell on Aug. 24; and it appeared likely that San Gabriele, the main pivot of the enemy's defensive system north-east of Gorizia, would soon follow suit. On the 28th, however, the Italians found themselves in contact with a strong position on the Volnik ridge, which forms the eastern rim of the Bainsizza plateau. Here the Austrians were in force, having been joined by fresh troops lately arrived from the Russian front. The advance from the Isonzo had occupied ten days, an interval which General Boreovic had put to good account by reorganising his forces and preparing his system of defence. The slowness of the advance was probably due less to the opposition encountered than to the delay involved in passing over the river, and transporting across the roadless plateau, the heavy artillery, ammunition, and other supplies, including water, the local sources of which, naturally insufficient, are said to have been poisoned by the enemy.

In the circumstances above described, an immediate attack was not to be thought of. It would have been necessary to await the arrival of the heavy artillery, the preparation of emplacements for the guns, and the accumulation of a sufficient reserve of ammunition for a battle of the first order. The additional delay would

have been to the enemy's advantage. Further, it was known that the Ternova Forest was strongly fortified; and it could not be turned without first capturing the positions on the Volnik range.\*

It was probably for these reasons that General Cadorna decided to suspend the operations on the plateau, and to order a direct attack on San Gabriele from the direction of Monte Santo. Fighting had been in progress on the slopes of the mountain since the commencement of the offensive. The serious attack began to develop about Sept. 1; and three days later a general advance was made, embracing the slopes east and west of the summit. The centre, which advanced along the Veliki ridge, quickly reached its objective, but the wings did not make corresponding progress; and the situation of the troops on the summit, enveloped, as they were, on the east, south, and south-west, was, in consequence, precarious. After maintaining their position for ten days against heavy counter-attacks, they were forced by weight of numbers to withdraw from the summit; but the hostile advance was checked before the main position on the northern slopes of the mountain.†

While these events were proceeding north of Gorizia, the Austrians had made several attempts to create diversions on the Trentino front; and, on Sept. 5, they launched a counter-offensive in force on the Carso, between Castanavizza and the sea, which, after a momentary success in the region of Flondar, was repulsed at all points. The fighting gradually subsided on both sections of the Julian front, and at the end of September the situation outlined above was practically unchanged. During the operations the Italians captured over 30,000 prisoners, 145 guns, and a large quantity of material. The Austrians claim to have taken 20,000 prisoners.

The opening of the new campaigning season in Mesopotamia has been signalled by the crushing defeat

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\* The Vienna communiqués refer, at this period, to Italian attacks in various sectors of the position on the Bainsizza plateau, which, if the statements be true, may be regarded as demonstrations to conceal General Cadorna's real design.

† According to the Vienna statement, the Italians had been completely driven from the mountain four days previously, on the 8th.

of a Turkish force, under Ahmed Bey, at Ramadiyah.\* A column, moving out from Feluja, surprised the enemy's advanced troops on the Mushaid ridge, four miles east of Ramadiyah, at dawn on Sept. 28, and quickly drove them in. Continuing the advance, the infantry manoeuvred to the left, and, attacking obliquely from the south-east, carried the main position after severe fighting. By nightfall the enemy was surrounded on the east, south-east, and south; while the cavalry, by a wide movement, had reached the river west of Ramadiyah, intercepting the line of retreat. The Turks, having neglected to bridge the river, were thus completely hemmed in, and, after an ineffectual attempt to break through the cavalry cordon in the night, were forced to surrender.

The destruction of Ahmed Bey's force should have the effect of assuring the position of our main army north of Baghdad; for, although the Euphrates is not a probable line of operation for a large force, a comparatively small body of troops, of which his command may have been intended to form the nucleus, might cause embarrassment by threatening Baghdad from the west during the operations which are likely to take place hereafter in the region to the north. The Germans, naturally incensed at the loss of Baghdad, are reported to have been engaged in organising an expedition for its recovery, and to have sent Marshal von Falkenhayn to direct the movement, which, should it materialise, may be expected to develop in the area between the Tigris and the Diala. General Maude's skilful blow on the Euphrates is likely to have caused some dislocation of the marshal's plans, besides having a dispiriting effect on the Turks, already depressed by their defeats in last winter's campaign.

At the close of the fighting in Galicia and Bukowina in the late autumn of 1916, the front of the opposing armies lay roughly through Brody, Brzezany, Halicz, and Stanislau, continuing thence along the Czarna

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\* Ramadiyah is on the south bank of the Euphrates, 27 miles above Feluja (*vide* map published in the 'Quarterly Review' for April last). Our troops occupied Feluja on March 19.



Bistritz to the Pantyr Pass.\* The Russians held Brody, Stanislau, and the heights about the Pantyr Pass; while the Austro-German armies were in possession of Brzezany and Halicz. This situation was unchanged when, on July 1, our Allies took the offensive on a front extending from the Tarnopol—Lemberg railway to the heights south of Brzezany. In the course of six days' fighting, the 11th Army, on the right, made some progress in the region of the head-waters of the Strypa; but the 7th Army, on the left, was unable to make any permanent impression on the formidable positions covering Brzezany. South of the Dniester General Korniloff advanced with the 8th Army, on July 6, from the line of the Bistritz, and, by the 12th, had occupied the heights north of the Lomnitza from Halicz to Kalusz, including these towns, while his left wing had reached the river at many points above Kalusz. At this stage General Terstyansky, commanding the 3rd Austrian Army, having been reinforced by German troops, took the offensive, recaptured Kalusz, and pushed the Russians back across the Lomnitza.

The subsequent movements of Korniloff's army were governed mainly by the course of events north of the Dniester, where Böhm Ermolli (who had succeeded Count Bothmer in command of the Austro-German army-group), having also been reinforced, proceeded to take the offensive. The course of the operations was, however, determined less by the enemy's action than by the state of the Russian troops, who, permeated by revolutionary theories, and corrupted by German agents, refused to obey orders, and, in many instances, abandoned positions without even waiting to be attacked. The 11th Army fled incontinently towards Tarnopol, uncovering the flank of the 7th, which was obliged to conform to the movement. At this juncture Korniloff superseded Gutor in the command of the Russian army-group; and it was probably owing to his exertions that a temporary stand was made on the line of the Sereth.

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\* Maps which cover the theatre of operations were published in the 'Quarterly Review' for Oct. 1916 and Jan. 1917. The Lomnitza (shown, but not named on the map) rises near the Pantyr Pass, and falls into the Dniester at Halicz.

By the end of July, however, the Russians had retreated behind the frontier-river Zbrutz, where, after a few desultory actions, the hostile offensive came to an end.

The retreat of the 7th Army made it useless and dangerous for the 8th Army to attempt to maintain its isolated position south of the Dniester; and General Tcheremisoff, who succeeded Korniloff in the command, fell back rapidly, and in comparatively good order, towards the Bessarabian frontier, which he reached, after fighting two unsuccessful engagements in front of Czernowitz, about Aug. 4, thus coming into line with the armies north of the river. The effects of the *débâcle* in Galicia were still more far-reaching, for the Russians, to avoid being taken in flank, were forced to retire from the line of the Carpathians as far south as the Tolgyes Pass, and to abandon the whole of Bukowina.

In the meantime, presumably as part of the general plan of operations, General Scherbacheff had attacked von Rohr's 1st Austrian Army (formerly commanded by General von Gerok) in Moldavia. Here, also, the Russian troops behaved badly on various occasions; but the Rumanian armies, now reorganised and well supplied with munitions, fought with great gallantry in spite of the instability of their allies. The 2nd Army, under Avaresco, taking the offensive on July 24, defeated the Austrians in a series of engagements between the Trotus and Putna valleys, and drove them back nearly to the frontier, capturing some 5000 prisoners and 90 guns. Then Mackensen came to the assistance of his colleague, and, concentrating in the neighbourhood of Focsani, advanced against the passages of the (Moldavian) Sereth, which he failed to force, and up the valley towards Aguidu, the junction of the Trotus and Sereth valley railway lines, the capture of which would have cut Avaresco from his source of supplies. The situation was critical. The Russian General Staff, alarmed at the enemy's progress in Galicia, had ordered the transfer to that theatre of the 4th Army, which, posted north of Focsani, formed a link between the 1st and 2nd Rumanian armies; and when Mackensen, who mustered ten German and two Austrian divisions, with a powerful artillery, began his attack on Aug. 6, the movement had already

commenced. The Russians gave way; but the 2nd Rumanian Army arrived on the scene in time to retrieve the situation by a spirited onset. Baffled in his first attempt, the German Marshal concentrated more to his left, and, after again defeating the Russians, occupied Panciu, within fifteen miles of Agaidu; but his further advance was stopped by Avaresco, who, throwing back his left wing, barred the way.

The German General Staff, unwilling to accept defeat, ordered a third attempt, on a more formidable scale. Mackensen was again to advance, in conjunction with von Rohr, who was reinforced by two German divisions. The Russians being out of action, Avaresco, with his ten divisions, had to sustain the attack of twenty Austro-German divisions, with only such support as his colleague of the 1st Army, Christesco, could afford to give without endangering the line of the Sereth. Yet, after fierce fighting, which lasted nearly a fortnight, the enemy had to confess a complete failure. The limit of their advance was less than five miles, and the Rumanian front maintained its cohesion. Exhaustion, coupled, no doubt, with alarm at the Italian successes on the Isonzo, prevented the enemy from continuing the struggle. During the operations at least two hostile divisions had been removed from the Galician front, to the detriment of the enemy's position in that region.\*

The operations in Moldavia have been noticed in some detail because the gallant bearing of the Rumanian troops provides a bright spot in the otherwise gloomy panorama of events on the eastern front; and because they afford the only instance, in that theatre, of what can correctly be described as military operations. In no other quarter were the forces opposed to the enemy in a state admitting of strategical plans being carried into effect, or even of a tactical defence being maintained. There can be no doubt that it was Hindenburg's design to put the finishing touch on last year's campaign by completing the occupation of Rumania, and that he believed the Russian *débâcle* in Galicia would ensure the

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\* The Germans claim to have taken, between July 19 and Aug. 18, 42,000 prisoners, with 257 guns, 548 machine-guns, 50,000 rifles, and a large quantity of other material.

success of the enterprise. The retreat of the Russian armies in the Bukowina made the position of the Rumanians very difficult; and it is likely that, but for the firm front which their armies maintained against Rohr and Mackensen, the situation would have become extremely grave. Scherbacheff had two main lines of communication—the railway through Czernowitz and Suczawa, and thence down the valley of the Sereth; and the Bender-Jassy line, which joins the former at a point forty miles west of Jassy. After the loss of Czernowitz, he had only the Bender-Jassy route by which to obtain supplies; and the pressure to which it, and the lines through southern Russia, were subjected, must have been very great. In fact, there was an obvious possibility that the armies in Moldavia might fail through lack of ammunition and other supplies. Again, shortly after the fall of Czernowitz, the Archduke Joseph's left wing occupied the upper part of the Suczawa valley, the region east and south of Kimpolung, and the north-west corner of Moldavia, as far south as the Tolgyes Pass. Not only did its advance threaten to take in flank Scherbacheff's positions west of the Sereth, but its general front was within eighty miles of Jassy, and only half that distance from the junction of the railway from Jassy with the Sereth valley line, through which all his supplies had to pass. This critical situation was reached in the early days of August, at the time of Mackensen's first rebuff; but the Archduke was unable to make further progress with his left wing, possibly because it became necessary to send or divert reinforcements to Rohr and Mackensen.

While the Germans were glad enough to seize the opportunity offered by Brusiloff's breach of the 'truce' on the eastern front to reconquer Galicia and Bukowina, and to attempt to occupy Moldavia, they appear to have thought it expedient to exert pressure nearer Petrograd, with the idea that a threat to the capital might create a situation favourable to the conclusion of a separate peace. On Aug. 20 they made the first move on the Riga front, by advancing between Mitau and the coast, and driving the Russians back behind the river Aa on the west, and, on the south, as far as the southern

branch of the Dwina at Dahlen. On Aug. 31 von Hutier\* forced the passage at Ixkul (where, early in the month, the Russians had abandoned the bridgehead), and moved north to cut the railway from Petrograd. The Russians retreated precipitately, abandoning the north bank of the river as far east as Friederichstadt, and losing, according to the Berlin account, nearly 9000 prisoners and 325 guns. On Sept. 5 they halted on the line River Melupe—Segewold—Friederichstadt, the Germans contenting themselves with maintaining contact by means of light troops. The lull continued for a fortnight, after which the scene of action was transferred to Jacobstadt, where the Russian troops had shown signs of instability by abandoning, on Aug. 26, a section of the defences north-west of the town. An attack, delivered in this locality on Sept. 21, caused the Russians to retreat hurriedly behind the river, abandoning the town, and the bridge-head, which enclosed it on a front of twenty-five miles.

The immediate effect of the fall of Riga was to cause a political crisis, which, however, did not take the form which might have been expected. Successive Commanders-in-Chief had urged upon the Provisional Government the paramount necessity of enforcing discipline in the army, and among the railway and other establishments behind the front, but without avail. The Government was practically unmoved by the disasters in Galicia; and at the date of the Moscow Conference (Aug. 26) a series of recommendations drawn up by General Korniloff had not been adopted. Speaking at the Conference, he declared that the fall of Riga was imminent, and that Russia could only be saved by the complete regeneration of the army. His warning fell on deaf ears, so far as the majority were concerned; and the Government, being dominated by the Soviet, continued inactive. When, three days later, Riga fell, he appears to have become more insistent in his demands, and it was even stated that he ordered a force to march on Petrograd, to depose the Government. The accounts of what happened at this period are incomplete and conflicting, and the motives which inspired the chief

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\* Commanding the 8th German Army. He was opposed by the 12th Russian Army, which held the Dwina line below Friederichstadt.

actors can only be conjectured. But there is some ground for believing that it was at the instance of the Soviet, whose hostility or apprehension he had aroused, that Korniloff was proclaimed a traitor, and accused of aiming at making himself dictator.

The prospect of a military dictatorship caused more alarm than the disasters in Galicia and the fall of Riga. The Provisional Government, doubtless with the object of regularising its position, proclaimed a Republic, and placed the executive power in the hands of a council of five, in which General Verkovsky was Minister of War. The services of General Alexeieff were secured as Chief of the Staff, Kerensky retaining the nominal position of Commander-in-Chief. If Korniloff had any adherents in the army, they deserted him; and the self-appointed administrative bodies in various parts of the country declared their confidence in the new régime.

These measures seemed at first to convey at least a prospect of a firmer conduct of affairs, by an executive fortified somewhat against the malign influence of the Soviet, which had been mainly responsible for the disintegration of the army. The prospect was illusory. The Soviet is still supreme. General Verkovsky, in a report made after a visit to the front, declared himself opposed to the punishment of offences, and in favour of 'implanting ideas of discipline in the troops,' presumably by rhetorical means; and he announced his intention of removing all officers who were not in favour with the men. The system of soldiers' committees, devised by the Soviet, has been retained; and also that of commissioners\*—officials deputed by the Government to supervise the actions of the army commanders—whose presence with the army cannot be expected to conduce to the success of operations, or to enhance the prestige of the officers. Further, regulations concerning administrative matters, published by the political department of the Ministry of War, charged the commissioners with the task of 'establishing discipline in the army, on the basis of democratic revolutionary principles'; thus categorically

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\* 'Commissary' (the term commonly used in the newspapers, probably owing to mistranslation) denotes an official employed on the service of supply.



taking the duty of maintaining military discipline out of the hands of the officers, and transferring it to political theorists.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that General Alexeieff should again have tendered his resignation, having found his position intolerable. To make matters worse, nearly all the officers of note who had not resigned, together with their staffs, have been removed on account of their alleged reactionary principles. The Soviet, not content with having corrupted the body, has set itself to destroy the brain of the army; and if, by some miracle, the former should be restored to health, it would inevitably fail, when put to the test, for the want of officers experienced in the command of large forces, and of a trained staff.

The offensive in Galicia was evidently a loyal effort to give effect to a combined plan of operations which had been arranged among the Allies. The original intention was, probably, to operate along the whole front occupied by the Russian and Rumanian armies in Galicia and Moldavia. The movements on the various sections of the front, so far as they materialised, were probably carried out as intended. The first attack was made north of the Dniester, presumably with the object of threatening Lemberg, and, by drawing the German reserves in that direction, of facilitating the advance of the 8th Army, which would cut Böhm Ermolli's lines of communication. These enveloping movements, if successful, might be expected to result in the capture of Lemberg, and to open the routes over the Carpathians for the invasion of Hungary. The successive advance of the armies in Bukowina and northern Moldavia, which did not materialise, and of the Russo-Rumanian army-group south of the Trotus, would involve the German staff in serious difficulty, as their available troops would have been already set in motion to reinforce Böhm Ermolli and Terstyansky. Moreover, the most vulnerable part of the enemy's front would be attacked—it being held, for the most part, by Austrian troops—and that nearest the vital centres of Austria-Hungary, the weaker partner in the Central Alliance.

Large Russian forces, amply provided with munitions of every kind, and greatly outnumbering those opposed

to them, had been concentrated on the offensive front. They included the seasoned troops led by Brusiloff in last year's offensive, which had suffered least from the corrupting influences of the revolution and of German agents. It was doubtless hoped that their example would arouse the newly-formed units to action, and spur them to emulate their deeds; and they appear to have been detailed, with this object, to lead the attack. The initial success won by these troops was made abortive by the unsoldierly behaviour of those held in reserve, which, when ordered to reinforce the fighting line, refused to obey, or, in some cases, abandoned their positions without waiting to be attacked. Similar incidents occurred on the Riga front, where only a few isolated units attempted to resist the enemy's advance.

The misbehaviour of the bulk of the 'revolutionary army' has had other, and perhaps not less serious, results than the failure of the campaign, and the loss of the positions which had been won last year, at considerable cost, by the imperial armies. It has involved the sacrifice of the loyal nucleus, and of a vast number of officers, who fell in heroic attempts to lead their unstable troops into action—assets which would have been of incalculable value in the task of regenerating the army, if that difficult work should ever be seriously undertaken.

While the Russian army is a factor of uncertain value in the general situation, the utterances of M. Kerensky and other members of the Government leave no uncertainty as to their fixed determination to continue staunch to the Alliance. They, and, no doubt, all thinking and patriotic men in the country, not only recognise the obligation to carry Russia's part in the war to a successful conclusion, but are well aware that the ultimate victory of the Central Powers, or even a 'German peace,' would be no less disastrous to Russia than to her Allies. Thus, while the latter must still bear the brunt of the offensive war, Russia, by holding, with Rumania's assistance, some 140 Austro-German divisions on the eastern front, is rendering a very real service to the cause for which we and our Allies are fighting.

W. P. BLOOD.

